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This dissertation explores the challenges, especially those relating to education and to social 
marginalization, that are being faced every day by underprivileged migrant families residing in Hanoi, the 
capital of Vietnam.  It also reveals the coping mechanisms they must devise in order to stay afloat 
financially in a nation that is rapidly urbanizing and thereby changing at a dizzying speed.  Drawing 
primarily upon my interviews with and observations of migrant families and associated community 
members, and secondarily upon scholarly and governmental research, this study shows how these 
families’ survival strategies reveal those patterns of resource mobilization that are intimately linked to their 
social relations to, and ties with, others in the destination area.   
In the wake of the economy’s marketization that began in the mid-1980s, Vietnam has undergone 
massive social changes, including a vast upsurge in free migration, an increased bargaining power of 
cash, and rising levels of social segregation.  On the one hand, the advent of the market-oriented 
economy and nominal relaxation of the state controls over population mobility have opened up new paths 
down which migrants can pursue economic opportunities in their urban destinations, and have given 
people on the move some room for negotiation with the state.  On the other hand, their status as non-
permanent residents of Hanoi has continued to hinder them from gaining access to public services and 
government-sponsored care, equal to that enjoyed by their permanent-resident counterparts.   Perhaps 
the chief consequence of the latter adverse trend is that migrant children not meeting the financial and/or 
regulatory conditions that all students are expected to meet if they wish to enter mainstream, formal 
education are inclined to seek learning opportunities in the other sphere of alternative, informal education.  
Thus migrant families have essentially been trapped, socioeconomically, in the informal sector; they have 
little prospect of upward social mobility, and they are compelled to adopt a stance of self-reliance with 
respect to resource mobilization.  Then too, the everyday and governmental discourses that too often 
 
portray migrants as being disorderly at best and criminal at worst, and thus as constituting a deleterious 
social presence, have served not only to vindicate the state’s ongoing adherence to the preexisting 
household-registration system but to disguise its ineffectiveness at managing rural-urban migration and its 
failure to redress Vietnam’s ever-widening social inequalities and increasingly inequitable resource 
distribution.  The permeation of such discourse among the city residents, and its internalization by the 
migrants themselves, have only served to exacerbate the stigmatization and peripheralizing of migrants.   
Serving to at least somewhat counteract the latter negative trend is the migrants’ resourcefulness 
in settling into the city and forming social safety-nets, mutual-aid arrangements often based on sharing 
the same village of origin.  Unfortunately, the social solidarity of village-based relations often goes hand in 
hand with exclusivity and thus with discrimination against all those who fall outside the inner circles, 
thereby further distancing the migrants from the mainstream of city life.  Ultimately the study points to the 
need for some structural transformations in the Vietnamese government, changes reflective of the fact 
that migrants are not mere “social evils” but to the contrary, part and parcel of the state’s growth.  Only 
when such steps have been taken will the discourse about migrants shift from vilification to praise or even 
concern, and will Vietnamese society no longer be “transitional” because it has become inclusive and 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED 
Bui Doi Dust of Life.  The term is used to refer disparagingly not only to vagrants 
and roaming street-sellers but also to all of the rural migrant poor coming 
to work in Vietnam’s cities.  While a metaphorically alludes to their mobility 
and wanderings like “dust,” it also insinuates that they are unwanted in 
society.  
 
Com Binh Dan Literally meaning “working-class rice” and thus “popular meals,” com binh 
dan—inexpensive eateries that serve a variety of common local dishes, 
most of them consisting of rice, vegetables, soup, and a selection of 
meats.  
 
COSA The National Assembly’s Social Affairs Committee 
 
CPFC Committee for Population, Family and Children 
 
CPV Communist Party of Vietnam 
 
DOET Department of Education and Training 
 
Doi Moi Policy Renovation Policy.  Economic reforms initiated in Vietnam 1986, and 
marking its transition from a centralized command economy to a socialist-
oriented market economy.  
 
DOLISA Department of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Giao Duc Thuong 
Xuyen 
Continuing Education  
 
GSO General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
 
HEPR Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction (Recently renamed National 
Target Programmes (NTP))  
 
Ho Khau Household Registration 
 
ILO International Labour Organization 
 
Lang Nau Brown Village 
 
MOET Ministry of Education and Training 
 
MOLISA Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs  
 
NEZs New Economic Zones 
 
Nha Tro Lodging House 
 
Nha Que  Country Bumpkins 
 
NTP National Target Programmes (Previously called Hunger Eradication and 




OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 
SCUK Save the Children U.K. 
 
SEDS Socio-Economic Development Strategy 
 
So Do Red Book (Land Use Certificate) 
 
So Ho Khau Household Registration Booklet 
 
USD U.S. Dollars 
 
VLSS Vietnam Living Standards Survey 
 
VMS Vietnam Migration Survey 
 
VND Vietnam Dong.  At the time of my fieldwork in 2008-2010, the average 
exchange rate postulated that 1 USD was roughly equivalent to 17,000-
19,000 VND.  As of April 2014, 1 USD is equivalent of approximately 
21,000 VND. 
 
Xe Om  Motorcycle Taxi 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
Problem Statement 
This study explores how migrant families with school-age children, living in a low-income neighborhood of 
Hanoi, dynamically cope with their day-to-day and educational challenges within a set of constraints and 
opportunities established by market forces and governmental policies that affect migrants residing in 
urban destinations.  Since it began to transition to a market economy in 1986 the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam has undergone massive social changes, including a vast upsurge in free migration, increased 
bargaining power of cash, and rising levels of social segregation.  Despite the expansion of opportunities 
in the city and increased population mobility as a result of marketization, the state’s continued adherence 
to residence-based policies (which essentially bind one’s permanent residence to the location of one’s ho 
khau or household registration, and thereby one’s entitlement to available public services in that locality) 
has largely trapped migrants within the informal sector.  Within the education sector, the state’s decision 
to introduce market-oriented incentives to education delivery and services, even in the sphere of 
compulsory primary and junior secondary education, along with the proliferation of private, supplementary 
lessons and monetary gifts to schoolteachers, has not only resulted in growing financial burdens for 
individual households; it also has undermined the state’s professed commitment to universal access and 
equity in education.  Consequently, migrant families are left with the choice of either paying extra fees for 
their children to receive mainstream, formal education or of settling for a non-formal, basic education, 
often provided outside the purview of state services.  Moreover, the public discourse that often portrays 
migrants as a social burden, along with cultural presumptions underlying local residents’ discriminatory 
attitudes toward rural migrants, has led to their stigmatization and marginalization in the city.    
By looking at which economic, social, and cultural resources1 are (and are not) accessible to 
migrant families, this study shows how migrant families use such resources to create a livelihood, survival 
strategies, and educational opportunities for their children, as well as the challenges that these families 
                                                          
1 In this study, economic, social and cultural resources are defined as follows.  The term economic resources refers to 
financial sources that may or may not be accessible to migrant populations, through either formal or informal 
channels, to help them cope with their economic struggles.  While social resources can encompass rights and 
services that may or may not be granted to migrant populations within the domain of social policy, in this study 
special focus has been placed on the educational domain due to its emphasis on understanding the educational 
environment of children who were accompanied by their migrant parents to the city. Cultural resources refers to 





face.  The study further attempts to show how the coping strategies of migrant families reveal the patterns 
of their social relations and ties with others in their urban destination: Hanoi.  Drawing on ethnographic 
accounts of and interviews with both members of migrant families and associated community members 
including neighbors, school officials, nongovernmental organization workers, and local authorities, as well 
as on census data, reports, and research studies conducted by Vietnam-based organizations and 
scholars on the issues of internal migration, urban poverty, and education, this study seeks to understand 
the implications of the state’s residence-based policies for disadvantaged migrants who often have been  
peripheralized in the city.  It also considers what challenges Vietnam’s transitional society is confronting, 
as it seeks to redress social inequity and to achieve better social integration of its migrants, plus what role 
education could play in opening up pathways of upward social mobility for migrant children over the long 
term. 
This study builds upon the work done by Berry (1993), in the sense that it sees access to and use 
of resources as being shaped in a “mutually constitutive” way by economic, social and cultural dynamics.  
It goes on to suggest that understanding these three dimensions’ interrelationships and the themes that 
permeate them, allows one to appreciate the processes of social differentiation and change.  Based on 
these assumptions, the study looks specifically at three factors—the growing influence of market forces, 
the continuing practice of residence-based policies as exemplified in the state’s adherence to the ho khau 
system, and migrant families’ recourse to different social networks—all of which interact so as to form the 
social phenomena of rural-urban migration in Vietnam and thereby to peripheralize the migrant residents 
of Hanoi.  By elucidating both the constraints upon, and the spaces created for the autonomy and 
negotiability, within its examination of the ways in which the three resources (economic, social, and 
cultural) are secured and used and how they reciprocally shape new forms of social division and 
inequality in the course of urbanization, the study seeks to fulfill the following two objectives: (i) to identify 
the factors fostering the marginalization and disintegration of migrants in the city, and (ii) to help pave the 
way forward an environment in which the city residents, regardless of their registration status or 
socioeconomic condition, could benefit more equally from living in the city, even in the face of Vietnam’s 
transition to a socialist-oriented market economy. 




State-society relations in Vietnam are and long have been undergoing substantial change, for the 
social and economic liberation policies of Đổi mới (renovation) have been taking effect since 1986.  Via a 
series of liberalizing, pro-capitalist reforms the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), which leads this one-
party communist state, recently implemented its decennial Socio-Economic Development Strategy 
(SEDS).  This socialist regime has made it clear that it aims to speed up industrialization and 
modernization so as to become a middle- income country by 2020 (CPV, 2010).   While the new socialist-
oriented market economy has, over the last two decades, opened up venues for Vietnam’s economic 
growth and its integration into the global economy, accelerated rural-urban migration, as a corollary of the 
demise of the subsidy period and of collectivization, as well as of rising opportunities in the urban areas, 
has generated some stark social divisions within the urban centers.  In the face of a dramatic influx of 
rural migrants into the cities, the continuing practice of residence-based policies as exemplified in the ho 
khau system, and a recent amendment designed to tighten the criteria for obtaining permanent residency 
in Hanoi seem to reflect a prevailing conception of migrants as constituting an impediment to the 
modernization of the city, a conception which itself serves to depreciate their role as a contributor to the 
city’s ongoing development.   
 Since it was first introduced in 1955, the ho khau system has served as a mechanism of 
population management and of surveillance (keeping track of people’s movements).2  Essentially, people 
must live where they are registered as permanent residents; they are not allowed to relocate, either 
temporarily or permanently, without getting permission from the government.  Both the degree of 
thoroughness in its enforcement and the nature of the consequences of not abiding by its regulations 
have changed over the years, as Vietnam has experienced political and economic transitions moving it 
from what the Vietnamese always refer to as “the American War” (1955-1975), through the national 
reunification and rationing period (1975-1986), to the time of economic liberation ensuing from the 
implementation of the doi moi reforms (1986 to present).  During the initial phase, the primary objective of 
the ho khau system was to counteract the massive southward migration initiated by the exodus of anti-
Communists, revolutionaries, and criminals as a result of the 1954 Communist victory over France (Hardy, 
2001; Hoang, 2013).  During the post-war rationing period the possession of ho khau was directly linked 
                                                          




to the allocation of daily necessities and jobs, as well as access to public services.  The shift from a 
centralized, planned economy to a more market-oriented one reached a threshold with the termination of 
the subsidy phase with respect to population movement.  A growing number of rural migrants, drawn to 
the urban centers in search of opportunities and having, or not having, formally acquired permission to 
relocate not only accelerated the trend of urban-ward migration but also undercut the function of the ho 
khau system as a population-control device.   
And yet, despite some increased flexibility brought about by the relaxation of the system after the 
end of the subsidy period, ho khau continue to bind people to their place of permanent residence by 
retaining the tight link between one’s registration status and one’s access to rights and services in the 
registered location.  Conversely, non-permanent residents—including temporary residents who are 
properly registered in the locality but for only a limited duration of stay and whose ho khau remains rural, 
as well as unregistered residents—do not have equal property rights or the same entitlement to access 
public schools and health services as do permanent residents.  By the same token, non-permanent 
residents are charged higher fees for schools, medical services, and public utilities; they also largely are 
excluded from government subsidy programs for the poor, and debarred from utilizing formal credit 
sources.  
 While such exclusion of migrants from the economic and social benefits of city living have 
resulted from the urban growth taking place both across Asia (ODI, 2006) and globally, Vietnam is 
undergoing a particularly intense clash between free-market pressures and the socialist regime, with this 
not only triggering frustrations on the local administrative side but also heightening social tensions among 
city residents who have vastly unequal access to urban-sector services.  In effect, the strict demarcation 
of residents based on their residential status and their places of origin seems to have fomented a 
pervasive distrust among the city’s permanent residents, of their non-permanent migrant counterparts.  
Widespread perceptions of the latter as posing a threat to the social order leave them institutionally as 
well as culturally peripheralized.  
 When it comes to those migrant families who have been accompanied to Hanoi by school-age 
children, it can be unequivocally asserted that the educational environment of those children has been 




of residence-based policies, and by the increased self-reliance and financial burdens resulting from the 
education reforms ushered in by doi moi.  The state’s withdrawal from its former role of sole and full-scale 
education service-provider, and its increasing tendency to rely heavily upon market-based education 
instruments, are showing up in the rise of private and semi-public schools, mounting school-related fees 
beyond just tuition, and the proliferation of “extra study”: fee-charging supplementary, private class 
sessions provided by schoolteachers. The chief and sad consequence of all this is that migrant children 
too often are being left outside mainstream education.  
 At this juncture it seems wise to take a step back from the ongoing debates as to the efficacy of 
the residence-based policies in the post-doi moi period, at least long enough to reexamine the ideological 
underpinnings of the state’s enduring endorsement of strategies for curbing rural-urban migration-flow.  At 
a demographic level, despite the state’s persistent attachment to the use of the ho khau system as a way 
of staving off urban-ward population mobility and thus staging a preemptive strike against overpopulation 
in the cities, the effort does not appear to be paying off.  It is hard not to interpret thus the following 
finding: “According to the 2009 census, net migration from the countryside to the cities was 1.4 million 
people between 2004 and 2008.  The figure was 770,000 people for the five years leading up to the 1999 
census.  This demographic shift is especially affecting Hanoi.  Some 6.5 million people lived in the capital 
in 2009, compared with just 2.7 million a decade earlier—a 140 percent increase. During the same period, 
the total population of Vietnam rose by 12 percent.” (Hoang, 2013).  Among the new regulations included 
in the Capital Law that came into effect on July 1, 2013, is one that raises the bar of eligibility for 
permanent residency (“Ha Noi tightens residency criteria,” 2013).  Under the new rule, a migrant applying 
for permanent residency must prove that s/he has lived in Hanoi as a temporary resident for at least three 
consecutive years (as opposed to one year, as formerly prescribed), has a state job and/or a formal work 
contract, and owns a house or has settled in with relatives who already have a permanent residence in 
the city.  If s/he lives in a rented accommodation, its average floor area must be at least 15 square meters 
per resident.  The enforcement of the new scheme has stirred up controversy, with many critics 
questioning its feasibility.  Their view is that the new policy will not help to stop the migration inflow but will 
merely make the lives of the migrant poor more difficult.  As one critic has put it, “current shortcomings in 




 Notably absent from the current state discourse on migration is any mention of the fact that 
migrants have long been an important part of the city’s economic growth, and any speculation as to how 
urban management could better be achieved in order to facilitate more equitable access to public services 
and a higher standard of living for both migrant and non-migrant residents.  Instead the discourse is 
obsessively centered on the need to minimize inward migration, with the idée fixe being that migrants are 
to be blamed for placing excessive pressure on urban infrastructure, causing the deterioration of social 
order, and impeding the city’s “beautification project” that is all about purveying an image of 
modernization and “middle-classness.”  One must ask, what is at the root of this lamentable lack of policy 
discussions within a socialist regime whose constitution professes the citizens equal rights in the political, 
economic, cultural, and social spheres.  If we had a better understanding of what has caused the state to 
shy away from exploring ways to build an urban society whose members, regardless of their residential 
status, enjoy the benefits of urban living, have access to socioeconomic services, and gladly and without 
impediment participate in civil society, that would allow us to pinpoint the fundamental causes of a 
growing social segregation between, and an inequitable distribution of resources across, the city’s 
residents.   
 
Gaps in Existing Research 
The existing research on the issue of urban-ward migration in Vietnam has two major streams.  On the 
one hand, policy-oriented studies tend to highlight the vulnerability of migrants and their peripheral 
positions in the society (Le et al., 2011; Save the Children, U.K., 2006; UN Viet Nam, 2010a; 2010b; 
UNDP, 2010; UNFPA Viet Nam, 2007; UNICEF Viet Nam & MOLISA, 2009).  In these studies the primary 
focus is on the regulatory obstacles imposed upon migrants, and on how the supposed need for them 
springs from the migrants’ poor standard of living in the city (UN Viet Nam, 2010a).  Thus they stress the 
need to revise the existing policies so as to better accommodate migrants, giving them improved access 
to government services and urban infrastructure.  Non-policy-oriented studies, by contrast, are more 
inclined to illuminate how migrants strive to improve their livelihoods by making the most of their social 
networks throughout the migration process.  These tend to emphasize those aspects of such networks 
that aid migrants’ survival in the urban destination and help them to maintain their social ties (Agergaard 




successful in capturing what they set out to demonstrate: the socioeconomic marginalization of migrants 
constrained by permanent-resident-preferential policies, and the viability and resilience of migrants 
achieved through substantial recourse to social networks that provide them with valuable resources of 
information and support.   
What seems to be lacking from the current literature is an assessment of the ongoing interplay 
between these two structural and cultural dynamics.  The former type of study that points up the 
institutional restraints often fails to acknowledge that there is a certain amount of room for negotiation—or 
to put this matter more bluntly, numerous ways to circumvent the regulations.  Too often it also fails to 
address the ideological assumptions embedded within both the continuing implementation of the state’s 
preferential policies for permanent residents and the prevailing public discourse, in which migrants are 
portrayed as an undesirable influence on social life and as putting an intolerable strain on urban 
infrastructure.  Conversely, the latter sub-group within the literature, with its emphasis upon migrants’ 
contextually relevant responses and collective adaptations to socioeconomic deprivation via the 
development and preservation of informal networks as a vital source of strength risks, despite its cogent 
arguments, overlooking the potential of said internal collectivity of migrants to further their social 
segregation and stigmatization.  It seems there is still much room left for a more vigorous investigation of 
the implications that a sense of internal connectedness among migrants have for the social positioning 
and (dis)integration of migrants within Hanoi’s urban society.  Staying within this vein, it can be suggested 
that looking at how such structural and cultural dynamics play out in the context of rapid urbanization 
within Vietnam’s transitional society could shed some needed light on precisely which factors are 
impeding the making of those fundamental changes needed to offset the increasing social differentiation 
and the imbalanced access to, and distribution of, resources among the city residents.   
On a more topical level, the existing field-based qualitative studies of internal migrants in 
Vietnam’s two great cities of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are concerned primarily with the lives of (i) those 
seasonal migrants who come to work temporarily in the urban centers with or without a spouse, while 
leaving their children behind in the countryside with their grandparents (Agergaard & Thao, 2011; Jensen 
et al., 2008), and (ii) the migrant children who work as street children (Burr, 2006; Hong & Ohno, 2007). 




household dynamics surrounding their decisions to migrate and the mobile livelihoods of those so-called 
“circular migrants” who move back and forth between the city and their home villages.  Few studies have 
examined the livelihoods and sociocultural practices of the migrant families that took their children along 
to the cities, or of those who intend to reside in their urban destinations not just on a seasonal or 
temporary basis but for a longer period of time, or even permanently.  In effect, as Jensen et al. (2008) 
indicated in their longitudinal study of the female roving street-vendors of Hanoi, seasonal or temporary 
migrants who have come to work without their immediate family members are not seeking permanent jobs 
in the cities.   
Similarly, qualitative studies on migrant working children often are concerned with the social 
worlds of these children and their surrounding urban environment.  These studies have not only identified 
the existence of diversified groups of working children in Vietnam but have cautioned us as to the 
misleading nature of the term street children, owing to the fact that most of those so called are not literally 
living or sleeping on the street but have homes to return to, during both their migration in the city (shelters 
or lodging houses) and their post-migration life in their home village.  Nevertheless, it seems that too little 
attention is being paid to how migrant children who accompany their parents to the urban destination 
forge relationships with their parents and/or guardians, peer groups, neighbors, and others who surround 
them in their daily urban lives.  While several policy-oriented studies have pointed to the major constraint 
on school-age migrant children—that they are not granted automatic admission to the local public school, 
owing to their temporary or non-registered residential status—they have focused chiefly on those 
regulatory aspects of schooling that discourage migrant children from becoming a part of the community, 
as opposed to on how such institutional dimensions interact with those social blights of post-migration 
stigmatization and disintegration to which migrant children are exposed.          
In the next section the conceptual framework that provides the organizing structure of this study is 
presented.  
  
Conceptual Framework  
In synthesizing her analysis of the collected data and her interpretation of the themes that have emerged 
from it, the author of this study was inspired by theoretical and empirical works that helped her to 




specifically, the conceptual framework of the study is based on a set of theoretical and cross-cultural 
comparative studies concerned with the process of social change, whereby people interact with one 
another within both corporate (or institutional, de jure, public, formal) and non-corporate (or non-
institutional, de facto, private, substantive/informal) domains, in a constant work-in-progress mode of 
adjustment and negotiation.  
 In The Study of Social Structure (1998), M. G. Smith presented a comprehensive, synthesized 
conceptual framework of social structure, comprised of a diverse set of intricately interrelated social 
elements.  In so doing he revisited and examined the ways in which social structure had been understood 
and theoretically conceptualized by earlier social philosophers and social scientists. Taking inspiration 
from, among others, Max Weber and Marion Levy—the influence of the former being evident both in 
Smith’s conception of society as “a historical structure continuously in process of change and 
development, due both to its internal dynamics and its need to adapt to external exigencies of differing 
kinds” (p. 13) and in his identification of social relations with the mutual orientations of actors (p. 51), and 
the influence of the latter showing itself in the idea that concrete as opposed to analytical structures are 
present within social processes and entities—Smith conceived of society as “a dynamic complex of 
processes, collectivities, units and relations,3 embedded in an empirical context that has material, cultural, 
and social dimensions” (p. 60).  His approach to social structure, one that strove to understand the 
ongoingly dynamic processes of social reality and change within which individuals interact with one 
another at two levels or aspects of human society—the culture, and the social organization—attested to 
his conviction that society and culture are inseparable (L. Comitas, personal communication, October 18, 
2005).  While social structure is embodied as an empirical reality comprised of “the particular 
arrangements of their groupings and relations in society” (p. 58), culture is manifested as “the set of 
values, ideas, beliefs and assumptions by which each people creates meaning” (p. 58).  Careful 
observation of the nature and manner of people’s interactions and relationships would thus allow 
                                                          
3 In broad terms, Smith’s theorization of society may be said to have consisted of two major analytic categories: 
social processes and entities (Smith, 1998, pp. 60-61).  Social processes are subdivided into the institutional 
(“regulated and supported by collective sanctions”; p. 62) and the non-institutional, whereas social entities are further 
classified into collectivities (“social aggregates with unclear boundaries and membership”; p. 71) and units (social 




ethnographers to delineate how various social groupings construct their surrounding environments via 
their culturally imbued perceptions of them (p. 55).  
Smith’s problematization of systematic, structural, or functional accounts of social reality 
stemmed from his observation of the “plural societies”4 prevalent in European colonies, where the diverse 
ethnic, linguistic, economic, and cultural differences of peoples bring the ruled into continual engagement 
with the rulers, as both parties seek to negotiate their conflicting interests and needs (Smith 1998, p. 3).  
By applying the notions of corporation and membership and of public (de jure or by law) and private (de 
facto or by practice) domain---ideas originally developed by Meyer Fortes---Smith was able to analyze the 
ways in which the members of a plural society who are set apart, even within the bounds of the private 
domain, by such diacritics as race, ethnicity, religion, and language, are incorporated into the public 
domain (L. Comitas, personal communication, October 18, 2005).  The chief such way is the public 
regulative force of those corporations that differentiate their statuses and roles. 
The conceptualization of society elaborated by Smith (1998) has been an invaluable aid to the 
present writer as she has sought to discern how the social phenomenon of urban-ward migration in Hanoi 
is taking place both at the interface of the interactive and relational dynamics and within the economic, 
social, and cultural arenas where people engage in a broad range of activities, both individually and 
organizationally.  Of special use to this study has been Smith’s conception of people’s participation in 
multiple entities as revealing two distinctive membership types—“social units,” characterized by their 
exclusive membership and sense of corporate unity, and “collectivities” that have ambiguous boundaries 
of membership and are deficient in the solidarity-sense.  This has allowed the present writer to elucidate 
migrant families’ associations with and dissociations from groupings having varying degrees of exclusivity 
and unity, and to show how the migrants ascribe cultural meanings and assumptions to all of their 
relations.   
Furthermore, Smith’s emphasis on the need to identify discrepancies between the public (de jure) 
and private (de facto) domains has helped the author to direct the reader’s attention to the process 
whereby migrants continually engage in the negotiation of their interests and needs, and to show how that 
                                                          
4 Smith’s idea of “plural societies” was influenced by Furnivall’s ecological determinism, in which he used the term 




negotiation process derives from the disjunction between the entitlement of rights and resources, as 
prescribed in the constitutional laws, and their actual, manifestly unfair allocation and unequal distribution.  
Within the context of urban-ward migration in Vietnam, such instances of inconsistencies between 
constitutional prescriptions and everyday practices include, among other things, equal rights to access 
social services and formal education, and charge-free public primary education.  The enforcement and 
practice of the ho khau system, and its associated residence-based policies, presents an interesting case 
in this regard.  Its recent slight, but real, relaxation of sanctions against those not abiding by the 
regulations (i.e., migrants relocating without having acquired formal permission) might seem to indicate 
that migrants are being incorporated more extensively into the private domain, even as they remain 
excluded from the public domain simply by dint of being non-permanent residents.  The truth of the matter, 
however, is that these migrants increasingly are being pushed to the margins of society within both the 
public and private domains, subject as they clearly are to social differentiation conditioned by institutional 
regulations and prevailing social stigmatization.  
 Smith’s call for attention to the processual aspects of social change, whereby the fluid contents or 
segments of social institutions can be transformed over time by endogenous or exogenous stimuli that 
induce changes even while retaining the same larger institutional structures, has helped the present writer 
to understand how Vietnam’s integration into the global economy, and the growing urban-ward migration 
characteristic of the post-doi moi period, have not entailed substantial changes on the structural level.  
These trends have rather led to the diversification of social networks and to increasing social 
differentiation and inequity among Hanoi residents.   
Most vital, it seems, in helping us to grasp precisely which factors are perpetuating both the 
socialist regime’s ongoing endorsement of residence-based policies and the effects of those on people’s 
lives is the gaining of a deeper understanding of the ideological assumptions behind policymaking and 
practice.  Only then can we hope to explicate how people engage in the process of determining what the 
policies mean to them, in their lived experience and in relation to their cultural practices.  In their 
theorization of the anthropology of policy, Shore and Wright (1997) questioned the instrumentalist view of 
policy, which has a propensity to objectify it as an ideologically neutral, technical, and rational tool that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




policymakers use to govern populations, solve problems, and effect change.  They proposed instead that 
implemented policies be studied via explorations of the ideological and politicized complexity of their 
operation.  Bond (2002) argued that the manifest advantage of anthropological approaches to policy lies 
in their capacity to elucidate how policies, in the course of their formulation and implementation, affect the 
everyday lives of individuals and communities.  In relation to the setting of this study, a careful 
observation of how the residence-based policies affect both people’s everyday lives and those power-
relations that structure both the state discourses and the mundane narratives on rural-urban migrants 
could demonstrate that policies are not something hegemonic but rather capable of functioning as a 
device that serves to empower some people but not others.  By implicitly asking “‘Whose voices prevail?’ 
and ‘How are their discourses made authoritative?’” (Wright, 1995, p. 79, as cited in Shore & Wright, 1997, 
p. 15) in the context of the ways in which migrants are portrayed and narrated in both formal and informal 
public discourse, this study will be attempting to show how such power-dynamics have created an 
imbalanced discourse and have thereby served to stigmatize migrants and to marginalize them within the 
city.  
The study also has been informed by Sara Berry’s approach to analyzing societies undergoing 
economic and social transformations, one that views them through the three lenses of culture, power, and 
material resources (Berry, 1993).  In her comparative study of agrarian change in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Berry focuses on tracing and analyzing the constantly negotiated and contested social processes involved 
in the mobilization and exercise of power, with special attention being paid to the allocation and use of 
time and productive resources among African farmers across a wide range of times and places.  By using 
data drawn from her own fieldwork, done chiefly in western Nigeria, as well as secondary ethnographic 
and archival materials on the cocoa-farming areas of southern Ghana and southwestern Nigeria, the 
settler economy in central Kenya, and a rural labor reserve in northeastern Zambia, she has been able to 
show how the changing patterns of resource-access and resource-use within various agrarian systems 
bespeak the continuing, and growing, significance of social networks in the wake of colonial rule, while 
also pointing to the high cultural variability and the localized nature of such patterns.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           




The  increased commercialization and political centralization (e.g., national land legislation and 
reforms privatizing the right to own land and other properties) brought about by both colonial and 
independent national governments did not lead to these institutions becoming the only hegemonic, de 
jure and de facto institutions having definite power and control over resource mobilization, allocation, and 
use in agrarian economies.  Rather, these economies’ responses to the disruptions brought about by 
socioeconomic change came in the form of the diversification and proliferation of both preexisting and 
newly created fluid, non-corporate social networks, as well as unequal degrees of participation and a high 
degree of individual and resource mobility (Berry 1993).  This flexible, dynamic, and increasingly 
individually oriented coping or survival strategy, while showing resilience in spite of the challenges of 
extreme regional variability in topography, climate, and economic insecurity, has in turn exacerbated 
socioeconomic inequalities and has heightened instability within social networks and groups ranging 
across descent groups, chiefs, headsmen and their subjects, families, and self-help groups. The end-
result is a scarcity of land and capital, and farmers’ increased reliance on their own or hired labor.  
Despite the variance in regional focus (e.g., agrarian change in rural Sub-Saharan Africa as 
contrasted with migration and urban change in a Southeast Asian city), Berry’s analytical lenses have 
immensely helped the writer of this study to understand transitional societies.  One of those lenses in 
particular has been invaluable, for Berry’s emphasis on the role played by non-corporate social networks 
in mobilizing resources so as to counter socioeconomic uncertainty, and on their continuing importance 
as coping strategies, has enabled me to see that rural migrant families in Hanoi turn to informal networks 
because these grant them access to productive resources and economic opportunities.  Post-colonial 
African farmers’ localized patterns of resource-acquisition and network-formation tell us that they cope 
with increasing economic and political instability by diversifying their income-seeking activities and by 
participating in both corporate networks (e.g., descent groups) and non-corporate areas (e.g., hired farm 
labor, self-help groups) (Berry, 1993).   A similar trend has been observed in Vietnam, ever since the 
advent of the economic reforms.  As will be further described in the ensuing chapters, rural migrant 
families in Hanoi do indeed strategize their livelihood strategies so as to secure resources, doing so 
primarily by forging bonds within multiple social networks.  Such social connections include those of 




the increasing shift to more flexible and individually oriented coping mechanisms, brought on by 
unpredictable market conditions that have exacerbated socioeconomic inequalities, is one that the 
present study can only underscore yet again.  In Vietnam, the state’s transition toward a so-called 
“socialist-oriented market economy” has not only prompted greater self-reliance with respect to resource-
mobilization; it also has heightened social differentiation and inequality across and within social networks, 
thereby socioeconomically marginalizing the unregistered migrants, who have only limited access to 
formal and informal networks.    
  
 
Organization of the Study  
This study is divided into eight chapters.  Chapter I presents the objectives of and rationale for the study, 
assesses the existing studies on urban-ward migration in Vietnam while noting their research gaps, and 
describes the conceptual framework that structures and informs the study.  Chapter II sets out the 
background to the study by tracing the course of internal migration in Vietnam through the pre- and post-
war periods, and by taking note not only of the establishment and evolution of the ho khau system but of 
how its role is changing in response to the increased population mobility brought on by the economy’s 
marketization.  Chapter III introduces the context of the field site and the research setting.  The chapter 
also explains how “migrants” are defined within the parameters of the Vietnamese official census and 
thereby reveals its failure to accurately depict the experiences of groups of people on the move, 
especially those of the temporary and the unregistered migrants.  By illustrating the familial and living 
circumstances of the underprivileged residents in the study site, the chapter provides the reader with a 
snapshot of the livelihoods of two families who participated in the study.  Chapter IV identifies the trends 
and patterns of migrants’ mobilization in its relation to their quest to obtain economic resources.  It 
underscores the migrants’ limited access to economic resources via formal channels, and thus their 
propensity to turn to informal credit sources and, in some cases, to rely heavily upon their working 
children, in the informal sector, to be the breadwinners.  Chapter V begins by giving an account of the 
historical development of school education in Vietnam prior to marketization, then points to the de jure 
and de facto discrepancy between most people’s and migrants’ access to social resources.  The contrast 
it draws, after looking at the overall education system in Vietnam, between the legislatively stipulated right 




reveals how much harder it is for the latter, as opposed to their permanent-resident counterparts, to gain 
access to mainstream education.  So as to exemplify a type of alternative education and its associated 
challenges, the chapter presents a case study of a “charity class,” a fee-free literacy class catering to 
socioeconomically disadvantaged and migrant children residing within Hanoi’s so-called the Thanh Ninh 
area.5  Chapter VI, which focuses on cultural resources, looks at migrant families’ attempts to build up 
social relations and networks within the destination area, and shows the wide variances with respect to 
amount of material, financial, and moral support and degree of social collectivity and interpersonal trust.  
In addition, the chapter reveals the existence, in the study site as well as in Hanoi’s wider society, of a 
multi-layer structure of inclusion, operative both between migrants and non-migrants and among the 
migrants themselves.  It also explores how such inter- and intra-differentiation of residents serves—by 
working in tandem with the ascription of cultural traits to each differentiated group—not only to exacerbate 
the social stigmatization of underprivileged migrants but also to hamper their development of a sense of 
belonging to the local community.  Building on the findings and discussions of Chapters IV, V, and VI, 
Chapter VII identifies the continuities and changes that characterize migrant families’ resource-
mobilization and their coping strategies in the context of post-doi moi Vietnam.  The chapter also 
examines the factors animating the state’s adherence to residence-based policies and its propagation of 
that discourse, both of which undermine the social position of migrants in the city.  Chapter VIII 
summarizes the major findings and discussions of the study and offers some suggestions about its policy 
implications.  The chapter culminates by presenting the limitations of the study and by pointing to some 
avenues that I may wish to go down when pursuing future research.  
                                                          
5 My pseudonym for this study’s research site, which is one of the popular destinations for rural migrants undertaking 




CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
This chapter’s presentation of the background to the study has two basic thrusts.  First, it shows how the 
patterns of internal migration in post-war Vietnam have been transformed, during both the post-
reunification period (1975-1986) and the post-doi moi period (1986-present).  Second, it reveals how the 
ho khau system, first established in 1955, has evolved over the years in parallel to increasing population 
mobility.  
 
Internal Migration in Pre-War Vietnam 
Internal migration in Vietnam has, throughout its modern history, been intimately linked with its political 
context. Historical evidence suggests that geographically, southward migration has been the more 
common practice owing to “the lack of agricultural lands in north Vietnam and the central coast’s 
unsuitability for paddy rice cultivation” (Dang et al., 2003, p. 2).  One exception in the north was the Red 
River Delta.  With its abundance of natural resources rendering it conducive to agricultural production, the 
region has attracted migrant settlers from other areas.  During the French colonial period (1858-1954), the 
chief pattern of domestic population-movement was that of circular migration: farmers moving between 
rural areas during the slack periods of the agricultural cycle (Thompson, 1968, as cited in Le & Khuat, 
2008).  Also, albeit to a lesser extent, this period saw some “rural to urban migration of landless people 
[and] low-cost labour movement between rural villages and the colonial plantation/mining zones” (Dang et 
al., 2003, p. 2).  The movement to and from the colonial plantations and mining zones was 
characteristically a compulsory migration from northern villages (Le & Khuat, 2008, p. 31).   
 While internal migration in northern Vietnam during the colonial period was facilitated both by 
one’s village networks and family relations and opportunities created by the colonial regime, out-migration 
from Red River Delta villages was relatively uncommon.  Hardy (2003a) asserted that the colonial 
administration must be held responsible for the low rate of out-migration from the Red River Delta given 
the large number of landless in the region, people who might have achieved social and economic upward 
mobility if they had decided to leave their villages.  Unfortunately, the colonial government imposed undue 
political control via administrative mechanisms that discouraged people from detaching themselves from 




collection,6 and the issuance, nominally, for security purposes,7 of tax receipts and identification cards 
“required for border crossing and administrative tasks” (Hardy, 2003a, p. 123).  Hardy further argued that 
the popular discourse, suggesting that peasants have special psychological and social attachments to 
their home regions where their ancestors are buried and their kin live, helped to legitimatize a French 
administration that aimed to bind people to their villages and yet has failed to explain why few landless 
people out-migrated during the colonial period.             
 The two-state period commencing in 1954, followed by the American War that lasted from 1956 
to 1975, saw some greatly reshaped internal migration patterns with significant regional variations.  
Shortly after the French withdrew from Indochina after their defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, 
and the subsequent signing of the Geneva Accords in the same year, Vietnam was divided into the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north, led by the Viet Minh, a communist national independence 
coalition, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, and the Republic of Vietnam in the south (Dang et al., 
2003, p. 2).  The breaching of the Accords, instigated by repeated refusals on the part of Ngo Dinh Diem 
(first president of the Republic of Vietnam) to hold national elections in 1956 to reunify the country, would 
result in full-blown war.  Southern Vietnam saw rapid urban growth,8 owing to the increasing insecurity in 
its rural areas (Le & Khuat, 2008) and people’s natural desire to avoid contact with northern forces (Dang 
et al., 2003).  This urban-bound migration, with rural migrants taking up street jobs in the cities (e.g., 
peddling, shoe-shining, street-vending), led to a burgeoning of that sidewalk economy in the informal 
sector. 9  By the end of the war it was “the largest single source of non-farm civilian employment in South 
                                                          
6 In the wake of a series of administrative changes, all men over 18 were eventually forced to pay a head tax, 
whereas the “women were neither taxed nor identified” (Hardy, 2003a, p. 122).  
 
7 Under French colonial rule anyone wanting to leave her/his village, even temporarily, had to seek the permission of 
the village head (Hardy, 2003a).  Permission was contingent upon people’s proving that they had paid their tax by 
presenting their tax receipts and ID cards.   
 
8 The urban population in the south reportedly expanded from 15 to 20 percent of the total population in the early 
1960s to 47 percent by 1974 (Le & Khuat, 2008). 
 
9 In this study I adopt the definition of informal sector developed by Cling et al. (2010): “all unregistered 
unincorporated enterprises (called informal household businesses)” (p. 49).  Although it excludes farm activities 
(agriculture, forestry, and fisheries), this definition combines the descriptions of the informal sector formulated at both 
the international and the local levels: “broadly characterised as consisting of units engaged in the production of goods 
or services with the primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned,” as defined 
by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 1993, para. 5.); and a “household business without business 
registration, primarily due to its income below the standard level, as conceptualized in business legislation in 
Vietnam” (Cling et al., 2010, pp. 48-49).  According to the calculations done by Cling et al. (2010) of job distribution by 




Vietnam” (Kolko, 1985, as cited in Le & Khuat, 2008, p. 33).  By contrast the north experienced much 
slower urban growth,10 due in part to the evacuation of city-dwellers to rural areas where they could avoid 
the U.S. bombing of cities and industrial bases (Dang et al., 2003; Le & Khuat, 2008).  Playing an even 
bigger role, perhaps, was the initiation in 1961 of the New Economic Zones (NEZs; details on these follow 
in the next section).  These sought to redistribute population more evenly geographically by encouraging 
people to migrate from lowland to upland and from urban to rural areas, and succeeded well enough to 
contribute to the decline of the urban population. 
 
Internal Migration in Post-War Vietnam 
Post-war Vietnam has witnessed massive population movements in two very different types of flow: 
organized migration and spontaneous migration.  As the government policy in Vietnam recognizes it, 
organized migration occurs via government-sponsored resettlement programs and normally entails a 
permanent change of residence (Dang, et al., 2003).  Spontaneous migration, on the other hand, signifies 
relocation of individuals who migrate at their own behest and their own cost.  While organized migration 
has been supported and encouraged by the government so as to consolidate the State, redistribute 
population, and effect regional planning, spontaneous migration has been discouraged by raising fears of 
overpopulation in urban centers and unmanageability of population mobility.  As will be illustrated below, 
in the mid-1980s the introduction of doi moi and its associated reforms, which prompted a huge upsurge 
of spontaneous migration from rural to urban areas, marked a turning-point in the dynamic of population 
movement.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
estimated at 46.2 million people, close to 11 million cite jobs held in the informal sector as their main job.  This 
number represents 23.5% of the total labor force and thus comes in second after agriculture (50%) (p. 74) and ahead 
of the public sector (10.7%), which ranks third.  When one takes into account the common Vietnamese practice of 
multiple-job-holding, the informal sector share, comprised of both main and secondary jobs, makes up 22.7% of the 
total and represents 12.413 out of 52.636 million jobs (p. 75).  Such figures are compelling but in a certain sense not 
compelling enough, for we must never forget that owing to its intrinsic nature, jobs in the informal sector often slip 
through the net of formal administrative regulations (Salemink, 2003, p. 48).  The informal sector comprises all kinds 
of businesses and services that are conducted outside the formal employment sector, ranging from street-peddling 
and petty trading of food, drinks, souvenirs, sundry goods, clothes, and underwear to a variety of service offerings: 
motorcycle taxi, casual labor, domestic helper, prostitution, etc.  Some less visible but nonetheless widely prevalent 
jobs include sorting through garbage to unearth recyclable goods and thereby reap a small profit and the provision of 
“extra study” (fee-charging supplementary, private classes after hours) by schoolteachers seeking to augment their 
minimal incomes.    
 
10 The urban share of the northern population increased incrementally: “7.4 percent by 1955, 10.9 percent in 1965, 




Population Movements in the Post-Reunification Period (1975-1986) 
While most people are aware that the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 marked a defining moment of 
history, both in Vietnam and globally, few realize that the reunification of Vietnam as a socialist state 
entailed a massive two-pronged population movement: a repatriation of southerners to their native 
villages, and the formation of those government-mandated resettlement areas known as the New 
Economic Zones (NEZs) (Dang et al., 2003).  At the core of the State’s post-reunification migration policy 
have been its efforts to redress an uneven distribution of population between north and south and 
between the Red River delta and the mountainous regions of the western frontier, as well as to prevent 
excessive urbanization of the big cities.  To this end the large-scale migration and relocation of people, 
from urban to rural and from rural to rural areas, was planned and organized in conjunction with the 
development of NEZs, all of it serving the State’s interest in promoting the industrialization of unexploited 
highlands.  The southward resettlement of northern urban lowlanders to rural highlands not only implicitly 
endorsed the reunification of the new State, strategically inciting sentiments in favor of consolidation of 
north and south, but unwillingly promoted the sedentarization of ethnic minority groups (Hardy, 2003b; 
Save the Children, U.K., 2006).   
While there can be no doubt that the policy of establishing NEZs has substantially boosted 
population movement to rural areas, it has had mixed results.  On the one hand the State’s direct 
intervention has not merely generated a large-scale urban-rural resettlement, involving as many as 3.92 
million people who migrated to the targeted rural areas between 1976 and 1990 (Save the Children, U.K., 
2006); it also has prompted the relocation of nearly 50,000 ethnic minority families (267,580 people) by 
1982 to sedentarized settlements (Hardy, 2003b).  On the other hand, the practice of pushing ahead with 
resettlement plans without first ensuring sufficient availability of cleared land, physical and social 
infrastructure, and health and food security has substantially slowed migration to the NEZs (Dang et al., 
2003).  According to Desbarats (as cited in Dang et al., 2003, p. 3), “[a]s many as half the migrants to 
NEZs have been reported to have moved again or to have returned home soon after arrival.”  
 
Migration Patterns and Trends in the Post-Doi Moi Period (1986-Present) 
The introduction of the doi moi (renovation) policy in 1986, when taken in tandem with the largely failing 
results of the State-mandated migration policy as of the early 1990s, has led to a significant alteration in 




urban spontaneous migration.  The doi moi reforms represent Vietnam’s shift from a centralized 
command economy to a more market-oriented one (UN Viet Nam, 2010a).  Among the major doi moi 
reforms are the abandonment of the subsidy system that had been tightly linked to one’s lawful residence 
through the ho khau system11 and the decollectivization of agriculture via the introduction of the 
household contract system.  The latter reform, which allowed contracting  households to sell surplus 
(beyond the contractual production of a specified quota) grown on their redistributed cooperative land 
(Dang et al., 2003), led to the unintended emergence of a land market as farmers began to sell, transfer, 
or lease their lands (NCSSH, 2001; UN Viet Nam, 2010a).  Thus the abandonment/relaxation of 
preexisting systems and the introduction of new regulations predicated on market-economy-facilitated 
conditions allowed people to move more freely and flexibly, the result of which has been a decline of the 
agricultural sector and a concomitant urbanward migration.  
 On the economic front, the doi moi reforms have ushered in a proliferation of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and booming industrialization.  Despite the attenuation of FDI in-flows in recent years,12 
the increasing dispersal of market forces driven by doi moi has fostered an FDI-attracting environment 
and thereby incentivized such export-oriented, labor-intensive manufacturing industries as textile and 
garments, footwear and furniture.  While the doi moi reforms have to a great extent supported Vietnam’s 
rapid economic growth and industrialization, the concentration of the industrial and manufacturing sectors 
in urban areas, and the upsurge of economic opportunities in the informal sector that has sprung up there, 
have unquestionably accelerated the out-migration of rural labor.   
Not only has migration been a major contributor to urban growth but its high-rate contribution13 to 
the population growth of the country’s two largest cities, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, suggests that the 
dynamic of internal migration has always been strongly linked to the urbanization produced by the flow of 
                                                          
11 We will see in the next subsection how ho khau was introduced and how it has evolved in Vietnam.   
 
12 In the wake of the 2008-2009 global economic crisis, and after hitting a record high of 64 billion USD of registered 
FDI capital at the trend’s peak in 2008, Vietnam has experienced a decrease of FDI in-flows (Nguyen, February 18, 
2013).  In 2012, the figure dropped to approximately 13 billion USD.  
 
13 Between 1994 and 1999, over 50% of the population growth was attributed to migration to Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City (GSO & UNFPA Viet Nam, 2005).  More recently some other regional cities have begun to attract migrants as 
their place of destination, such as “Can Tho City, Long Xuyen, Cau Mau in the Mekong Delta, as well as emerging 




people to selected urban centers having higher levels of economic opportunity (GSO & UNFPA Viet Nam, 
2005).  
What characterizes migration in the post-doi moi period, in addition to its increased spontaneity 
and the change in the types of flow, is the diversification of migration patterns.  Among the best-
recognized patterns of migration movements are the seasonal, circular, temporary, and permanent ones.  
Seasonal migration usually takes place in accordance with agricultural cycles: people migrate during the 
slack seasons on the farm so as to engage in non-agricultural work and supplement their incomes, 
returning to farming at harvest time.  While seasonal migration is not a particularly new social 
phenomenon in northern Vietnam, more, and more complex, market relations have been observed since 
the introduction of doi moi, as in the combination of agricultural production at harvest time and outward 
migration during the agricultural off-season (Hardy, 2003b).  Circular migration occurs when  migrants 
move back and forth between their place of destination and of origin; such trips range from daily or weekly 
commutes to virtual hejiras lasting for several months or even years (ODI, 2006).  Seasonal and circular 
migration may be considered types of temporary migration, in the sense that both presume the migrant’s 
intention of returning, but not all temporary migration can be classified as either seasonal or circular.  At 
the opposite end of the spectrum from temporary migration is permanent migration; in this case people 
migrate to the destination area intending to resettle for good, as opposed to returning to their place of 
origin or relocating to another area in the future.   
The variations in backgrounds of the populations constituting internal migrants14 should also be 
noted.  These include but are not limited to age group, gender, and marital status (Save the Children, 
U.K., 2006).  Even though the demographic snapshot of migrants provided by the 1999 Census15 
indicated the dominancy of single youths, more recent studies suggest a greater degree of both 
diversification and compartmentalization within Vietnam’s internal migrant population.  Some sectors, 
such as the textile garment and service areas, attract a large number of female migrants who work in 
factories or as domestic helpers (UN Viet Nam, 2010a).   
                                                          
14 Although the issue of international migration is beyond the scope of the present study, it is worth mentioning that a 






Within the informal sector, comprised of migrants working in cities, there is a notably increasing 
presence of female petty traders.  Since the late 1980s many of the food stalls have been taken up by 
women who have turned their homemade delights such as pho (rice noodle soup) and bun cha (“mini 
kebabs on noodles” (Hayton, 2010, p. 51)) into street-vending staples (Hayton, 2010).  The prevalence of 
food stalls in the cities has spawned, or at least been mirrored by an expansion of other informal 
enterprises undertaken predominantly by female migrants: roaming vendors hawking such products as 
fruit and vegetables, clothes, underwear, and sundry goods on a pole; and collectors of garbage and 
recyclable goods such as papers, cardboard, and glass and plastic bottles.  Similarly, Agergaard and 
Thao (2011) report in their study of migrant porters working within Hanoi’s informal labor market that a 
significant gender difference exists with respect to the family situation of their respondents.  Not only was 
the average age of female porters (40) notably higher than that of their male counterparts, but there was 
a great variance in their marriage status.  “[A]ll except one of the female porters were married, while a 
third of the male porters were unmarried” (Agergaard & Thao, 2011, p. 626).  Moreover, according to a 
study jointly conducted by GSO and UNFPA Viet Nam (as cited in UN Viet Nam 2010a, p. 23), nearly 38 
percent of migrant respondents in the 2004 Vietnam Migration Survey (VMS) indicated that they moved 
along with their families, indicating an emerging trend of family, as opposed to single-male or single-
female, migration.   
 Despite all of the variations identified within the demographics on internal migration, it is the 
economic factor that appears to be the foremost one driving migrants to move urbanward in the context of 
post-doi moi Vietnam.  According to the 2004 VMS, 70 percent of internal migrants responded that they 
had migrated for economic reasons such as seeking employment opportunities and improving their living 
condition.  The high under- and unemployment rates in rural areas, caused by both the shortage of 
farming and non-farm opportunities and the lack of stability in the agricultural sector, explain why rural 
migrants seek urban employment in the hope of garnering a higher income (Dang et al., 2003).  The 
income disparity, between the major cities of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and the nation’s rural areas, is 
reportedly on the order of five or even seven to one (Guest, 1998).  
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Furthermore, economic motivations to migrate often spring from migrant families’ strategies to 
cope with economic insecurity and to maximize their family incomes (Dang et al., 2003; UN Viet Nam, 
2010a).  As urbanization surges at a fast pace, a clash is emerging between it and the socialist State’s 
migration policy, with its ongoing emphasis on discouraging urbanward migration and diminishing the 
massive inflows of rural migrants being driven by the new market-oriented economy (Save the Children, 
U.K., 2006).  As outlined in this section, spontaneous migration had by the mid-1990s replaced the 
government-led planned migration as the predominant population movement; nonetheless, administrative 
concerns have arisen as to the capacity of the State to oversee the ever-shifting population dynamics 
(Hardy, 2003b).  One is inevitably driven to wonder what lies at the root of this negative association of 
urbanization strictly with a high inflow of migrants to the cities.  In order to further examine the growing 
tension between the new dynamic of population mobility and the felt need to impose upon it some 
administrative control, we must first take a closer look at the ho khau system, which has been the 
foundation of population management in Vietnam for over a half-century.  The next section first provides 
the reader with an overview of ho khau, the focus being on how it was brought into Vietnam and how it 
has evolved ever since.  It then points to emerging issues associated with ho khau that warrant attention 
here in the post-doi moi period. 
 
The Ho Khau System: Its Origins and Evolution  
The implementation in 1955 of ho khau, the household registration system, grew out of administrative 
concerns vis-à-vis security and population management, prompted by the massive southward migration of 
nearly 1 million people in the previous year (Save the Children, U.K., 2006).  The year 1954 marked the 
signing of the Geneva Accords, which concluded the First Indochina War and formalized the military 
defeat and withdrawal of the French.  And yet the division of Vietnam into North and South—a communist 
state led by Ho Chi Minh in the North and a new democratic state proclaimed by Ngo Dinh Diem in the 
South—had the unforeseen effect of negating the Accord’s stipulation that nationwide elections be held in 
1956 to reunify the country.   
Patterned upon a Chinese model of household registration known as hukou, the Vietnamese ho 
khau system became a tool used to control population mobility and curtail migration undertaken at the 




urban households, and beginning in 1960 it was spread throughout the countryside (Le et al., 2011).  
Under the system each household was (and continues to be) required to register its members with the 
local police, as well as to report any changes in the residents’ living and residential status (e.g., births, 
deaths, and migrations) (Hardy, 2003b).  The household registration booklet or so ho khau was to be 
used to record such information as “the names, sex, date of birth, marital status, occupation of all 
household members and their relationship with the household head” (Le et al., 2011, p. 5).  Thus the 
nationwide implementation of ho khau not only allowed the government to impose tighter control over 
mobility but led to the formation of “local surveillance networks” (Hardy, 2003b, p. 109), designed to 
ensure that people maintain residences strictly in their registered locations.  When taken in combination 
with ly lich (reports about one’s political activities and family background) and ho tich (records of the births, 
deaths, marriages, ethnicity, religion, and occupation of every household member), the ho khau system 
has been seen as functioning as a surveillance mechanism, seeking to eradicate any budding subversive 
movement (Hardy, 2001; Save the Children, U.K., 2006).  
The trend toward collectivization that commenced in 1958 and that placed more restrictions on 
spontaneous mobility further decreased people’s incentives to migrate.  Allocation of the economic and 
social benefits linked to one’s membership in the cooperative was carried out via the ho khau system, 
with permission to undertake rural-urban migration being officially granted only to those who had landed 
state jobs or who were consolidating their families via such a transfer.  
 During the coupon-rationing period that came prior to doi moi, both the provision of such daily 
necessities as food and other commodities and access to such social services as education and health 
were contingent upon proper compliance with the ho khau system (Le et al., 2011).  As Le et al. (2011) 
put it, “the ho khau was used not only as a system of identification, but also for controlling access to rights 
and services” (p. 5). 
 Subsequent to the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, ho khau, along with the newly established 
NEZs, served as the backbone of the centralized State’s regional planning and population-redistribution 
programs (Hardy, 2001; Le et al., 2011).  As previously noted, the government-led resettlement plans 
were designed to boost the economic productivity of those living in the uplands and other rural areas by 




during the subsidy period ho khau grew into an effective mechanism wielded by the State’s central 
planning system to tighten the linkage between one’s formally encoded identification and one’s access to 
rights, services, and employment (Save the Children, U.K., 2006).    
 Vietnam’s economic transition into the market system, ever since the initiation of the doi moi 
reforms and the decollectivization trend of the mid-1980s, has reached a threshold in the sense that ho 
khau has revealed itself to be the fundamental means of controlling population mobility and of doing 
regional planning.  The plethora of employment opportunities in Vietnam’s urban areas, occasioned by 
rapid economic development, has drawn a flood of rural migrants into the cities.  The growth of non-state 
sectors, as seen in the development of private enterprises and the rise of the informal economy, has 
facilitated and accelerated urbanward migrations.  The emergence of private enterprises has opened up a 
labor market for migrants without permanent residency, thereby breaking the link between one’s 
residential status and access to employment (Save the Children, U.K., 2006).  So too, thriving 
opportunities within the urban informal sector is luring more and more rural migrants into seeking ways of 
generating income outside of agricultural work.  It seems one can conclude, therefore, based on the 
migrants’ increased flexibility and mobility, that ho khau, as an institutional device intended to inhibit 
urbanization and manage population movement, has passed its heyday.  At the very least it comes as no 
surprise, especially given the lackluster results of the government-led resettlement programs as 
exemplified by the NEZs of the early 1990s, that the efficacy of the ho khau system, as the supposed 
backbone of state regional planning, is being challenged.  Economic expansion, facilitated by the 
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, seems to have a mind of its own.  
 And yet, despite its decreased extent of control over people’s mobility, ho khau continues to exert 
a powerful influence upon their lives via the link between one’s registration status and one’s access to 
rights and services in the registered location.  Indeed we have seen that so ho khau, or the household 
registration book, is required for all sorts of administrative procedures, which include but are not limited to 
purchase and registration of such essential properties as housing, land, and motor vehicles; installation of 
phone lines; borrowing money from banks; registration of marriages and children’s births; and access to 
formal schooling and subsidized medical care, water and electricity (Le et al., 2011; UN Viet Nam, 2010a). 




through the ho khau system is summarized in the Decree No.51/CP dated 10 May, 1997, and the Circular 
06/TT/BNV issued in the same year by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  In these legislative statements, ho 
khau is viewed as “a measure of administrative management of the State to determine the citizens’ place 
of residence, ensure the existence of their rights and obligations, enhance social management, and 
maintain political stability, social order and safety” (Le et al., 2011, p. 6).  As the system of ho khau now 
stands therefore, entitlement to government services is restricted by one’s residential status (UN Viet 
Nam, 2010a): while permanent residents are granted a maximum level of privileged rights and social 
protection, those without permanent residency or proper registration are very much left out of the 
government’s schemes. 
 The socialist State’s persistent emphasis on population management, which discourages 
spontaneous urbanward migration in an attempt to restrict rapid urban population growth, has been a 
source of much frustration at the local administrative level.  Massive inflows of migrants into urban centers, 
with the concomitant need for social infrastructure and administrative services, have imposed 
considerable pressures on city administrations (Save the Children, U.K., 2006).  Yet without effective 
measures or regulatory guidelines that they could use to alleviate such free-market pressures, city 
authorities carrying out day-to-day administrative tasks related to inward migration understandably 
express concern and even resentment.  Hardy (2003b), for instance, cites a remark made by an official 
from the Labor Department: “Nowadays, we do not yet have a policy for the administration of people 
registering to live in cities, but only the household registration management policy [i.e., the Decree 
No.51/CP, issued on 10 May, 1997]. . . .  But in reality in the market system, management of the process 
of free migration to the city cannot escape influences from many directions, and lies in the realm of 
general urban administrative policy” (p. 132).  
 What is alarming about the continued reliance upon the ho khau system, even in the post-doi moi 
era, is that the State’s migration policy, with its emphasis on restricting urbanization via the formulation of 
administrative measures designed to diminish the flow of unmanaged inward migration to the cities, not 
only underestimates the role of non-permanent and unregistered migrants as a driving force of economic 
growth; it also heightens those migrants’ vulnerabilities and risks by hindering them from gaining full 




counterparts.  Moreover, and as will be further illustrated in the ensuing chapters, the habit of 
undervaluing and excluding migrants through the institutional mechanism of ho khau has become 
intimately intertwined with social stigmatization of migrants as constituting a “shady existence” and 
thereby a threat to permanent city residents and to their urban environment.  Such negative 
conceptualizations of migrants point to a risk of ho khau becoming a social device all too conductive to 
furthering social disparities (UN Viet Nam, 2010b) and thereby increasing the marginalization of migrants.  
 Under the ho khau system the Vietnamese population has been classified into categories 
according to their residential status, granting them only the explicitly associated rights.  Prior to 2007 
there were four categories of residents: KT1, those with permanent registration in the district of current 
residence; KT2, those without permanent registration in the district of current residence but registered at 
another district of the same province/city (i.e., intra-district migrants); KT3, those without permanent 
registration at the place of current residence but with a temporary residence permit of 6-12 months with 
possible extension; KT4,16 those without permanent registration at the place of current residence but with 
a temporary residence permit of less than six months.  Apart from these four categories of residents, 
there were unregistered residents who resided in another district or province without registration while 
their permanent registration remained in their place of origin; these individuals were not captured 
statistically by official figures (UNDP, 2011).  Among such unregistered residents were people who had 
lost their original registration records and thereby become undocumented.   
In 2005, some legislative changes were made to ho khau with respect to changing residency.  
These included reforms implemented via the effectuation of Prime Minister Decree No. 108/2005/ND-CP 
issued on August 19, 2005, which moderately eased the conditions for migrants (mainly those in the KT3 
category) to gain KT1 residential status by reducing the required duration of continual residency from five 
to three years and by eliminating the requirement of owning a house (Save the Children, U.K., 2006; UN 
Viet Nam, 2010a).  Still, the renewed conditions to gain KT1 residency status, including residence in a 
                                                          
16 KT4 were distinct from KT1-KT3, in that they were registered as individuals without a family (UN Viet Nam 2010a). 
Seasonal workers and students residing temporarily in a province different from that of their permanent registration, 




“legal house”17 and having a stable job and continuous residence for years, remained hurdles too high for 
many prospective candidates to clear.  
The enforcement of the new Law on Residence passed in 2007 reduced the number of 
residence categories to two: temporary and permanent (UN Viet Nam, 2010a).  The legislative changes 
also brought a relaxation of the conditions for obtaining permanent residency in centrally administered 
cities.  Temporary residents became eligible to switch to permanent residency if they could provide a 
proof of one year of uninterrupted employment and residence, instead of three years of continuous 
residence as previously had been required.  Moreover, the old requirement of legal employment was 
dropped.  Still, it has been reported that a certain amount of inconsistency exists in the application of the 
2007 Law on Residence across the country.  While local authorities in Hanoi appear to be more rigorous 
in using the new residential categories, those in Ho Chi Minh City allegedly still are applying the old four 
categories of KT1-KT4.  This inconsistent application of the legislative changes seems to reflect both an 
absence of administrative guidance given to local authorities and a lack of consensus as to interpretation 
of the law across the various stakeholders.  
Of more concern to temporary migrants is a returning trend toward tightening conditions for 
migrants to Vietnam’s large cities.  The initial draft of the Capital Law of 2010 included reforms that would 
have significantly raised the bar for permanent residency in Hanoi, making the minimum duration of 
continuous residence not one year but five years and requiring proofs of an earned salary of twice the 
minimum wage and of legality of employment (UN Viet Nam, 2010a).  Even though the drafted reforms 
eventually were dropped prior to the consideration of the draft Capital Law by the National Assembly, the 
impulse that prompted their inclusion bespeaks the nation’s ongoing skepticism as well as “political 
schism” (UN Viet Nam, 2010a, p. 19) with regard to the issue of temporary migration to urban cities.  
Three years after its initial drafting, the Capital Law came into effect on July 1, 2013, prescribing the 
required minimum duration of residence in the city in order to apply for permanent residency as three 
consecutive years, as opposed to one year as formerly stipulated (“Ha Noi tightens residency criteria,” 
2013; “Hanoi to tighten immigration rules,” 2012; “Migration to Hanoi to be restricted from 2013,” 2012; 
Thao, 2012).  The Law also stipulated that migrants must prove their continuous registration as temporary 
                                                          




residents if they wish to obtain contracts for state jobs or other types of formal employment or to have one 
of the specified and proper living arrangements: house ownership; living with relatives who are permanent 
residence-holders in the city; or renting an accommodation having an average floor area of at least 15 
square meters per resident.  
 
In what follows, the study will seek to determine how economic, social, and cultural resources have been 
accessed and used by migrants and what challenges their patterns of resource-mobilization present in the 
context of post-doi moi Vietnamese society.  As will be illustrated in the next chapter, migrants’ ability to 
gain access to economic resources through formal channels is rather limited, due to their having merely 
temporary or unregistered residential status in the city.  In consequence, migrant families with limited ties 
to their home villages turn to off-the-books monetary sources in times of financial adversity, seeking to 
sustain themselves via unstable jobs within the informal sector.    
                                                                                                                                                                                           




CHAPTER III: FIELD SITE AND RESEARCH SETTING 
 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam: A Brief Overview  
Vietnam, or as it is formally known the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, occupies the easternmost part of the 
Indochina Peninsula in Southeast Asia.  With almost 90 million inhabitants (88.78 million, according to the 
2012 census) living on approximately 330,000 square kilometers of ground, it is the thirteenth most 
populous country on the planet and has the third largest population in Southeast Asia after Indonesia and 
the Philippines. Vietnam is bordered by the South China Sea to the east, Cambodia to the southwest, 
Laos to the northwest, and China to the north (see Figure 1).  The country has a surprising amount of 
climatic diversity, with four seasons in the north and in the south a subtropical climate that alternates 
between rainy and dry seasons.  To its climatic and topographical diversity is added the ethnic sort, for 
Vietnam’s diverse population is comprised of 54 officially recognized ethnic groups.  The Kinh people, 
traditionally lowland wet-rice cultivators (Salemink, 2003), accounts for nearly 86 percent of the nation’s 
overall population; the ethnic minorities, who represent only about 14 percent of the population and yet 
speak over a hundred languages, typically inhabit the upland, mountainous areas.  Syncretism 
characterizes Vietnam’s religious practices, for both major religions and a myriad of other belief systems 
have long held sway there (Salemink, 2003).  Buddhism once was practiced as a major state doctrine 
“[d]uring the first centuries of Vietnam’s independence from China” (Salemink, 2003, p. 35). Taoism and 
Confucianism, both of which originated in China, based their influence on moral and organizational 
principles and thrived from the early fifteenth century until the French occupation in the nineteenth century.  
In addition to these three long-established religions or belief systems, Christianity in its Catholic form was 
introduced into Vietnam during the sixteenth century but saw most of its growth in popularity only 
beginning in the nineteenth century.  Mingled with these religious influences have always been a 






Hanoi: Administrative and Sociological Space 
As rapid urbanization and socioeconomic differentiation occurs among its residents, Hanoi, the capital city 
of Vietnam, is in the process of diversifying its space, both administratively and sociologically.  Being the 
second largest city in the country after Ho Chi Minh City, its administrative area has been extended via  
 
Figure 1. Map of Vietnam and bordering countries  
 
Source: https://www.google.com/maps/@16.68209,104.4738005,6z (Google Maps, 2014)  
expanded boundaries.  According to Tien Phong Online (as cited in DiGregorio, 2011, p. 301), the 




seven surrounding provinces  to become a ‘megacity’ of nearly 13,436 square kilometres and 18 million 
people by 2050.”  Shortly after the promulgation of the plan in August 2008, Ha Tay province, one of the 
provinces formerly bordering Hanoi in the Red River Delta, became subsumed into Hanoi municipality, as 
did Vinh Phuc province’s Me Linh district and Hoa Binh province’s Dong Xuan, Tien Xuan, Yen Binh and 
Yen Trung communes (DiGregorio, 2011).  This 2008 annexation doubled Hanoi’s population and 
multiplied its municipal area by approximately 3.6 times; the merger also resulted in a rise of the city’s 
population living in its rural areas from 35 percent in 2007 to 59 percent in 2008, thereby reversing the 
proportions of urban and rural population.  As of 2012 the population of Hanoi stood at 6,844,100 and its 
area extended to 3,323.6 square kilometers (GSO, 2012a).  Of the city’s over 6.8 million people, 43 
percent (2,931,300) are reported to live in urban areas and 57 percent (3,912,800) in rural areas (GSO, 
2012b; GSO, 2012c).    
Existing studies of the residential distribution in different parts of the city point to how its historical 
development during the colonial and post-colonial periods, and the urbanization processes that have 
transpired in more recent years, have shaped socially differentiated residential spaces within it (Kato & 
Nguyen, 2009; Nguyen, 2011).  According to these studies, Hanoi is essentially comprised of five 
residential zones having very distinctive social characteristics: Old Quarter; French Colonial Quarter; 
urban residential areas that emerged during the subsidy period from the 1960s to the 1980s; new peri-
urban residential areas developed after the 1990s; and the outer-dyke areas along the Hoa Hong River.  
Situated in the heart of the city, the Old Quarter is believed to have come into existence with the 
1010 relocation of the country’s capital, by LyThai To under the rule of the Ly Dynasty, from Dai Viet to 
Thang Long (the current Hanoi).  Alternatively called “Hanoi - 36 districts” (Hà Nội - Ba mươi sáu phố 
phường),18 the area historically has been a residential and commercial area comprised of streets that 
specialize in distinctive artifacts and products sold, such as Pho Hang Bac (silver street), Pho Hang Gai 
(silk street), Pho Hang Ma (paper-products street), and Pho Hang Quat (hand-crafted wooden seals street.  
Most of this area’s residents are believed to be descendants of people who settled in before or during the 
French colonial period.  Typically residing in cramped houses standing in longitudinal land-plots, these 
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residents continue to rely heavily on manufacturing and/or merchandising crafts and other products they 
sell (Kato & Nguyen, 2009; Nguyen, 2011).   
 The French Quarter that surrounds the Old Quarter has long been the site of political and 
administrative headquarters (Kato & Nguyen, 2009).  After the withdrawal of the French colonial 
government, villas, detached houses, and buildings of colonial architecture were taken over by the 
revolutionary government, which turned some of them into government offices and converted others into 
residential houses and apartments to be dwelt in by powerful government officials.      
 During the subsidy period, a new set of residential areas was built under the centrally planned 
economy.  Heavily influenced by the former Soviet Union’s multi-story uniform apartment blocks, these 
new apartment buildings were built as state-subsidized housing and used mainly by government 
employees (Nguyen, 2011).  Each apartment was designed to have a compact area of just 20-40 square 
meters on average.  
 After the country’s turn toward an open-market economy in the mid-1980s, the city began to 
expand its residential neighborhoods into the peri-urban areas.  Starting in the 1990s high-rise apartment 
buildings and condominiums have increasingly been built, along with hotels and other commercial 
buildings and facilities.  The buyers and tenants of these buildings are mostly newcomers, plus emerging 
middle-class residents who are reaping the benefits of the market economy.  Meanwhile farmers, the 
former occupants of the land that these newly developed suburban areas are being built upon, are finding 
they have little choice other than to move out of their old, and often well-loved, localities.  Given the 
ongoing expansion of Hanoi’s municipal borders, this trend is likely to continue to affect villagers who 
suddenly find themselves residing in an urban area.  
 Lastly, neighborhoods in the outer-dyke areas (within which the Thanh Ninh area is situated) 
have attracted illegal squatters.  Some of the present residents initially came to occupy the area as far 
back as the 1950s (Kato & Nguyen, 2009).  Overall, the residents in these neighborhoods are comprised 
of a mixed group of people, from self-employed workers making a living from small trading and daily 
employment to a smaller groups of employees of government offices and enterprises and of farmers.  
These areas contain migrants from impoverished rural villages plus other low-income residents; some 




1990s, building houses with or without obtaining the so-called so do or “red books” (land-use certificates).  
The spread of “illegal housing,” often nothing more than shanties slapped together on a temporary basis, 
has put the residents in these areas at the constant risk of flooding and thus led to revised estimates of 
the river’s flood-level.  
 To sum up: This section has illustrated how Hanoi’s very diverse residential areas have been re-
shaped in the course of its historical and administrative transformations.  Increased urbanization and the 
expansion of its municipal localities in recent years have served to intensify the already very high degree 
of diversification of residents, with respect to both socioeconomic backgrounds and livelihoods.  The 
following section will provide the reader with a closer look at the study site, the so-called Thanh Ninh area. 
 
Thanh Ninh Area: Demographic and Socio-Cultural Contexts  
Situated about two kilometers from the center of the city, the Thanh Ninh area is one of the popular 
destinations for rural migrants undertaking a short- or long-term migration to Hanoi.  Running north-south 
along the Hoa Hong River, the area attracts migrants from such surrounding Northern provinces as Bắc 
Giang, Hưng Yên, Nam Định, Ninh Bình, and Thanh Hóa.  These migrants turn to casual laboring and 
small trading as their primary sources of employment and income-generation (Save the Children, U.K., 
2006).  While Hanoi itself retains its “semi-rural nature” (Li, 1996, p. 15) largely just because its historical 
development is attributed to generations of people coming to it from the countryside’s neighboring 
provinces, the Thanh Ninh area has become known, ever since the early 1990s, as a popular destination 
for flocks of spontaneous migrants coming into the city.  Following the promulgation of Doi Moi in 1986, 
the number of nha tro19 or lodging houses has boomed.  This is understandable, for nha tro 
accommodate migrants requiring temporary residence for a modest price during their migration in Hanoi 
(Li, 1996).  It also is worth noting that the rise of spontaneous migrants coincided with the opening of a 
wholesale agricultural market in the center of the Thanh Ninh area in mid-1992 (Agergaard & Thao, 2011).  
This market continues to provide opportunities for many seasonal migrants, who work there as porters 
and in other capacities. 
                                                          
19 Generally speaking, a nha tro is a room rented out by a live-in landlord.  The dimensions and facilities of such 
rooms vary, but typically a room consists of a mere sleeping space on the floor for up to ten, and sometimes even 
dozens, of people.  While a kitchen facility often is provided and is shared by some of the tenants, especially the 
women, all of the tenants share a bathroom, which usually is nothing more than a pit toilet plus a hut used for bathing.  




Prior to the surge of material and population flows brought about by the advent of the doi moi 
reforms and the subsequent opening of the wholesale market, the Thanh Ninh area had been a piece of 
state-owned land having few settlements, just some government offices and state-owned apartments for 
the use of government employees (ward official, personal communication, September 21, 2013).  Dotted 
with several lagoons, the area once served as a food-supply base where rau muong (water morning 
glory)—once a staple vegetable of the poor, and even today an essential culinary ingredient in Vietnam—
was grown to feed Hanoi’s citizens.  The government recruited farmers from northern provincial villages to 
cultivate and harvest crops.  The hydroponically cultivated vegetables, chiefly rau muong, would be 
handpicked by farmers moving around by boat.  Repeated floods and breakage of dykes, however, 
eventually compelled the government to fill in the lagoons and to continually heighten the dykes.   
In the wake of the doi moi reforms, the part of the land that had been used for farming was 
allotted to farmers and their families.  The allocation system worked thus: the larger the household, the 
larger the piece of land provided.  The convergence of a rising number of spontaneous rural migrants with 
the government’s disinclination to hunt for illegal squatters occasioned the encroachment of people 
settling into the Thanh Ninh area and building alleys, shops, and houses without obtaining authorization 
from the government.  Subsequently, meaning in the 1990s, real neighborhoods began to take shape 
between the dykes and the river (Koh, 2006).  A woman who moved to the area in 1992 with her husband 
and her mother-in-law, after they had bought a piece of land there, told me that some people would 
encroach upon an open space, build a house here, and self-claim their ownership to the land.  Others 
who did not have enough money to build houses would squat in an empty lot, setting up shacks made of 
found materials, though in the early 1990s some of these shacks were demolished by the government 
when the construction of the wholesale market began on a site where one of the lagoons previously had 
existed.  The migrants continued, however, to demand places to settle in, and this outcry led some of the 
families of the former farmers to rent out spaces they were not using; others even turned sandbanks 
adjoining the river into a complex of shelters for the use of low-income unregistered migrants, doing so 
behind the government’s back in order to cash in on the newly lucrative situation.  The completion of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
or the other, and each room is occupied by a group of migrants from the same village, mostly acquaintances or 




wholesale market in 1992, which as we have seen attracted a large number of migrants ready and willing 
to work as porters, etc., further accelerated this trend.   
Moreover, after the liberalization of the housing sector began in 1991, the modest land prices in 
the Thanh Ninh area, as compared to those in other central locations of Hanoi, started to attract a new set 
of residents: outsiders who could afford to buy land.  Pundits trying to come up with a logical reason for 
such modest land prices, in particular in some of the most migrant-concentrated sections of the area, 
have pointed to the constant risk of demolition by the government, unstable soil conditions produced by 
multiple landfills, and the proliferation of “illegal construction.”20  The latter, however, is by no means a 
problem unique to the Thanh Ninh area; to the contrary it is widespread across Hanoi, for construction 
projects that often involve drilling and pile-driving along the dykes can weaken a dyke or even completely 
undermine its foundation (Koh, 2006).  In 2005, a massive redevelopment project along the Hoa Hong 
River was announced via the release of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), co-signed by the 
then mayors of Seoul and Hanoi at the World Mayor Forum (Ngoc, 2005).  The project set out to enhance 
flood-control and to create an urban parkland and multi-complexes for industrial, residential, and touristic 
purposes along both sides of the Hoa Hong River.  It began to take shape, in the wake of the 2007 
development proposal put forward by the Seoul Metropolitan Government, at an estimated cost of US$7 
billion (Moffat, 2011).  According to the plan an estimated 90,000 homes were to be provided for 318,180 
people, but the downside was huge: all the current residents living along the river—estimated at 170,000 
(39,100 households) as of 2008, and with both figures sure to go higher—would have to be relocated 
(Lamarcam, 2011; Minh, 2008).  As of now the development plan has been placed on hold, due to 
expressed concerns with respect to both a foreseen difficulty in the relocation of households and possible 
adverse effects of high-density development on the ecosystem, perhaps leading to more flooding (Moffat, 
2011).  The project’s halt has been a great relief to Thanh Ninh residents, especially to those without 
                                                          
20 In Vietnam, activities that involve either “build[ing] a house or other dwelling from scratch, or any extension or 
renovation to either the interior or exterior of a house or a flat . . . without official licenses or permits” (Koh, 2006, p. 
205) are considered “illegal construction.”  At the root of the problem is a severe shortage of housing in Hanoi, a 
holdover from the socialist housing regime.  Back then, a mere 10% of houses in Hanoi had non-state ownership, and 
all houses having more than one room were nationalized.  The original inhabitants of the nationalized houses were 
allocated just one room and were required to rent out the remaining rooms to other families (Koh, 2006; Hayton, 
2010).  People’s rising expectations for higher housing quality and their felt need for privacy, as those factors 
combined with a considerable growth in the number and size of families, intensified the housing shortage in Hanoi 




formal ownership of their houses or land,21 and all the more so to the lan nau residents who live in 
houseboats on the river.  Uncertainty remains, however, as to whether occupants without legal ownership 
will be provided with compensation for their relocation; a rumor has widely been circulating among the 
Thanh Ninh residents that the inhabitants of “illegal housing” will not be eligible for such compensation. 
At the center of the Thanh Ninh area stands the large-scale agricultural wholesale market.  One 
will find there all in-season fruits and vegetables, being sold in bunches.  The market not only draws 
merchants but also serves as a major source of employment for internal migrants coming to work as the 
porters and laborers who load, unload, and make deliveries (Save the Children, U.K., 2006).  While the 
merchants who are registered to sell and trade their products at the market are mostly non-migrant Hanoi 
residents (Thanh Ninh Market Manager, personal communication, August 24, 2010), porters and laborers 
almost always are migrants with or without papers.  Although the market is open on a round-the-clock 
basis, its “rush hours” come in the wee hours from 2 to 5 a.m., at which time transactions involving large 
volumes of fruits and vegetables take place between wholesalers and retailers (Agergaard & Thao, 2011).  
Two of the busiest market “days,” aside from Tet (Lunar New Year) and other special holidays, are the 
nights before the first and fifteenth days of each lunar month.  On those days people go to pagodas to 
honor ancestors, and there is a great demand for fruit and flowers as offerings. 
Aside from its market, the Thanh Ninh area also exerts a magnetic attraction upon migrants 
because, as we have seen, it is a place where they can engage in small trading, street-selling, and 
motorbike taxi- driving.  Further adding to its convenience in the eyes of migrants coming from nearby 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1980s that some liberalizing changes were brought into the arena of housing, followed by the state’s formal 
recognition in 1991 of “the right of private ownership and participation in the housing sector” (Koh, 2006, p.220).   
 
21 In Vietnam, formal land/house ownership is notarized via a so do, a land-use certificate called a “red book.”  A 
significant gap between the number of home/land buyers and the provision of red books by localities has been 
reported in a recent news article (“Red book grants suffer lengthy delays,” 2013).  On top of the lengthy administrative 
procedures for obtaining a red book, home/land buyers need to pay a high price for its issuance based on the square- 
footage of their property.  For instance, in 2001 a couple in the Thanh Ninh area purchased for 200 million VND a 
piece of land (55.1 square meters) having an abandoned house without drainage; then in 2009 they demolished the 
old house and constructed a new four-storied one of 220.4 square meters.  The couple was not even aware of the 
requirement to obtain a red book, or of the danger that existed until 2010 of having their house demolished by the 
government, without compensation, if they were found to be without a red book.  In order to minimize that risk they 
filed for a red book in 2010 and paid 100 million VND to the people’s committee in their locality. Out of that 100 million 
VND, 25 million VND went to the issuance fee and the rest (75 million VND) to the middleman who had helped the 
couple with the registration process.  It took them over three months to have their red book granted.  Residents who 
are unwilling to pay, or simply incapable of paying, such high processing fees often opt not to obtain a red book.  




northern provinces are the bus service that connects the Thanh Ninh area to Hanoi’s neighboring 
provincial towns and villages and a variety of low-budget rental accommodations such as the nha tro.  
Both existing studies and anecdotal evidence drawn from my interviews with local authorities 
point to a high incidence of non-permanent residents, be they temporarily registered or unregistered 
migrants, in the Thanh Ninh area.  For instance, the migration study done by Save the Children U.K. 
(2006) cited a large number of seasonal migrants at certain times of the year.  Local authorities remarked 
that the percentage of registered temporary migrants, in the ward we happened to be discussing, 
fluctuated and increased at certain times of the year by 5 to 6 percent.  According to a ward official in the 
Thanh Ninh area, in some of the migrant-concentrated segments of the area the number of migrant 
residents exceeds that of permanent residents (ward official, personal communication, September 21, 
2013).  While the number of permanent residents in the area continues to rise every year, so does the 
number of migrant residents.  In one section of a migrant-concentrated ward that holds about 1,400 
residents, permanent residents are estimated to make up only about 30 percent of the total.  It is 
speculated that among the migrant residents, only 2-3 percent are holders of temporary residency 
permits; the rest of the migrants are unregistered.  With respect to the entire migrant population residing 
in the area, the largest proportion is considered to be engaged in unskilled work in the informal sector, 
with typical jobs being porter, xe om (motorcycle taxi) driver, petty trader, roving street-vendor, tea-seller 
and recycle/garbage-collector.   
While the public image of the Thanh Ninh area as a low-income residential neighborhood seems 
to derive largely from the visible presence of migrants working and living in the area, and to a somewhat 
lesser extent from the high concentration of nha tro and other low-cost housing catering to migrants and 
impoverished residents, a closer look at the area reveals it to be slightly more multi-layered in its social 
structure.  Not all the neighborhoods in the area strike one as being seedy or deprived, and many are 
simply thriving and therefore cheerful.   
For instance, both the entrance to the market and the streets surrounding it bustle with truckers, 
motorbike riders, and porters, all of them laden with fruits and vegetables, as well as with people coming 




small shops, among them being cafés, com binh dan,22 and other unpretentious eateries serving such 
quotidian repasts as pho (Vietnamese rice noodles), plus karaoke bars and beauty salons.  Most of the 
nha tro where single migrants live (those who have come to Hanoi to work without bringing their families, 
regardless of their marital status) are located on this southern side of the market.  To the north extend 
more middle-class residential neighborhoods, mixed with sparse shops along the streets.  The closer the 
neighborhoods are to the dykes that divide the Thanh Ninh area from the main road the more sturdy-
looking the houses appear, many of them indeed being built with cement and iron and having their own 
entrances. 
 
Figure 2. Back street of the Thanh Ninh area 
                                                          
22 Literally meaning “working-class rice” and thus “popular meals,” com binh dan are inexpensive eateries that serve a 
variety of common local dishes normally consisting of rice, vegetable, soup, and a selection of meat dishes.  





As one moves away from the main road and the dykes so as to follow small alleys leading 
toward the river, neighborhoods come into sight that contain smaller and shabbier-looking houses and 
informal settlements subdivided into tiny shacks.  Constructed of corrugated metal roofs and bare cement 
walls, these settlements are all that many impoverished migrant families have to call home.  The alleys 
are dotted with tiny shops only about 10 square meters in size, although the minute one steps inside, one 
will be astonished to see that they are packed with groceries (e.g., milk, eggs, rice, snacks, cooking oil, 
rehydratable noodles, candies) and daily essentials (e.g., bathroom tissues, Kleenex, toothbrushes, 
detergents, shampoos, body soaps, diapers).  The alleys are unpaved, and so narrow that no cars can 
get in; motorbikes or bicycles do just fine, however, thereby causing pedestrians to cling closely to the 
edge of the alley to avoid being knocked down (see Figure 2).  
 As one reaches the eastern edge of the Thanh Ninh area, the Hoa Hong River and a midstream 
island come into view.  Adjacent to the island are informal settlements on the river: a few dozen 
dilapidated houseboats (see Figure 3).  Called Lang Nau or brown village,23 this houseboat community is 
composed largely of people who have come to Hanoi from different places of origin.  While the farmland 
on the island is not owned by the settlers in Lang Nau, some landowners now allow Lang Nau residents 
to tend their vegetable patches.   
                                                          
23 More extensive descriptions of the brown village and those of its residents who participated in this study are 





Inter-class division can be seen cropping up all across the social geography of Hanoi, as noted 
earlier, and the Thanh Ninh area is no exception in this regard given its mixture of middle- and lower-class 
residents.  A moment ago I alluded to the alleys in the riverfront area, and it is just as well to make clear 
at this juncture that in Vietnamese duong and pho are roads or streets and thus relatively big and wide,  
ngo and ngach small and narrow back streets and alleys.  The discrepancy can be significant, because in 
addition to geographical location and residential neighborhood, the road, street, or alley that a person’s 
home is located on can be an additional indication of her/his social status.  Owning a house can lend one 
a certain social status or upward mobility, but the precise location of the house matters as well.  The 
assumption is that the bigger the street on which the house stands, the wealthier its owner must be.   
Conversely, if the property is located on a small, narrow alley in a section of low land values, its owner is 
not likely to be perceived as being of a high social class, no matter how big the house may be. 
 




 The resettlement patterns in Thanh Ninh area also speak to this issue of the perceived parallel 
between the precise location of the resident and her or his social class.  As noted earlier, the residential 
neighborhoods that extend to the north of the market have more free-standing houses, made of cement 
and iron and with their own entrances, than do the rest of Thanh Ninh’s neighborhoods.  Then too, most 
of the front streets in these neighborhoods are paved, and wide enough to permit two-way automobile 
traffic.  While the residents comprise the usual mix of rental tenants and house-owners, they are 
conceived to be relatively better off as compared to the denizens of other neighborhoods.  When it comes 
to the neighborhood to the south of the market, on the other hand, although both the front and back 
streets have more traffic, they are not well paved and thus rough in spots.  The streets and alleys are 
packed with nha tro catering to temporary migrants, as well as small, inexpensive eateries such as the 
com binh dan and rice-noodle shops.  What the reader who has seen neither of these Thanh Ninh 
neighborhoods should realize is that as one moves east in either the northern or the southern 
neighborhood so as to get to the river (or more specifically, to the dyke that separates the Thanh Ninh 
area from Hanoi’s main road), the narrower the street gets and the more seedy become the complexes 
and shelters inhabited chiefly by low-income residents.  And as we have seen, beyond the edge of these 
neighborhoods is the river, with its midstream island and houseboats.  To sum up: social differentiation 
and segregation within the Thanh Ninh area, to the extent that these are revealed by dwelling-place, are 
manifested by the physical location of a person’s house, the exterior house materials, and the 
geographical location of Hanoi’s residential neighborhoods. 
   
 
Who Are Migrants?  
The purpose of this section is twofold.  First, it seeks to explain the way the term migrants is defined in the 
context of Vietnam’s official census, to reveal that definition’s limitations, and to clarify how the term is 
used in this study.  Second, it attempts to give the reader a more vivid sense of the livelihoods and social 
circumstances of the migrants who participated in this study.  To that end, the section features two 
migrant families.   
 
Definition of Migrants  
How are migrants defined officially, within the context of Vietnam’s national census?  In the nation’s 




“people [who are aged 5 or older and] whose place of residence 5 years prior to the time of the census is 
different from their current place of residence” (GSO, 2011, p. 19).  Non-migrants, in turn, are “people 
whose place of residence 5 years prior to the time of the census is their current place of residence” (GSO, 
2011, p. 19).  Thus this definition of migrants leaves out both long-term migrants—those who migrated 
more than five years prior to the census date—and return migrants: those whose migration took place 
within the five-year period but who had already returned to their place of origin before the time of the 
census.  Consequently temporary, seasonal, and circular migrants not only are hard to identify due to 
their shorter periods of stay but often are “mixed in with non-migrant or migrant populations” (GSO, 2011, 
p. 19).  Moreover, given that one’s place of residence in the census context is based on her/his de jure 
place of registration (Dang et al., 2003), inevitably not captured are those who migrated without going 
through the temporary registration procedures; that is, unregistered migrants.  The limitations of this 
definition and the deficiencies of this mode of identification of migrants have been acknowledged by 
Vietnam-based organizations and scholars alike (Dang et al., 2003; GSO & UNFPA Viet Nam, 2005; Le et 
al., 2011; Save the Children, U.K., 2006; UN Viet Nam, 2010a; 2010b), and even by the GSO (2011) itself. 
All those in the field point to how the official figures on internal migrants, as recorded by the census, are 
underrepresenting temporary migrants, including seasonal and circular migrants, not to mention non-
registered migrants.   
Meanwhile, the number of unregistered migrants is reported to be on the rise.  In his research on 
population and urbanization in Ho Chi Minh City, Thanh (as cited in GSO & UNFPA Viet Nam, 2005) was 
able, by comparing the data compiled in 1998 and in 2000, to identify a growing presence of unregistered 
migrants across all the districts of Ho Chi Minh City.  The percentage of unregistered migrants increased 
by approximately 2 percent; this means that this group went from making up around 13 percent of the 
population of Ho Chi Minh City in 1998 to over 15 percent in 2000, in 20 out of 22 districts.  Similarly, 
according to the estimate of the share of unregistered migrants arrived at by Koesveld (as cited in Le et 
al., 2011), over the next ten years we will see an increase of about 45 percent of their share of overall 
urban population.  
Aside from the methodological difficulty inherent to the formal identification of migrants, there is 




Under the ho khau system people are required on each occasion to notify the local police in their place of 
origin of their upcoming migration to a city (or elsewhere), and to re-register upon arrival at their places of 
destination.24  This means that with the exception of those people who have just very short-term lengths 
of stay, such as circular migrants engaged in daily or weekly commutes, most migrants to Hanoi should, 
in principle, be registered for long- or short-term temporary residence even if their household registration 
books remain in their places of origin.  One clear reason explaining why so many migrants opt out of 
obtaining temporary registration as either KT3 or KT4 is their desire to steer clear of the onerous 
administrative procedures involved in the process.  In order to be granted KT4 registration one needs to 
be equipped with a proof of secure employment at the destination area, as well as letters from local 
authorities endorsing her/his release from the place of origin (UN Viet Nam, 2010a).  Little wonder that a 
good many people migrate unregistered, given that they have no formal employment contract and could 
only guess the likely length of their stay.  And of course many others simply are not aware that they are 
bypassing the lengthy administrative process entailed in applying for temporary residency.  Then too, 
some migrants decide not to renew their temporary residence permits after their initial registration as KT4 
has expired.  Or other circumstances may have changed, and made it hard for them to have their papers 
renewed. And of course while many migrants decide to move to a new destination in the hope of finding 
new and better opportunities and/or to improve their living conditions, in the case of many others, getting 
renewal was not their choice to begin with.  Although opting out of temporary registration is not lawful in a 
strict sense, the relaxation of ho khau as the backbone of centralized population control has given people 
on the move at least some “wiggle room” for negotiation.  
The fact remains, however, that the shift from temporary to permanent residence status is the 
biggest hurdle many migrants continue to face.  The results of the 2004 VMS revealed that as many as 46 
percent of those surveyed had responded that they remained temporary residents at the current 
residence because they believed their application for permanent registration would not be accepted (GSO 
& UNFPA Viet Nam, 2005).  While the number of respondents who went unregistered after their 
temporary residency had expired is unknown, the survey results suggest that the chance of being granted 
permanent residency is, for the majority of spontaneous migrants, fairly low.  Among the respondents who 
                                                          




expressed their disbelief in the likelihood of their obtaining permanent residence status, 53 percent 
migrated in search of a job and 47 percent moved to improve their living conditions—those indeed being 
the two major reasons for spontaneous migration. 
The migrant families who participated in this study25 represent that a segment of migrants whose 
existence is not captured in the census owing to their status of “without papers” or to the long-term, semi-
permanent nature of their migration.  Thus, migrants are herein defined as those who reside in their 
current place of residence without permanent-residency status, regardless of either possession of 
temporary permit or length of stay.  Of the migrant families interviewed, only one had obtained a 
temporary permit; the rest of the interviewees had not done so.  All of the participants were non-seasonal 
migrants (i.e., migrants intending to stay in the city for an indefinite period) residing in the city with their 
families, with the exception of one seasonal female migrant who comes to work in the city without her 
family for only short periods of time (two weeks to a month) during the slack seasons on the family farm.26  
All migrant participants except one27 originated from provinces in northern Vietnam: Bac Giang, Hai 
Duong, Hung Yen, Lang Son, Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, Thai Binh or Thanh Hoa (see Figure 4).  
 
Minh: Single Mother in Brown Village 
Minh is a single mother and a widow, in her thirties.  She lives in a brown village with her two children.  
My first encounter with her was coincidental.  The day we first met, Huyen,28 my research assistant, and I 
were going to visit one of the charity-class students who lives in the brown village.  This was the first time 
that Huyen and I had ever visited the village, which is accessible only from the midpoint of the nearby 
bridge because it is located on a midstream island.  As soon as we set foot there we noted a drastic 
change of scenery, from urban to more rural: land covered with grass, weeds, and some vegetable fields; 
unpaved paths leading to the village settlement, essentially made up of scattered  houseboats floating on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
30 days or more must register their temporary status with the police” (UN Viet Nam, 2010a, p. 18). 
 
25 The study’s research sample, including both migrant and non-migrant participants, is provided in Appendix A, 
Research Methodology.  
 
26 In keeping with the purpose of this study as set out in Chapter I, the study’s target group is migrant families with an 
intention to stay in the destination area on more than just a short-term basis; the study’s one seasonal migrant was 
contacted with a view to observing firsthand the living conditions in nha tro.  
 
27 One participant was born in Hanoi, but she later lost her permanent-resident status in the city due first to the loss of 




the river, toward both ends of the island; no streetlights; and entirely free of the hustle and bustle of the 
city.  Not knowing in which direction we should be heading, we inquired of a boy and a girl, both of them 
being about primary school age, who were walking right in front of us.  They turned out to know the 
student to whom we were paying a visit, and agreed to take us to where he and his family live.  As we 
followed the children for 10 to 15 minutes toward the edge of the island, we saw a woman, whom I would 
later learn is named Minh, walking ahead of us, pushing a bicycle laden with plastic bags full of plastic 
bottled beverages and bags of chips.  When she reached a houseboat she started to unload them, a task 
that appeared to be too much for her to handle on her own.  Since we were not in a hurry we decided to 
lend her a hand, helping her to carry the beverages into her houseboat.  After thanking the children who 
had led us there, we approached the entrance to the houseboat.  Minh, who was sitting on the living-room 
floor sorting her bottles into several different plastic baskets, looked up at us.  She then looked straight at 
Huyen and spoke to her in a friendly manner: “I know you! You used to work in the Hang Dau area, didn’t 
you?”  As it turned out, Minh was an old acquaintance of Huyen’s from her street-working days; they had 
not seen each other since the late 1990s.  Although Huyen did not remember Minh’s face well, Minh said 
that she had quickly recognized Huyen’s face, and noted that she had not changed much since she was 
younger.  After we had finished carrying in all the bottles, Minh invited us both in for drinks.   
Minh’s houseboat, like others in the brown village, was shabby looking.  It was covered with a thin 
wooden shingle held in place by ill-fitting wooden beams, and had plastic sheets on its sides for weather 
protection.  Just two narrow wooden boards connected the shore and the house.  The house itself was 
divided into two sections—living room with attached kitchen space, and sleeping room—partitioned by a 
thin bamboo board.  The living room looked bare but it had a household altar; underneath the altar was a 
wooden desk, atop which were a photograph of a deceased person (I later learned it was her late 
husband) and offerings to the altar: a bunch of lychee, tobacco, and a small cup of alcohol.  Given that 
there was no running water in the house, Minh’s family, like their neighbors, would use water drawn from 
a feed-pump in the village to cook and wash their clothes.  
Minh was born in 1979 in the Thanh Ninh area, as the oldest daughter of the family.  Still very 
young when her parents divorced, she grew up with her mother and two other siblings, one of whom has 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




since passed away.  Her mother has had a gambling problem as long as Minh can remember; when she 
was in primary school, her family lost their house because of it.  Her family then moved from one place to 
another.  She went to school through the second grade, but in order to support her family she started to 
work in the Hang Dau lake area, which is a hub for street-children and peddlers.  In the beginning she 
was working alongside her mother as a tea-seller.  As she became a teenager she started to engage in 
what she euphemistically dubbed “social evil.”  After inhabiting a series of temporary dwellings, the family 
had just gotten settled in Thanh Ninh area when a massive typhoon hit the city; their house was flooded 
and their ho khau went missing.  Owing to their financial hardship the family never was able to have its ho 
khau reinstated29; thus they lost their permanent residency and became unregistered in the end.  Minh’s 
encounter with her late husband, who was a migrant worker from Bac Kan province (situated to the north 
of Hanoi in the Northeast region), was a life-changing event that brought at least a brief break from her life 
filled with distress.  The young couple soon fell in love, but his parents opposed their marriage.  
Eventually they eloped without getting legally married and had two children.  The family moved to the 
brown village in 2007.  There they bought a houseboat for 6 million VND30 in the hope of starting a new 
life. Their financially pressured yet happy concubinage did not last long, however.  In 2009, two years 
after their move to the brown village, Minh’s husband died and left her with an 11-year-old son and a 6-
year-old daughter to raise all on her own. 
Since 2008, Minh has been working as a tea-seller on the bridge that connects the midstream 
island to the mainland.  Along with three of her neighbors she serves drinks to customers who stop by for 
a drink on the bridge.  Their setup is very simple: a sheet or two of straw matting, and a box that contains 
the bottles, ice, and glasses (see Figure 5).  During the day, most of the customers are farmers who 
cultivate plots on the island beneath the bridge; in the evening, the women’s stalls attract a greater 
number of young couples and others who come to have drinks and enjoy the night view of the city.  The 
tea-sellers work long hours, normally from noon to midnight, although sometimes they cut their work short 
when there are few customers.  On good days they can make as much as 150,000 to 200,000 VND; on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
challenges of working with an interpreter—are provided later in this chapter.    
 





bad days they barely make 50,000 VND.  The average monthly income Minh can derive from tea-selling 
is around 1.5 million VND, but “average” is a misleading term since her income is fairly unstable.  The 
women’s sales are directly dependent upon the weather as well, for when it rains, there is no business. 
And even the good news is bad news in a sense, for as the bridge has become a hot spot for young 
people over the last few years it has started to draw an increasing number of competitors as well as 
customers.  When Minh and her village neighbors first began their tea-selling business, in 2008, there 
were only four of them; nowadays more than 20 sellers occupy the bridge during the nighttime.  As a 
result the average amount of Minh et al.’s sales has not changed, or even worsened.  
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Figure 4. Map of Hanoi and neighboring provinces 
 
Source: https://www.google.com/maps/@20.7803649,106.0462187,9z (Google Maps, 2014) 
Currently both Minh’s son and her daughter attend a local public school, with the administrative 
and financial support of NGOs.  In the past they attended a literacy class (similar to a charity class) that 
was provided by one of the NGOs operating in the area, with the instruction coming from college 
volunteers.  Prior to his entering the literacy class her son gained admittance to a public school through a 
social connection Minh had at the time, despite his lack of both birth certificate and ho khau as a result of 




person, the school principal, left the school, however, when Minh’s son was in the third grade, he was 
made to quit school owing to his lack of a birth certificate and thus was left with no choice but to seek an 
informal education.  This trying experience led Minh to negotiate with her late husband’s parents in 
person, in Bac Kan, begging them to have her children registered under their ho khau.  They were 
reluctant at first but eventually her tenacious appeal, reminding them how important it was that their 
blood-related grandchildren have unimpeded access to formal schooling and thereby a brighter future, 
won their hearts and they agreed to follow up. 
Minh acknowledged frankly to me that she could not, or at least would not, trust anyone except 
her own children.  Although she has some old friends in the Thanh Ninh neighborhood where she used to 
live, and they see each other every once in a while, she told me she would not consult with any of them, 
not even in times of difficulty.  “I have been through a number of disappointments and betrayals from my 
own family.  Five, six years ago, my younger brother asked me to lend him money so he could start a new 
business, but then he disappeared without repaying the money.  More recently, my mother begged me for 
the same thing.  I had to raid my savings to lend her money, but I never heard back from her again.  Later 
I found out that she spent all the money on gambling!  I mean, how can you trust someone unrelated to 
you, when you can’t even trust your own [family] (nguoi nha con khong tin duoc nua la nguoi dung 





Figure 5. Tea-seller on the Thanh Ninh bridge 
       
Thu and Her Peddling Family   
Thu was one of the few girls with whom Huyen and I had contact outside the charity class, and without 
having forged any previous social connection.  When we first met, she and her youngest brother Khanh 
were “working” at a local pagoda, begging for mercy.31  Originating in Nam Dinh province, Thu’s family 
typifies how a migrant family makes a living in the informal sector.  The family moved to Hanoi in 2004 to 
find better opportunities in the city, outside of farming.  In the early days of their migration the parents 




stayed home and took care of each other.  Her mother, Hien, would work as a roving street-vendor, 
carrying fruit on a pole; her father, Ngoc, was the attendant of a motorcycle parking lot at a coffee shop.  
After 2006 the parents and Thu, the eldest daughter of the family, began to work on the same street 
corner, near one of the international chain hotels located in the city center.  While Hien and Thu were 
peddling side-by-side small touristic items such as postcards, folding fans, and logoed caps, Ngoc was 
working as an xe om or motorcycle driver.   
Thu’s family’s house, where they lived until 2012, was located on a tiny quiet alley at the northern 
edge of the Thanh Ninh area.  Unlike the cluster housing in the central part of the Thanh Ninh area, near 
the wholesale market where multiple households of low-income migrant residents inhabit each complex, 
their house was a solitary one of two stories.32  The first floor had a living room about 12 square meters in 
size, a small kitchen, and a bathroom in the back; the second floor was made up of a sleeping room for 
the whole family.  Like many other migrant families living in a limited space with multiple household 
members, they too, a family of six, shared a queen-sized bed.  They had an old TV and a portable electric 
fan in the house but it lacked basic furniture, such as a dining table or desk.  When eating they would use 
an aluminum tray to serve meals, so that they would not have to put their bowls and plates on the floor.   
Thu dropped out of school when the family migrated to Hanoi; she was a second-grader.  Her 
younger sister, Hoa, and her brother, Van, were lucky enough to secure, by the time they had reached 
school age, financial support from an NGO to attend a public primary school in the Thanh Ninh area.  
Because of Thu’s older age and long periods of being out of school, it was not as easy for her to get 
admitted to a public school in Hanoi.  Although she had a strong desire to go back to school as soon as 
possible, it was her parents’ (and the NGO’s) opinion that she should wait until the new school year 
started and transfer to a public school, instead of attending an informal literacy class such as the charity 
class.  “They tell me that it’s no use going to a class like that,” Thu told me, “because they only teach 
basic education and it won’t help you to have a better future.”  A major concern the family had, however, 
was the condition set by the NGO: in exchange for receiving financial assistance, children were not 
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32 In terms of rent, those complexes close to the market were slighter cheaper (2 million VND in average), whereas 




allowed to work on the street.  If they were caught doing so, support would be terminated.  Because 
Huyen and I knew that Hoa would be joining her mother and sister to do street-sell on the weekends and 
during her school breaks, Thu begged us not to tell the NGO so that Hoa could stay in school.  
Thu’s family, like so many other low-income, unskilled migrant families, has been in financial 
distress, and they continue to seek out better ways to cope with it.  Since their relocation to the city the 
family has moved three times and has tried out different jobs (all in the informal sector) at various 
locations so as to improve their income security.  As of 2010, the year in which I did my intensive 
research, Thu and Khanh were going to a pagoda to beg on the first and fifteenth days of each lunar 
month.  Hien and Ngoc, the parents, tried to sell drinks during the night hours, because their combined 
revenues from street-selling and Ngoc’s xe om business were not sufficient to provide for the family.  
When I returned to Hanoi in 2013 for a follow-up study I found that the parents were embarking on a new 
business: peddling items that were name-brand imitations (e.g., T-shirts, wallets, and clutch bags) across 
the city and indeed all the way to Bac Ninh City,33 where there were fewer street-sellers.  Thus they were 
constantly making an effort to increase their financial security, both by diversifying their activities that 
might generate income and by trying to find a niche market relatively devoid of competition.  They were 
still struggling to make ends meet, however, owing to their being unskilled labor and non-permanent 
residents in the city—two devastatingly interacting factors that have essentially trapped them in the 
informal sector without any prospect of upward mobility.  While the family no longer held land or property 
in their home village in Nam Dinh, they were registered under the ho khau of Ngoc’s widowed mother, 
who lives with his two younger unmarried brothers.       
To my and Huyen’s surprise, when we visited Thu’s family again in 2013 we found that Thu had 
left for Hai Phong,34 where her uncle on her mother’s side lives, to work.  As it turned out the NGO’s 
support had abruptly been terminated in 2011, due to its own mismanagement.  Thus the parents decided 
to move out of their old two-storied house and into the current one in another part of the Thanh Ninh area 
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decided in 2012 to relocate to a deserted house whose rental fee was less expensive.    
 





—a one-story deserted house situated in a patch of waste land and requiring their own refurbishment.  
That way they could save on rent,35 and keep Hoa and Van in school with their own finances.  At the time 
of my return visit in 2012 Thu had just resumed her schooling after years of waiting but she soon quit it, 
feeling ashamed to be going there when her school fees were no longer being paid by the NGO.  Khanh, 
the youngest boy, was supposed to attend a kindergarten with the NGO’s sponsorship, but without its 
support he had no choice but to stay home for two consecutive years.  The situation changed when their 
foreign benefactor, he whose donation to the NGO as a “child sponsor” had been used to pay Thu and 
her siblings’ school fees, contacted the family through a Vietnamese friend in early 2013.  He was trying 
to find out why the NGO had stopped sending him letters informing about Thu’s family whom he was 
sponsoring.  After he had discovered that his financial support was not reaching the family as it should 
have been, he visited the family in person, along with his local friend; he agreed to send the money 
directly to the family on the condition that they would give him the school bills so that he could be sure the 
amount of money the family was asking for was within a reasonable range.  Given this man’s renewed 
financial support, Thu was expecting to return to Hanoi to attend a secondary school as a ninth-grader, a 
year behind her cohort, in the fall of 2013.  The last time we met, Hoa and Van were continuing their 
studies at a public school as an eighth- and a fifth-grader, respectively, while Khanh was set to begin his 
primary schooling as a first-grader in the fall.    
 
Orientation of Field Research 
Field Entry, and Gaining Access to the Study Site 
The field research component of the study consisted of a two-year, exploratory-fieldwork period that 
spanned from September 2008 to August 2010 and of a month-long follow-up study done in September 
2013.  The first half of the long term fieldwork period was devoted to solidifying my language skills and 
trying to identify and gain access to potential research sites, with the second half being devoted to more 
intensive field observations and the conducting of interviews.   
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Initially interested in conducting school ethnography that explores the educational circumstances 
of underprivileged migrant children in the Thanh Ninh area, I spent my preliminary research phase visiting 
several public and private schools serving children in the Thanh Ninh area.  My hope was that by gaining 
access to educational institutions that provide formal and/or informal education to children in the area, I 
would be able to make an initial connection and thereby perhaps obtain permission to conduct participant 
observations and interviews with children and school personnel.  Having regular access to educational 
institutions seemed to be the ideal way for me to find out about the educational opportunities and 
challenges presented to disadvantaged children in the area.  I also had anticipated that gaining access to 
schools would enable me to investigate how the cultural dynamics of underprivileged children, and the 
groups of people who surround them such as their classmates, schoolteachers, and other school 
personnel, play out in school settings.   
Contrary to my wishful thinking, however, just gaining such authorization proved to be extremely 
difficult; it seemed I must forget entirely about my plan of nosing around the school site, and even the 
seemingly innocent act of making appointments with school personnel for interviews proved to be a 
daunting task.  With each visit I would introduce myself and explain that I was interested in discovering 
what educational opportunities the school provides to its students residing in the Thanh Ninh area, 
including those of underprivileged backgrounds.  Occasionally some school staff member I met on the 
school site, and/or a local acquaintance, would give me the contact information of a school principal so 
that I could get in touch with her or him in person.  When asked for some form of identification I would 
identify myself as a graduate student currently doing research in Vietnam, then present a letter of 
introduction from the local research institute I was affiliated with and my student business card from 
Columbia.36  And yet despite all my conscientious efforts to make arrangements with the contact persons 
and to follow the customary “self-identification” protocol for a foreign researcher, more often than not I 
found myself being turned away at the door.  Typically no clear explanation was given, as to why my 
                                                          
36 In Vietnam, it is customary for foreign researchers visiting formal institutions to identify themselves by presenting 
letters of introduction from their local affiliated institution.  Normally such letters specify the purpose of the research 
and its expected duration in Vietnam, while the signature of an authority at the affiliated institution, and its stamp, 
prove its endorsement of the research.  The letter is valid only for a certain period of time, needing be renewed on a 




request had been turned down; I would be fobbed off with some mumbled words to the effect that the 
contact person was busy, or unavailable to meet with me in person.   
 After months of searching for an educational institution that would grant me admittance as a 
researcher, I finally was referred to an NGO that runs a charity class37 for impoverished children residing 
in the Thanh Ninh area.  In collaboration with a local state school, the class offers educational and 
nutritional support to children who have no access to formal schooling.  Students are taught basic literacy 
and arithmetic skills at the primary-education level by certified teachers.  Students also are offered either 
breakfast or lunch, depending upon the class session they have been assigned to.   
Luckily Nhung, the lady in charge of the program on the side of the NGO, accommodated my 
request to visit the class.  Understanding my research interest of exploring the educational and familial 
circumstances of the children whom they support, she gave me and Huyen permission to come to the 
class twice a week, on the condition that we interact with the students only during their fifteen-minute 
class breaks.  We were not allowed to enter any class while it was in session, because the teachers were 
not comfortable with the idea of having visitors observing their class on a regular basis38.  This was a 
major disappointment at the beginning, for it meant we would not have the opportunity to see firsthand 
how the class was conducted or to observe the classroom interactions between students and teachers.  
Without classroom observation, would I ever be able to form a full picture of the educational opportunities 
and challenges of these children?  The situation was what it was, however, and thus I had no choice but 
to re-strategize my research plan about how to elucidate the children’s educational circumstances.   
Our initial mood of disappointment receded somewhat as Huyen began to get better acquainted 
with the children.  At first they were shy, disinclined to initiate conversations with us; as we became 
frequent visitors, however, they appeared to be more relaxed and even curious, asking who we were and 
what had brought us to the class.   
A further benefit of having regular access to the students was that we were also able to come 
into contact with some of their families.  NGO staff members and class teachers would occasionally pay 
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visits to the students’ homes, to check up on how they were doing there and to see if they were having 
any domestic issues.  Those individuals told us, however, that the checkups of students’ families were not 
happening as once they had been because they were short-staffed.  Thus I volunteered to make home 
visits to find out about the students’ families’ current circumstances and also their views about the charity-
class education the children were receiving.  I further proposed that I would share with them, as a token of 
my appreciation for their having granted us access to the class and connected us with the students’ 
families, my research findings once the research had been completed, which might prove to be of some 
use for their future programming.  They accepted my proposal, giving us the green light to visit the 
students’ homes and interview their parents and/or guardians, if the latter agreed to participate.   
 
Follow-up Study 
During the follow-up study done in 2013, I revisited the research sites and reconnected with the people 
who had participated in my research during my initial fieldwork, my goal being to ascertain how the life-
conditions of the migrant families had or had not changed since I had left in 2010.  The research also was 
intended to provide complementary data for my dissertation, either supporting or complicating its analyses 
and discussions.  During this period of follow-up research I conducted interviews with my previous 
migrant participants, in order to learn how they were dealing with both the continuing and the new 
challenges in their daily lives.  My questions ranged from how they build social relations in the city, how 
and indeed whether they maintain ties with their extended families in their home villages, and how they 
cope with challenges in times of difficulty.  I also made a return visit to the charity class.  At that time I 
gathered information on the enrolment status and familial circumstances of the continuing and newly 
admitted students, as well as  received some updates on those students who had graduated or dropped 
out. 
 
Working with Research Assistant  
One of the biggest challenges in the early stages of my fieldwork was language.  I already had some 
familiarity with the Vietnamese language, at the time I arrived in Hanoi to begin my dissertation fieldwork.  
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I had completed the beginning-Vietnamese course and audited the intermediate-Vietnamese course 
offered by the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at Columbia University in the year 
2006-2007.  I also had spent two months doing an internship with an NGO in Ho Chi Minh City in the 
summer of 2007, at which time I had made my own arrangements for tutors and language exchanges.  
My acquisition of intermediate communication skills in the language made my entry into the field at least 
feasible, but my language proficiency was by no means sufficient for me to conduct interviews on my own.  
In the hope of improving my language skills as quickly as possible, I focused almost exclusively on my 
language training during the first six months.  I took language lessons every day at The Institute of 
Vietnamese Studies and Development Sciences (IVIDES), National University of Hanoi, the institution 
that sponsored my visit to Vietnam and facilitated the issuing of my student visa.  So as to build upon the 
language lessons I seized every opportunity to practice the language with the locals, whether that meant 
staff members working at the accommodation where I stayed, women selling noodles in front of it, waiters 
and waitresses working at the coffee shop where I sometimes whiled away an afternoon, or Vietnamese 
friends and acquaintances I hung out with, trying to get the hang of the language and especially to 
familiarize myself with its colloquialisms. 
Despite my ongoing and indeed rather relentless efforts to improve my Vietnamese, things did 
not go as smoothly as I had expected them to.  My language training really had facilitated my 
conversational fluency, but nonetheless my anxiety began to build as I wondered how, if at all, I was 
going to be able to complete my fieldwork all on my own.  It would be a real disappointment to find that I 
had come to Vietnam just to do language studies, while taking just a half-hearted stab at my intended 
research.  As I struggled to get the latter moving, I came to learn from other foreign researchers and 
graduate students based in Hanoi that working with an interpreter or a research assistant is a rather 
common practice in research settings in Vietnam.  They said that working with such a person can help 
one not only to gain access to some local resources one might not be able to pry open otherwise but also, 
if the person in question had good negotiation skills and could act as a facilitator, to smooth out lines of 
communication with local authorities.  At first I was a little hesitant about working with a research assistant, 




Fortuitously, just as I was beginning my quest for a research assistant, I met a 26-year-old 
woman named Huyen.  We were introduced to each other by a Japanese professor who has been 
involved in research and consulting work with the Vietnamese government, on industrial development, 
ever since the mid-1990s.  During the early years of his sojourn in Vietnam he often spent free time 
strolling around the Hang Dau lake, located in the central part of Hanoi and within easy walking distance 
of the Central Square.  The streets of the latter are lined with the stalls of artisans and merchants 
specializing in particular products such as silk, musical instruments, jewelry, and hardware, along with 
food specialties and a wide range of accommodations catering to both local and foreign tourists.  The lake 
area tends to be thronged with street-sellers who sell a wide variety of tourist items such as postcards, T-
shirts, caps, bilingual dictionaries, and folding fans made of bamboo.  There are also “tea-sellers” who 
offer many kinds of drinks, as well as sweets and tobaccos.  Back in the 1990s there was a far greater 
number of street children around the lake than one sees there today.  While sitting on a bench near the 
lake the professor would be approached by street kids, trying to sell their things or offering to shine his 
shoes.  Although initially annoyed by the children, he gradually opened up and interacted with them.  As 
he came to know that some of those children were eager to study and go back to school, he started to 
lend them a hand by making it financially to possible for them to attend English-language schools and 
local public schools.  His one condition was that they must inform him about their learning situations on a 
regular basis.   
Huyen and her younger sister were among the children assisted by the professor.  She first 
migrated to Hanoi in 1994, her sister following her a year later.  At that time they were primary students in 
Hung Yen province, but they decided to drop out of school so that they could earn money to help their 
financially struggling family stay afloat.  The financial assistance provided by the professor allowed them 
to re-enroll in school after a few years of absence.  They both worked very hard to reach their goal of 
gaining college degrees.  Huyen was granted her Bachelor’s Degree by an Interpreter Training Program, 
while her younger sister studied Finance abroad in Singapore.   
Fortuitously indeed, Huyen was herself seeking an opportunity to work with migrant and 
socioeconomically marginalized children as a way of drawing upon her own experience and of giving back 




the life of a migrant working child from the inside out, to work closely with underprivileged children who 
were going through situations highly similar to those she had once experienced.  And yet despite the 
intensity of her desire, it proved to be no easy matter for her to find jobs in the sphere of welfare work.  
Being fresh out of college, with limited social connections and no working experience of the social-service 
sector, she was going nowhere in her search until her frustrated desire and my anxious expectation met, 
and we delightedly discovered that our contact served to cancel out the frustration and the anxiety.    
Huyen’s personal experience as a street-seller from a rural village, and her extensive living 
experience in the Thanh Ninh area since her early years of migration, have combined to give her an 
insider’s view of how migrants live in Hanoi and more specifically in the Thanh Ninh area.  She related 
with passion and sensitivity to the study’s participants who are living in the very same socioeconomically 
disadvantaged environment she knows so well.  Very quickly she became my reliable research 
companion, and one of my key informants.  Her migrant network also enabled me to approach certain 
groups within the migrant population more easily, in particular in the Hang Dau lake area (her old 
workplace), where some of her old friends and acquaintances were still working on the street.   
In the initial stage of what had become our joint venture, we tried to work out how we could best 
conduct research.  I gave Huyen a copy of the terms of reference, which describe the objective of my 
study and set out the expected work-responsibilities.  I not only explained to her the vital need to protect 
the privacy of the participants but made it clear that we were to consider them knowledgeable persons 
from whom we had much to learn—hence the importance of building rapport throughout the research 
process.  As a married woman and the mother of a three-year-old daughter, Huyen had to strike a difficult 
balance between maintaining her home life and working with me, but we managed to come up with ways 
to accommodate her schedule. 
Our research participants had all been rendered unlawful residents in their current place of 
residence by the simple fact that their migration status was undocumented.  In the course of the 
interviews certain subjects that they clearly felt chary about discussing would come up, such as their 
unlawful residential status and their police records.  Thus, in order not to further exacerbate their already 
quite considerable wariness, we decided not to tape-record the interviews with the migrant participants—a 




again and again, mulling the implications of this statement and that.  As a way of mitigating this 
disadvantage, I developed a system of recording in writing as much as possible of the information 
obtained from the interviews.  During an interview I would pay close attention to the words and phrases 
used by Huyen and the interviewees.  Then I would check up on the contextual uses and implications of 
those that had caught my attention, not only with Huyen but also with my Vietnamese language teachers 
and other local acquaintances.  This exercise not only allowed me to see if anything had fallen between 
the gaps, so to speak, that is, between questions I had posed to the interviewees and the way they were 
translated; it also enabled me to better understand the subtle differences in the meanings assigned to 
closely related words.   
Furthermore, Huyen and I would go over each interview to ensure that no piece of information 
was missing or had been misinterpreted.  We used our post-interview review sessions to discuss anything 
and everything I was unclear about after we had reread my notes based on her on-site translations.  
Huyen would remember remarkably well both the flow of each interview and its details, but at times she 
would jog her memory to make it regurgitate the exact phrase the participant had used in the interview.  I 
later learned that her memory skills had come to her via her unusual living and studying conditions during 
her college days.  Living in a shared accommodation with other migrants, she would study until late at 
night without any light on, because her migrant roommates had to go to work early in the morning; once 
the shared light had been switched off, she had no choice but to mentally survey her textbooks and the 
notes she had taken in class.  This experience, she told me, had done wonders to improve her memory- 
retention!   
One of the challenges we faced came in the form of the exaggerated expectations of monetary 
assistance held by some of the low-income migrant families we observed and interviewed.  They would 
never ask me directly to give or lend them money, but several migrant parents would pointedly note, 
accompanied by an appealing look and repeatedly using the the word nghèo (poor), that their family was 
suffering financially.  Given that these families have (or previously had) received monetary support from 
international NGOs and foreign benefactors, it is possible that they saw me as a potential new sponsor.  
Huyen would take the brunt of the blame when we politely explained that we could not accommodate their 




budget.  She once expressed to me her discomfort with having to deal with the “financial talk.”  On 
another occasion she told me how one migrant grandparent whom we had interviewed later leveled the 
false accusation, to her sister-in-law who runs a small variety shop in the neighborhood, that Huyen had 
gotten in the way and refused to help the family when the grandparent had asked me to help pay the 
family’s rent.  Perhaps most difficult of all was the time when a migrant mother showed up on Huyen’s 
doorstep in the middle of the night, with her newborn baby in her arms and tears in her eyes.  She 
begged Huyen for help, telling her that her son had gotten sick and that she had no one else she could 
borrow the needed money from.  Such sad anecdotes make it clear that even though we tried to explain 
frankly to the participants what we had set out to accomplish, what we wanted to learn from them, and 
what we could and could not do for them, the mere fact of our being on the scene, visiting with and 
interviewing these migrant families, misleadingly generated expectations that it was beyond our ability to 
control.  Although we restrained ourselves from giving away money too easily, doing so only when there 
was some hugely compelling reason to make an exception to our rule, at the time of our home visit we 
usually would bring some food and/or household essential that the migrant families invariably were in 
need of.  I also sometimes would buy goods from migrant parents, when we interviewed them for long 
periods of time while they were working on the street.   
 
In what follows the study will explore how economic, social, and cultural resources are being accessed 
and used by migrants , and will seek to determine what challenges their patterns of resource-mobilization 
present in the context of post-doi moi Vietnamese society.  As will be illustrated in the next chapter, 
migrants’ access to economic resources through formal channels is rather limited, due to their temporary 
or unregistered residential status in the city.  As a consequence, migrant families having only limited ties 
to their home villages turn to informal monetary sources in times of financial adversity, while eking out a 






CHAPTER IV: MIGRANTS’ DIFFICULT QUEST TO ACCESS ECONOMIC RESOURCES 
 
With its relaxation of state control over population mobility, the post-doi moi period has opened up new 
paths migrants can use to pursue economic opportunities in destinations outside of their place of origin.  It 
makes sense, given the state’s transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one 
under the “open-door” policy, that the motivations compelling migrants to move have been predominantly 
economic.  The 2004 Vietnam Migration Survey (VMS) reported that approximately 70 percent of the 
respondents had migrated either in search of employment or to improve their living condition (GSO & 
UNFPA Viet Nam, 2005; UNFPA Viet Nam, 2007).  Given that the ratio of the average urban income to 
one derived from farming is said to be as much as five or even to seven to one (Guest, 1998), one cannot 
be surprised to find, at the root of urbanward migration, people’s strong attraction to economic 
opportunities.  The 2004 VMS further revealed that migration did, in fact, lead to an income-increase: over 
80 percent of the surveyed migrants stated that their post-migration incomes were higher, or much higher, 
than their pre-migration incomes (GSO & UNFPA Viet Nam, 2005; UNFPA Viet Nam, 2007).  
 While economic incentives undoubtedly are at the base of many migrants’ decisions to move, 
existing studies on migration in Vietnam rightly point out that motivating factors often are multi-layered 
(Dang, N.A. et al., 2003; Save the Children, U.K., 2006; UN Viet Nam, 2010a).  Economic reasons often 
are comprised of varied sets of determinants, such as finding ways to generate and increase the source 
and amount of income as well as to achieve economic security.  Moreover, migrants’ decisions to move to 
new destination areas are not a mere manifestation of individual needs or wants.  Rather their decisions 
often are closely linked to the coping and survival strategies devised by each household, as well as to 
family and kinship ties (Dang, N.A. et al., 2003).  Among the migrants surveyed in the 2004 VMS, “about 
two-thirds of male migrants and 80[%] of female migrants” acknowledged the involvement of other family 
members in their decision to migrate (UNFPA Viet Nam, 2007, p.13).    
The instance of female single migration to Hanoi can help us to see how household strategy 
plays its significant role within the decision-making process as to a family member’s attempted migration.  
Jensen et al. (2008), by taking a household-strategies approach sees that migration as being driven “by 
intra-household hierarchies of power and […] wider socio-cultural expectations of gender” (Chant & 




women’s decision to migrate to Hanoi and become roving street-vendors was structured by both intra-
household dynamics and a set of village norms.  These researchers found that despite their reluctance to 
spend time away from their families and especially from their children, village women migrated without 
much choice—often under family pressure, and heavily influenced by village norms that designate women 
as migrants—so as to earn extra income outside of farming labour.  By contrast, men normally remain at 
home but have the choice to migrate if they decide to do so.   
The practice of remittances—stated most simply, sending money back home—is another widely 
recognized example of how migration contributes to the preservation of family and kinship ties in the 
migrants’ home villages, as well as to the improvement of their living conditions.  The remittances are 
used to cover a broad range of expenditures, from debt-repayment to healthcare and education fees, and 
from daily necessities to expenses incurred via ceremonial rituals and family emergencies (Save the 
Children, U.K., 2006).  According to the 2004 VMS, 48 percent of male migrants and 54 percent of female 
migrants had sent money home during the twelve months prior to the survey, with the amount of their 
remittances making up 10 percent of the total income of male migrants and 17 percent of that of their 
female counterparts, on average (UNFPA Viet Nam, 2007).  Remittances thus seem to have a twofold 
function: they serve as an emotional lifeline for the migrants by tightening their connections to their home 
villages, and they are a vehicle for the amelioration of the standard of living in the rural areas. 
The practice of spending remittances varies widely, along with the socioeconomic 
circumstances of each migrant family and the degree of intensity of its ties to the home village.  Anecdotal 
evidence that emerged from my interviews with unregistered, longtime migrant families revealed that the 
poor state of their finances almost never allowed them to send remittances to their extended families; 
their hands were simply too full providing for the immediate family member in the city.  The attenuation of 
village ties over the years, as a result of longtime migration to the city, also explains the infrequency of 
remittances; as does, in some cases, the loss of land or permanent residency in the place of origin.  Even 
those migrant families I interviewed who maintain village connections indicated that they return to their 
home village only once or twice a year, at most; on such occasions, perhaps timed to coincide with a 
festival like Tet, they may give some money to their aged parents.  Such merely occasional sendings of 




had left their children back in the village; these exceptions to our above-stated rule would regularly send 
money back to the guardians of their children (normally, the parents on the father’s side) to pay for their 
children’s education fees plus other daily essentials.39   
In short, the post-doi moi era has provided rural migrants with increased mobility and more 
economic opportunities.  In the urban centers in particular, the rapid growth of the informal economy has 
helped unskilled and low-skilled migrants to augment their economic resources by taking on small trading 
and service-related jobs.  In response to the socioeconomic changes brought about by the state’s policy 
reforms, people are strategizing ways to improve their economic security by pooling and sharing family 
incomes (Dang, N.A. et al., 2003).  One should remember, however, that neither the practice nor the 
nature of sending remittances is not uniform among the migrants.  Remittances can play a major role in 
the maintenance and improvement of living conditions in the rural homes of some migrants, such as 
seasonal migrants and non-seasonal migrants whose immediate family members remain in the village, 
but this is not necessarily the case with those migrants who reside in the city with their immediate families 
and no longer retain close ties to their home village.  
 
Limited Access to Formal Economic Resources 
Migrant networks, usually comprised of relatives and friends who share a place of origin, provide a vital 
information resource, a way of unearthing economic opportunities in the destination area.  The 
importance of such informal networks in easing new-fledged migrants’ urban entry can scarcely be 
overstated (Dang, N.A. et al., 2003).  According to the 2004 VMS (as cited in UNFPA Viet Nam, 2007), 
“three in four migrants already knew someone” (p. 14) in their destination area.   
Conversely, migrants almost never enter the formal channels in their search for employment 
opportunities in the destination areas.  A mere 1 percent of the same survey respondents said they made 
use of information provided by government or private employment agencies (UNFPA Viet Nam, 2007).  
This finding attests not just to people’s traditional distrust of “the establishment” but also to the fact that 
                                                          
39 A migrant mother from Hung Yen Province told us that she sent remittances on a regular basis to cover the fees of 
her children attending the primary school in the village.  Although in this case send is the wrong word, for whenever 
she had earned a good round sum such as 1 to 3 million VND, she returns to her village and hand-delivers the money 





even within the localities where migrants have their permanent household registration, labor-market 
information pertaining to areas others than their own often is not available for them to access via the local 
authorities responsible for labor issues (Le et al., 2011).  Neither formal institutional bodies at the 
provincial and ministerial levels nor the Trung tam gioi thieu viec lam (Centers for Employment 
Introduction), administered by DOLISA in the larger cities, serve well as information-providers for job-
seekers, primarily owing to their lack of coordination and their limited employment information.   
Existing social policies and support programs seeking to alleviate the hardships of the poor are 
often bound up with the ho khau system (Le et al., 2011).  This means that most temporary as well as 
non-registered migrants are not eligible to benefit from government schemes targeted at the urban poor, 
among them being the National Target Programmes (NTP) (previously called Hunger Eradication and 
Poverty Reduction, or HEPR) and the Social Policy Bank.  “Credits from hunger eradication and poverty 
reduction programmes, school fee reduction or exemption, free medical care booklets, etc. explicitly 
exclude migrants from being qualified recipients” (Le et al., 2011, p. 11). 
The Bank for Social Policy was launched in 2003, replacing its predecessor known as the Bank 
for the Poor.  It is an official credit program that provides loans through a small-group system (Save the 
Children, U.K., 2006).  Borrowers are allowed to apply for loans of up to “VND 7 million for a 1-5 year 
period at an interest rate of 1.5%” (p. 96).  “The migrants living in cities or towns without KT3 family 
registration, a house or a stable job, cannot access this programme” (p. 96).  Another of the formal credit 
sources available in the localities is the Women’s Unions, deemed more flexible because providing credit 
even to some non-permanent resident migrants (Save the Children, U.K., 2006).  Still, credit gained 
through the Women’s Unions is out of reach for the majority of residents having temporary permits (those 
previously categorized as KT3 and KT4); only a lucky few gain admittance via a close contact with an 
official of the credit program.   
 When it comes to other formal credit-providers, such as commercial banks, the situation is 
essentially the same as that found at the government credit programs: access is for the most part 
restricted to those who have permanent household registration.  Essentially the permanent-residency 
document “serves as basic collateral in securing bank loans” (“Urban poor undetected by Vietnam,” 2010).  




bank-loan services.   
 Existing studies and survey results both point to the existence of a significant gap between 
migrants’ needs and their access to credit.  In the 2004 VMS, the respondents ranked access to credit 
first, among the types of difficulties faced by migrants as a result of not possessing permanent residency 
in the area of current residence.  Within the 42 percent of those who stated that they had faced difficulties 
due to their non-permanent residential status, nearly 46 percent pointed to their inability to gain access to 
loans as constituting a major difficulty (GSO & UNFPA Viet Nam, 2005; UNFPA Viet Nam, 2007).  Such a 
result clearly bespeaks the migrants’ crying need for easier access to loans, as does the very same 
survey’s finding that “only 22% of the migrants had received loans from formal credit channels, such as 
commercial banks and government bodies, whereas 46 percent of non-migrants had accessed loans from 




Given the migrants’ lack of either a formal support system or access to formal credit sources, one can’t 
help but wonder what they do when they are in need of immediate financial assistance.  One major 
available option is to get loans from private lenders.  Unfortunately these lenders of “hot loans” charge 
extremely high interest rates, often ranging from 15 to 20 percent per month.  As will be described further 
in Chapter VI, receiving and providing assistance in non-monetary forms is fairly common among 
migrants.  Indeed the 2004 VMS (GSO & UNFPA Viet Nam, 2005) revealed that migrants receive non-
monetary forms of help more frequently, as opposed to monetary assistance, after their arrival at their 
destinations.   Among the different types of assistance, moral encouragement was most often provided 
(71.3 percent women, 67 percent men), followed by help with housing (59.5 percent women, 56.8 percent 
men), finding a job (43.9 percent women, 39.3 percent men) and material help such as food, clothing and 
other basic necessities (35.8 percent women, 31.1 percent men); monetary help (27.3 percent women, 
21.7 percent men) fared poorly in comparison with most of the other non-monetary forms of assistance.  
Little wonder, then, that a study conducted by Save the Children U.K. (2006) called for increased 
attention to the soaring rates of indebtedness among migrants, its dual causes being dependency on hot 
loans at places of destination and lack of access to formal credit.  Both practices clearly are hindering 




Interviews with the migrants participating in this study confirmed their propensity to borrow money 
from loan sharks at usurious rates of interest.  While a handful of families are lucky enough to find an 
NGO and/or a foreign individual who is willing to provide them with financial support, most of them have 
no such alternative to turn to.  Instead they invariably pawn their possessions40 or borrow money from 
private lenders, thereby only ensuring a slide into increased indebtedness and downward mobility41.   
Interestingly, when referring to the private lenders, some of the participants used the term bạn 
(friends).  Among the loan sharks there are not only professional lenders for whom money-lending is their 
primary occupation but also neighbors and migrant “friends” or—at the very least colleagues, in the sense 
of fellow migrants holding precisely the same sort of unskilled low-skilled jobs as their borrowers do—who 
lend money at high interest rates only when they are asked to do so.    
 While the consensus shared by migrants and non-migrants alike is that relatives are the first 
people to ask for support in times of financial crisis, the fact remains that migrants without dependable 
relatives or access to formal credit sources or individual/NGO-based assistance networks have no other 
option than to borrow money from private lenders.  Lending money to such migrants who have only the 
most limited of financial assets or collateral is a high risk for the lender.  Because borrowers may delay 
repayment or never repay at all, lenders charge them at extremely high interest rates, even if the parties 
to the deal are acquaintances or friends.   
 As she was telling me how she sometimes asks her “friends” to lend her money, a mother in her 
forties, who, along with her 10 year-old daughter, sells foreigners touristic products such as postcards, 
bamboo fans, and baseball caps around the Hang Dau lake looked over my shoulder at her fellow street-
sellers from whom she would borrow money when she had to.  When I asked if she ever asked family 
members or relatives in her home village to lend her money, she replied “My parents are already dead.  
My three older brothers are still living in Thanh Huyen, which is my home village, but I hardly see them 
and have very little contact with them.”   
                                                          
40 A xe om driver and father of four children told me he had pawned his motorbike several times when his family 
needed a large amount of money. Pawnbrokers assess the amount of a loan based on the market value of the 
particular item.  In this case the man was once allowed to borrow 6 million VND; during the two-week loan period he 
was charged 20,000 VND per day and he ended up paying 400,000 VND in total.  There also was an incident in 





Similarly, a widowed mother of two children in her mid-thirties said this:   
When I’m having difficulty, financially or otherwise, I don’t consult with anyone.  I do, 
however, ask my friends in the Thanh Ninh area every once in a while to lend me some 
money, and they will lend the money with high-interest rates, often as much as 15 to 20 
percent.  
 
 This issue of an absence of relatives to whom one can turn to in times of crisis emerges also from 
the comment made by another mother of three children in her forties:   
When our family is having financial problems, my husband and I sometimes ask our 
neighbors for help.  Some neighbors will lend us money so we can pay our bills, but we 
need to pay them back with interest. . . . Neither my parents nor my husband’s parents 
are alive, and there are no relatives who can lend us money.  
  
Reluctance to ask one’s own siblings for financial help was shared by a woman who resides with 
her husband and two daughters in the “brown village”:  
My father passed away when I was still young, and my mother single-handedly raised all 
of us. . . . Even though I have several brothers living in Hanoi, I feel reluctant to ask them 
for money.  So instead of seeking their help, I usually go to friends who are doing similar 
business to what I do, like tea- selling.  When I borrow money from them, I have to pay 
them back with high rates of interest.  
 
It would be hasty to conclude, however, that the rare practice among these migrants of 
borrowing money from their relatives, as it stands in contrast to their heavy reliance on informal loan- 
providers/friends, bespeaks a weakening of social ties within and between migrant families.  Members of 
some migrant families did admit to me that the frequency of their visits to their home villages has 
decreased over the years; so too, many of the children do not accompany their parents when the latter 
return to the countryside, with the sole exception to this rule being made for Tet.  Still, and as illustrated in 
existing studies, it is a by no means uncommon practice for migrant families to maintain ties with their 
home villages by sending back remittances.  It is reasonable to assume that the rural relatives do not lend 
a financial hand to their migrant relatives in the city for the simple reason that keeping themselves alive is 
all they can manage to do.   
Some migrant parents receive financial assistance from their grownup children.  A divorced 
mother of three children told me that although she was hesitant to ask her own children for financial help, 
her grownup son and daughter had offered to support both their mother and their younger sister, who 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
41  During my follow-up study in 2013, several migrants who had turned to loan sharks in the past indicated that 
nowadays some private lenders are reluctant to offer loans, owing to the large number of migrants who repudiate 




lives and works with the mother on the street, by paying their bills as needed.  In the case of another 
migrant family working on the street, the daughters would give all the money they earned from street-
selling, on average 40,000-50,000 VND per day, to their mother, who handles the family budget.    
The relative rarity of borrowing and lending money among family members appears to extend 
beyond the city so as to include the rural areas as well.  In her study of the changing living conditions of 
rural families in the Mekong Delta, Shibuya (2000) observed that offerings of monetary help between 
parents and children, or among siblings, were infrequent except in a time of emergency such as 
someone’s hospitalization.  In such cases family members pool the amount of money needed to pay the 
bills.  The prevalence of indebtedness among the village residents, brought on by borrowing money from 
private lenders charging high rates of interest, shows that family members generally are in no position to 
lend money to support other members, even if they want to.   
Some of the migrant families whose members I interviewed were lucky enough to have 
established contacts with NGOs and foreign individuals who agreed to support them financially.  As of 
2010 there were at least four NGOs operating in the Thanh Ninh area that provided assistance to migrant 
families in both financial and material forms.  Although varied in terms of budget, size of staffing, and 
services42 provided, all of these NGOs’ primary target is children who have no formal schooling and come 
from socioeconomically disadvantaged families.  One of these NGOs has been kept in operation based 
primarily on the personal funding of an American family that has adopted a daughter from Vietnam, and 
secondarily by other individual donations.  Employing local social workers, this NGO helps children to 
attend state schools.  It pays for tuition and other school-related fees on the condition that the children 
study full-time and do not work outside the home.  In addition to school fees, supported families are 
offered cash to cover their living expenses such as housing-rental fees.  While one of the NGOs recruits 
children both within and outside of Hanoi, the other three are working with children and their families 
strictly in Hanoi, and chiefly in the Thanh Ninh area.  Even though their areas of support somewhat 
overlap, few coordination efforts have been made.  On the end of the recipients, children and their 
                                                          
42 The range of supportive measures includes shelters and recreation centers for children, health services, vocational 
training, educational support (school placement, tuition support, informal education classes), and financial and 




families, some take advantage of having access to multiples sources of aid by indeed receiving support 
from more than one NGO. 
Apart from the NGOs, a handful of migrant families whose members I interviewed have received 
financial support from foreigners from Japan and the United States.  These individual “supporters” or 
“patrons” occasionally give money to the families for varying purposes, be it children’s school fees, living 
expenses for the families, or some other specific need.  One of these helpers is an American man who 
has been living in Vietnam for more than twenty years.  Extensively working in the NGO sector, he first 
got to know some families in the early 1990s when there was, as noted earlier, a greater number of street 
children working around the Hang Dau lake; this man’s NGO tried to recruit some of the migrant children 
for its vocational training project.  Since then the NGO has shifted its focus and no longer implements 
projects targeting working migrant children; some of the children it has supported, now grown-ups, still are 
working in Hanoi, continuing to make ends meet by street-selling.  The man keeps in touch with some of 
them and offers assistance from time to time when they are in need of extra financial help.  He gives 
200,000 VND per month to each family he decides to support; it is up to the family to decide how the 
money will be spent.  The few other foreign individuals who came up in conversations with members of 
migrant families had no previous or current affiliations with NGOs.  What these foreign supporters or 
patrons have in common is that they give their own pocket money.  
 
 
Children Working in the Informal Sector 
Another coping strategy employed by migrant families having only limited financial assets and access to 
formal credit sources is to increase family income and economic security by having their children work on 
the street.  But while children’s work makes a substantial contribution to a family’s survival, it comes at the 
high price of compromising the educational environment of the children.  In what follows I will illustrate 
how working children come to be conceived as breadwinners for the family and how they balance their 
schooling and their work life.  
While the decision to migrate often emerges out of discussions held by migrating and non-
migrating family members, including more distant relatives and in-laws, children who migrate with their 
families rarely have a say when it comes to either migration or their engagement in street work.  And yet 




breadwinners.  It certainly is clear that parents and guardians whose children work as street-sellers 
recognize their children’s significance as income-earners.  They know full well that the sympathy of 
tourists and other onlookers is elicited far more readily by a child than by an adult.  Even in the case of 
children who work “alongside” their parents or guardians, they always are encouraged to approach the 
potential customers alone as their parents/guardians watch them, and watch out for them, from afar.   
Several children now working as street-sellers told me that when they were small they 
accompanied their parents, working as beggars.  Quynh, a 12-year-old girl whom I met near the Hang 
Dau lake, said she was first brought to Hanoi by her parents, who still were married at the time, when she 
was just an infant.  The family worked around the lake, her parents carrying her on one or the other of 
their backs as they begged.  This practice continued until she turned six years old, at which age she was 
sent back home to the countryside to enroll in a primary school in Nam Dinh.  Another example is that of a 
father with a wife and three children who has been begging for decades.  He told me that it always was 
much easier to catch people’s eyes and to evoke their pity when he was accompanied by his child, as 
opposed to begging alone.   
While children and their families working on the street often have a particular territorial base, on a 
certain street-corner of the city or around the lake area, they nonetheless shift their work location every 
once in a while.  Thu for instance, as we saw earlier, usually works as a street-seller alongside her 
parents near one of the international chain hotels located in the city center, but on the first and fifteenth 
days of each lunar month she and her youngest brother routinely go to a pagoda,43 because on those 
days every pagoda is packed with worshippers.  The siblings sit in an outer corridor of a pagoda and ask 
for offerings, hoping to arrest the gaze of a worshiper by looking miserable, what with their disheveled hair 
and dirty and torn outfits.  Thu and her parents alike spoke with real excitement about how much money 
they can make in one day when they “work” at the pagoda.  “It’s amazing, you would be surprised!  We 
can make as much as 200,000 VND in just one day!”  
Just as I was preparing to leave Hanoi in 2010, Thu and her parents started selling drinks, late at 
night until around midnight, at a traffic junction within walking distance of the location where they work 
during the day.  Ngoc, Thu’s father, sounded enthusiastic when he told me about his family’s new 
                                                          




business.  “I’m really hoping that this business will help our family to make more money so we can have 
better lives, you know?” The other family members, however, would tell me that business was slow lately.  
Their targeted customers were tourists staying at the nearest international chain hotel, and other foreign 
travelers passing by.  There was a time when postcards sold well, but nowadays only a few tourists buy 
them since they can take as many pictures as they like with their own digital cameras.  The warm 
seasons of course work better for their street-selling business than the cool ones do, because there are 
more tourists on hand buying their products such as fans, T-shirts, and caps.  In terms of time of day, the 
hours from late afternoon through early night (3-4 p.m. to 9-10 p.m.) are busier than the morning hours.  
Like Thu’s family, some street-selling families habitually alternate their working areas, depending 
on the time of day.  For instance, a single mother of two boys works alone near the Hang Dau lake during 
the day while her sons are at school; at night one often can find her at another lake area located in the 
north of the city center, accompanied by her kids.  The mother and sons make the rounds of the 
restaurants and small eateries lined up around the lakeshore, selling chewing gum.  Longtime street- 
sellers and former street children who were working in the Hang Dau area in the late 1990s and early 
2000s told me that they always stayed there; it was rare for street-sellers in those days to change 
locations regularly or to cover multiple areas.    
The money that children raise from their street-selling work becomes an important source of 
family income.  Thuy told me that at the end of the day she gives all the money she has made to her 
mother.  That amount varies widely, and is very unstable.  On a good day she can make 100,000-200,000 
VND, but sometimes she cannot sell anything for an entire week.  Similar to Thuy, Quynh passes all the 
money she earns on to the foster mother (me nuoi) she lives with.  “When I return home in the evening, 
my foster mother is expecting me to give out the money I made that day.  I have no problem with that, but 
I can tell she is disappointed on the days I made little money or didn’t make any money at all.”  Quynh’s 
living situation is somewhat unique.  Shortly after her return to the countryside at the age of six, 
subsequent to her initial migration to Hanoi with her parents, the parents got divorced and she was left 
with her father.  He later remarried and that woman, who became her stepmother, had a baby by her 
father.  The stepmother became abusive toward Quynh after she had given birth to the baby, and when 




Quynh stay with her.  Their agreement was that the foster mother would provide her with meals and a 
place to stay, and Quynh would work full-time as a street-seller.  “I’m still new to street-selling and I’m 
getting advice from other street kids who work in the same area.  It’s tough and I miss home sometimes, 
but at least I don’t get beat up by my stepmother as long as I’m here,” said Quynh.   
Ha, a longtime street-seller around the Hang Dau lake, talked about how her parents sometimes got into 
an argument over whether she and her elder sister should continue to attend school or work longer hours.  
Their father, who worked as a beggar, would encourage the sisters to stay in school at least until they had 
completed their primary education at the charity class, whereas their mother wanted them to spend more 
time working so they could earn more money for the family, even if at the cost of schooling.  “My Mom 
thinks it is a waste of time for us to go to school because we can’t help her with street-selling while we are 
attending the charity class in the morning,” said Ha.  The sisters have been working on the street since 
they were little, and are important breadwinners for their family.  On good days they each can make as 
much as 60,000-70,000 VND, sometimes even more, and their earnings go a long way toward defraying 
the family’s monthly expenditures, which run to 3.5 - 4 million VND.  The household finances are 
managed jointly by the father and the mother, with the father being responsible for the family’s daily 
expenditures and the mother taking care of their rent.   
In contrast to working migrant children, some children who followed their parents to the city but do 
not work outside are adjusting to the new urban lifestyle that involves spending more time at home and 
yet doing a narrower range of household chores.   A migrant mother who moved to Hanoi with her three 
daughters told me that when the family was living in the countryside the daughters would spend more 
time helping her with household chores both inside and outside the house, with the latter tasks including 
farming and feeding the animals.  Since their migration to Hanoi her eldest daughter has taken care of her 
younger sisters, cooking and cleaning while the mother works outside as a vegetable-and-fruit-stand 
seller.  
Thus we see yet again how zealously migrant families seek and strategize ways to maximize their 
family income and thereby upgrade their economic security.  In such efforts the children often play a 
significant role as income-earners, but they rarely have a voice in the decision-making as to where they 




shift locations in recent years to cover multiple working territories, and have speculated that this bespeaks 
the growing challenge for the ever-increasing number of street-sellers to make enough money to sustain 
their new residencies in Hanoi.  
Many working children who earn cash to help out their families told me there is not much 
difference in their daily routines between weekdays and weekends, except that they attend school on the 
weekdays.  Those who were going to the charity class would spend only a few hours there, either in the 
morning or the afternoon, and oftentimes they were virtually forced to play hooky if their parents expected 
them to go to work even during the day to earn extra money.  For instance, Thuy’s mother would leave 
the house by 8 a.m. each day to work around the lake as a street-seller, and Thuy confessed that she 
had to miss her class a number of times in order to accompany her mother to work.  It is worth noting in 
this connection that children working as street-sellers around the Hang Dau lake area tend to work until 
10-11 p.m. during the summer, whereas during the winter they knock off at around 7-8 p.m.  
Working children often shared with me their preference for going to school over working on the 
street.  Thuy, for instance, said she would rather stay in school than go to work with her mother on the 
street.  Even though she was having difficulty keeping up with the class at times, she enjoyed playing and 
talking with her friends during the class breaks, and she found school to be more relaxing than stressful.  
“What about when you are working with your Mom? What is it like?” I asked.  Thuy hesitated for a 
moment, then whispered in my ear: “It’s not much fun, ’cause my Mom is constantly watching me, right by 
my side, to make sure I’m selling, and I need to follow her around all day.” Looking over at her mother, 
who was chatting by the lakeside with her fellow sellers, Thuy murmured, “Even now, I know she doesn’t 
want me to waste too much time, just talking and not working.”  Indeed, when Huyen and I first tried to 
talk to Thuy directly, she ran away from us.  We then approached her mother to have a chat with her.  
After the mother invited her daughter back to sit with us, she did so.  And yet during our interview with her 
mother, every time the mother saw foreigners approaching she told Thuy to walk over and display her 
wares.   
While the street-child’s choice between work and school might seem to be strictly a no-brainer, in 
fact it was not always clear to me whether working children prefer school to work.  Similarly to Thuy, Ha, 




classmates, chatting and playing with them.  Yet she later admitted that what she disliked about going to 
school was having to get up early in order to attend the morning class, which starts at 8 a.m.  “It’s really 
hard to wake up in the morning, because I often get back home from street-selling late at night, like 9 p.m. 
or even after 10 p.m.  How I wish I could sleep in! ”  “What about studying?  How do you like it?”  “Well, 
that’s the other thing,” she replied.  “Frankly, I don’t really like studying.  In the class we need to study 
hard and remember many things, and I found it hard.  But working on the street, on the other hand, is 
much more simple!”  Because of their long hours of street-working and the resulting lack of sleep, I often 
saw Ha and her elder sister Lan asleep at their desks during the class break, when their classmates were 
chatting, playing, or working on their assignments.  When the class was over the sisters would rush back 
home to eat lunch, then head for the Hang Dau lake to join their parents, who were working as beggars.  
Ha told me that street-selling comes naturally to her, since she started working on the street alongside her 
parents at the age of three.  Even when she was still an infant, her father would take her with him as he 
went begging around the lake.  Ha’s seemingly paradoxical remarks, whereby street work is “simple” 
while studying is “hard,” actually well reflects her mixed feelings about her school and work lives.  Her 
longtime experience as a street-seller has given her a certain professional pride, but her prolonged 
working hours leave her little time to study at home and above all take a toll on her sleep, thereby 
hindering her from making the most of her time in class.  Then too, several times being forced to repeat 
the same year in the charity class has understandably deepened her diffidence at school.  
One always must remember that every street-seller, be s/he an adult or a child, is always at risk 
of getting caught by the police.  Even though the number of street children in Hanoi has indeed 
decreased over the years, the city regulations remain in effect and are invoked time and again by those 
working to get the street-sellers and small traders off the street of Hanoi.44  Thuy has been caught by the 
police many times, and this unsavory aspect of her job is one of the main reasons she dislikes working on 
the street.  Once she was sent to a detention center in Dong Anh, where she was held for fifteen days.  
Her elder sister, too, has been caught by the police a number of times.  On one such occasion the family 
                                                          
44 Clean-up campaigns are continually being implemented by the government with a view to clearing street-vendors, 
petty traders, and other “social evils” off the pavements and thereby bringing at least some measure of order to 
Hanoi’s traffic chaos.  While streets filled with food stalls and peddlery have long been a norm of the city, and while 
many believe they add a bit of charm to the city (Cohen, 2003), the government is striving, via its beautification 




managed to pay the police around 500,000 VND to set her free.  Ha, one of the old-timers in the Hang 
Dau area, has gone through a series of detentions and releases over the years.  Seven years ago she 
and her sister Lan both were sent to the detention center in Don Anh, where they ended up staying for a 
month.  In the end their father managed to raise just enough money to bail them out.  When they were 
released they were sent by the police right back to their home village in Hung Yen province,45 only to 
come back to Hanoi a few weeks later, reunite with their parents, and get back to street work.  They still 
get caught by the police every once in a while, but now they have found a way to circumvent being sent to 
the detention center: by giving a small amount of cash to the police at the time of their arrest.   
In closing this chapter I wish to begin by reminding the reader that the ho khau system continues 
to play a vital role in rendering possession of permanent residency the foremost criterion determining 
one’s ability to access economic resources through the formal, governmental channels.  The state’s 
attempts to redress Vietnam’s growing socioeconomic polarization via the implementation of such official 
programs as NTP, facilitation of preferential loans to the poor, and increased educational and health 
expenditures, while laudable in and of themselves, have, largely owing to the superannuated residence-
based policy, not done enough to reach, and to remediate, the target groups, which includes migrants 
(Luong, 2003).  Although some NGOs have developed loan and saving programs for poor residents 
lacking access to formal credit sources, too often such implementations are restricted to certain localities 
that the organizations operate in and have close ties with, and they are not anticipated to replace official 
programs.  As a result, and as has been repeatedly noted in these pages because the point stands right 
at the heart of this study, migrants without permanent residency turn to migrant networks so as to cope 
with financial adversity in the short term and to improve their economic standing over the long term.   
Informal networks present both opportunities and challenges, however.  On the one hand informal 
connections serve as resourceful information-providers, helping migrants to tap into job opportunities in 
their places of destination.  We have seen that in the case of migrants who retain close relationships with 
relatives and friends in their home villages, asking them for financial help looks like an option but rarely is 
so in fact; many of these people have inadequate financial resources, and those remaining in the home 
village are in no position to extend help, being dependent on the migrants’ earnings in the first place.  The 
                                                          




major obstacle keeping migrants from pulling themselves up out of poverty is their limited access to credit 
from formal sources, the ones that offer loans at subsidized interest rates.  We have seen that migrants 
lacking financially dependable contacts within their circle of friends or relatives resort to “hot loans” 
tendered by such informal loan-providers as loan sharks, as they try to cope with financial adversity.  
Accordingly, these migrants run a great risk of being exposed to even higher economic vulnerability.   
 
 
The next chapter will examine migrant families’ access to social resources, or rather their lack of it, with a 
particular focus on the education sector.  It will point to a significant gap between de jure and de facto 
access to formal education among migrant children.  Alternative education as typified by “charity classes” 
or “compassion classes” offers educational opportunities to migrant children whose access to mainstream 
schools often is blocked by regulatory and/or financial constraints.  Transferring from alternative to 
mainstream schools is not always easy, however, owing not only to the low compatibility of their 
curriculums but also to the mounting school-related fees levied by public schools and to the widespread 
practices of “extra study”—fee-charging supplementary, private class sessions provided by 
schoolteachers—and of bestowing monetary gifts upon teachers.  The latter trends have become 




CHAPTER V: IMPEDIMENTS TO ACCESSING SOCIAL RESOURCES 
 
How accessible is good schooling for the migrant children residing in Hanoi; that is, what educational 
options do they have?  How does their residential status affect their access to state schools?  How have 
the education reforms introduced in Vietnam along with doi moi impacted the migrant poor?  These are 
the questions that this chapter sets out to answer.  It begins, however, by providing its reader with a brief 
overview of the development and dissemination of school education prior to the economy’s marketization, 
of the Vietnamese citizen’s stipulated right of access to education within the relevant national laws, and of 
the nation’s current education system in its two chief forms of mainstream and alternative education.  It 
then proceeds to illustrate how alternative education has been accessed more heavily than has 
mainstream education by many migrant children due to their socioeconomic constraints, and delineates 
the financial and regulatory obstacles they face as they seek to access mainstream education.  The 
chapter also presents a case study of alternative education, a charity class attended by migrant and 
underprivileged children in the Thanh Ninh area who have no access to regular public or private schools.  
Unfortunately, these children acquire only the most basic literacy and arithmetic skills.   
As will be further discussed in the ensuing section, while alternative education in the form of so-
called “charity classes” or “compassion classes” does provide a very basic sort of education to children 
whose financial, familial, and residential circumstances do not allow them to attend mainstream schools, 
the viability of transfer from alternative to mainstream schools is low, given the incompatibility of the 
curricula.  Moreover, the ever-greater school-associated financial burdens for parents and guardians in 
the wake of the doi moi related education reforms, the prioritization of admission of children with 
permanent residency, and the shortage of classrooms in urban centers all are factors serving to keep 
socioeconomically marginalized migrant children out of mainstream education.  As a result, education’s 
potential use as an opener of pathways to social mobility for migrant children is largely being wasted.  
It should be stated right at the outset of this chapter that this study is confining its discussion to 
the education sector, as it seeks to assess migrants’ degree of access to social resources.  Given that 
avowed limitation of focus, the study does not pretend to adequately address the issue of how other 
components of the social sector, such as healthcare and social protection, figure within the sphere of 




resources that went beyond the education sector and compared all such sectors would afford a more 
comprehensive picture of the various social resources accessed and used by migrant families, in that way 
making a more cogent case for the increasing social burdens being placed on migrant households and 
the proliferation, thereby, of social inequity. 
 
Development and Dissemination of School Education in the Pre-Doi Moi Period 
One cannot begin any discussion of the education system in Vietnam without noting the deep historical 
influence of Confucianism.  While Confucianism was introduced to Vietnam from China during the period 
of Chinese domination, ranging from 111 B.C. to 939 A.D., Confucian-type schools began to take shape 
only around the start of the fifteenth century, with privately-run village schools instilling in their pupils, right 
up until the nineteenth century, what was essentially a mandarin elitism (London, 2011a).  Under the 
guidance of Confucian scholars, the students, all of whom were male, studied Confucian classics and 
ethics in preparation “for exams and eventual careers as clerks, bureaucrats, or mandarins” (London, 
2011a, p. 6).   
 The emergence during the French colonial period of Franco-Vietnamese (“Annamite”) schools 
contributed not only to the undermining of the Confucian institutions but also to the formation of anti-
colonial sentiments that eventually fueled revolutionary movements guided by an anti-colonial 
intelligentsia (London, 2011a).  Developed in 1917, the Franco-Vietnamese school system sought to 
“keep Vietnamese out of French schools and to train Vietnamese for administrative occupations in a way 
that would not threaten French superiority” (Kelly, 1975, as cited in London, 2011a, p. 11).  The greater 
influence of, and exposure to, French education in southern Vietnam, as seen in the presence of a larger 
number of Franco-Vietnamese schools in that region than in the northern and central ones,46 precipitated 
regional differentials in formal education.  What is more, the introduction of the French language as a 
major medium for instruction, and use of the Romanized Vietnamese script known as Quoc Ngu during 
the first three years of primary education in Franco-Vietnamese schools, resulted in a declining use of the 
Chinese characters that had long been the central tool of writing instruction within Confucian education.  
                                                          
46 According to Thompson (1937, as cited in London, 2011a), by 1869 there existed in the south of Cochin China 126 
Franco-Vietnamese primary schools, serving an estimated 4,000 plus students.  In  
Tonkin in the north, on the other hand, there were just 42 Franco-Vietnamese schools, of which merely 13 were 




Under the French-Vietnamese education system, the illiteracy rate among the Vietnamese people was 
reportedly as high as 95 percent (“Education in Vietnam,” n.d.).  
 A shift from education as something strictly for privileged groups to mass education was 
prompted by Ho Chi Minh’s call for a “war campaign” against illiteracy in 1945 (Ashwill with Thai, 2005; 
Woodside, 1983).  Not long after the issuance of the mass-education decrees of September 1945, by the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam under the control of the Viet Minh, literacy classes were being organized 
in northern villages for three different age-groups: from 8 to 15 years old, from 16 to 45 years old, and the 
over-46-years-olds.  Astonishingly, just a year after the promulgation of the decree, 2.5 million people had 
attained literacy (Woodside, 1983).  Following this so-called “guerrilla model” of education, a formal 
school system was designed in 1949-1950 that included the free and compulsory provision of a four-year 
basic education to all children aged from 7 to 13 years old (Woodside, 1983; “Education in Vietnam,” n.d.).  
Moreover, the creation of the so-called “School Protection Committees” in the northern communes—their 
chief tasks being the mobilization of the human resources needed to build primary and lower secondary 
schools, the appointment of teachers from the local residents, and the settlement of the contribution 
norms that would jointly pay the teachers’ salaries—led to the rapid rise of people-founded schools 
(“Education in Vietnam,” n.d.).  It cannot be doubted that all such anti-illiteracy activities at the grassroots 
level contributed to the rapid expansion of primary schools in the north in the 1960s, “with an average 
increase of primary-school pupils of 9.1 per cent per year” (Woodside, 1983, p. 415).   
 In 1976, the two Vietnams were at last reunified. The post-reunification period then saw the 
integration of the national education system, with the government launching its efforts to expunge the 
remaining influences of the old education system in the south and to expand anti-illiteracy activities for the 
age group of 12-50 years old (“Education in Vietnam,” n.d.).  The process began with the development of 
a new 12-year school curriculum and the replacement of the textbooks previously used in southern 
Vietnam.  It was not until 1989, that a state-wide education system was adopted based on the education 
model in the south: a 12-year general education ranging from primary through upper secondary schools, 
as opposed to the 10-year system in the north (“Education in Vietnam,” n.d.).    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
introduction of these Franco-Vietnamese schools to the south preceded that to the north and the center by several 






Mainstream and Alternative Education 
Current Vietnamese law enshrines the right of every citizen to receive an education, regardless of her or 
his background.  More specifically, Article 10 of the 2005 Education Law, “Rights and obligations of 
citizens to learn,” states that  
Learning is the right and obligation of every citizen.  Every citizen, regardless of ethnic 
origins, religions, beliefs, gender, family background, social status or economic conditions, 
has equal rights of access to learning opportunities.  The State shall undertake social 
equity in education and enable everyone to get access to education. The State and the 
community shall help the poor have access to education, enabling gifted people to 
develop their talents.  The State shall give priority in enabling children of ethnic minorities, 
children of families in areas with special socio-economic difficulties, targeted groups of 
socially prioritised policies, disabled and handicapped persons and beneficiaries of other 
social policies to realise their learning rights and obligations. 
 
So too, Article 16, “Right to study,” of the 1991 Law on Protection, Care and Education of 
Children (amended in 2004) stipulates that “children have the right to study,” and that “children studying at 
the primary education level in public education establishments don’t have to pay school fees” (No. 
25/2004/QH11 of June 15, 2004).   
In addition to the state’s professed interest as elaborated in these national laws, its commitment 
to equal educational provision is reflected in a national program that implements the universalization of 
primary and lower secondary education.   
The current national education system in Vietnam consists of formal or mainstream education, 
Giáo Dục Chính Quy, and non-formal or alternative education, Giáo Dục Thường Xuyên.  Within the 
mainstream education the sub-sectors of the education system break down as follows: pre-primary 
education (Mai Giao), including crèche (3 months to 3 years old) and nursery school and kindergarten 
(from 3 to 5 years old); primary education (Tieu Hoc), ranging from grades 1 to 5; lower secondary 
education (Trung Hoc Co So), ranging from grades 6 to 9; upper secondary education (Trung Hoc Pho 
Thong), ranging from grades 10 to 12; professional education with professional secondary education and 
vocational training/education at three levels: elementary, intermediate, and college levels; and higher 
education, including the college undergraduate college, master’s, and doctorate levels.  Within the twelve 
years of formal basic education, primary and lower secondary schooling is compulsory for all children as 




majority of schools offering formal education are state-owned, there also are private schools47 that follow 
more or less exactly the same curriculum as that used by their government-school counterparts (Save the 
Children, U.K., 2006).  
Alternative education includes continuing education which currently, as stipulated in the 2005 
Education Law, constitutes one part of the national education system, as well as other types of formal and 
non-formal education programs provided outside of the state-endorsed programs.  Generally meaning to 
adult education of non-formal sorts, continuing education has made a significant contribution to Vietnam’s 
high literacy rate, now estimated at 93 percent.   
The universal primary education program known as Pho Cap has been implemented by the 
government with an eye toward  achieving the goal of having children in all localities complete Grade 5 by 
the age of fourteen (Bui, 2011).  In essence this program brings a form of alternative education to children 
who are performing at a level more than two years behind that of their cohort and thus are not admitted to 
mainstream education—that is, to state schools having a full-fledged curriculum (Save the Children, U.K., 
2006; Tran, 2011).  Since the program’s leaner curriculum requires fewer weeks of class and fewer 
subjects to study, students enrolled in it can complete their primary education within three years, as 
opposed to the usual five.  As is also true of continuing education that caters to adults, the program is 
provided by the local authorities under the auspices of the Department of Education and Training (DOET) 
and makes use of school buildings or continuing education centers or community learning centers located 
within the particular district or ward.    
                                                          
47 Since the early 1990s, private schools have widely been developed in Vietnam (Tran, 2011).  Doi moi paved the 
way for the coexistence of public and private establishments in the education sector, and thus an increasing number 
of private schools emerged in the nation’s urban areas in particular.  Bias against private schools as being 
substandard continues to make itself felt, however, with even many of its providers believing that their certificates and 
diplomas are less valuable than those issued by the state schools.  Strictly speaking, there are four different types of 
educational establishments in Vietnam: (i) public schools, established and fully funded by the state; (ii) semi-public 
schools, founded by the state and operating with partial funding support (e.g., land, subsidies) from the state; (iii) 
people-founded schools, set up and financed by social or economic organizations with permission from the state; (iv) 
private schools, founded and funded by private owners (individuals or groups of individuals) with permission from the 
state.  People-founded and private schools are referred to collectively as “non-state/non-public schools” or “private 
schools” (London, 2011, pp. 18-19; Tran, 2011, p. 134).  In keeping with this general, broader notion of public/state 
and private schools, throughout the study I use the term “private schools” without drawing any strict distinction 
between people-founded and private schools.  At present the degree of privatized education is highest at the pre-
primary level (over 50%), followed by the upper-secondary (over 25%) and tertiary (approximately 21%) levels; the 
percentage of non-public schools is fairly low at the primary and lower-secondary levels (approximately 3%) (Tran, 




 Aside from the universal primary education program, there is also non-formal education provided 
outside the bailiwick of state services.  Such non-formal education includes literacy classes widely called 
“charity classes” or “compassion classes,” and private schools chiefly targeting dropped-out students and 
socioeconomically underprivileged children.  Charity/compassion classes often are provided free of 
charge by NGOs, mass organizations, and religious institutions (Save the Children, U.K., 2006), whereas 
private schools, regardless of how they are funded, invariably impose a charge.   
Alternative education offers school-age children lacking access to mainstream education an 
invaluable opportunity to acquire a basic education.  In effect it represents the best option for migrant 
children whose families’ limited financial assets or constrained working/living conditions do not enable 
them to attend mainstream schools.  Still, the huge variability in the quality of the teaching48 and the 
notable absence of the breadth and depth of education at its finest—deficiencies largely due to the 
compressed curriculum in the universal primary education program and to the private schools’ and the 
‘charity/compassion classes’ lack of conformity with the official school curriculum—often make it difficult 
for students who have received an alternative education to be reintegrated into mainstream education 
(Save the Children, U.K., 2006; UNICEF & MOLISA, 2009).  Some NGOs have been striving to facilitate 
the transfer of students, from the affection classes they support to state schools, by negotiating with the 
DOET and other local authorities in the localities, but their efforts have not always paid off and have rarely 
reached the national level. 
 
 
Hindrances to Accessing Mainstream Education  
According to the Population and Housing Census data for 2009, the enrollment rate of primary-school-age 
children in Vietnam was approximately 92 percent.  Yet, as was rightly pointed out by the author of a 
previous study (London, 2011), the ongoingly inherent problem with the census data—that they exclude 
temporary migrants—makes it likely that the primary-school enrollment rate of migrant children in primary 
schools is much lower than that of non-migrant children.  
                                                          
48 For instance the charity class in the Thanh Ninh area, the case study here, has been running in tandem with a state 
school, making use of its state-certified teachers.  In other “affection classes” that have been provided by two different 
NGOs operating in the Thanh Ninh area, all the teachers are “volunteer teachers,” most of them being college 




 Then too, existing studies point to discrepancies between the de jure and the de facto operation 
of the Vietnamese education system; Vietnam is still a long way from its stated goals of universalizing  
primary education regardless of a child’s socioeconomic background and granting free access to public 
primary schools.  In an attempt to explicate the factors that have been contributing to the gap between 
education law and education practice in Vietnam, in the next two subsections I will be looking at the 
financial and regulatory aspects of Vietnam’s education system.  In the course of doing so I will pay 
particular attention to how both the education reforms enacted in the wake of doi moi and the state’s 
residence-based policies are making it harder rather than easier for low-income migrant families to send 
their children to mainstream state schools.  
 
Financial Barriers 
Vietnam’s structural shift from state socialism to a socialist-oriented market economy has necessitated 
the transformation and reconfiguration of the relationships among the state, market, and households 
within the education sector.  One of the post-doi moi education reforms entailed an emerging concept of 
“socialization” or xa ho hoa, which essentially means a transition to “an increasing share of institutional 
responsibilities for the provision and payment for education away from the state” (London, 2011b, p. 83).  
The state’s withdrawal from its role as sole and full-scale education-provider has facilitated a move toward 
an increased marketization of education services via the development of private and semi-public schools.  
This socialization process, a mobilization of resources within the private sector, has also necessitated “the 
introduction of the fees-for-service principle” (London, 2011b, p. 83), thereby increasing educational costs 
for households as the recipients of the services.  Such an imposition of fees on households includes the 
cost of textbooks and workbooks and the collection of various school fees, not just tuition but also “an 
array of indirect fees, [such as] construction costs,49 PTA fees, lunch fees, fees for the use of school 
facilities and equipment, like electricity” (UNICEF & MOLISA, 2009, p. 20).  School essentials such as 
uniforms, bags, and stationery, as well as means of transportation, also must be borne by households.   
 For many migrant families whose members are engaged in such unstable and poorly paid jobs as 
collecting garbage, street-vending, small trading, and motorbike (xe om) driving, the burden of school fees 
                                                          
49 These often are listed as being “contributions” to school construction or rehabilitation, but parents are compulsorily 




has long been an impediment to sending their children to public schools.  Even those parents who 
manage to get their children enrolled in state schools often complain about the significantly high number 
of non-tuition fees as opposed to the tuition fees themselves.  
 As if such fees were not a sufficient burden for households to bear, it has become the norm for 
children who attend state schools to also do “extra study” or hoc them.  This comes in the form of fee-
charging supplementary, private class sessions provided by schoolteachers (London, 2011b), who always 
are eager to augment their meager incomes. 50  These sessions normally take place outside of school 
premises, often at a schoolteacher’s residence.  “Extra study,” which has grown into an informal business 
carried out by low-paid state schoolteachers, started its transition from rare to common to normative back 
in the late 1990s.  Initially it was a way not only of reviewing what was covered in the classroom but also 
of expanding students’ knowledge based upon the classroom instruction.  
That rationale seems innocent enough, and attendance of extra study sessions is not compulsory.  
Unfortunately, however, in an attempt to increase their students’ attendance at extra study, some 
teachers purposely cover only half of what should be taught in class so as to save the rest for the extra-
study sessions.  Others provide special sessions to prepare students for in-class exams.  Thus students 
and their parents/guardians often are under considerable pressure to have the children enroll in the extra-
study classes, because attendance there can significantly upgrade students’ performances on school 
exams and can allow a student to curry favor with the teacher.  The amount charged for extra study varies, 
depending on subject and grade level.51  Students normally are required to pay for the extra-study fees at 
the beginning of each month.  While all the subjects are taught by the same teacher at the primary level, 
each subject is taught by different teachers at the lower secondary and upper secondary levels.   
                                                          
50 The average monthly salary of public schoolteachers ranges from 1.5 million to 1.8 million VND.    
 
51 In the case of a particular first-grader attending a public primary school, the student attends extra-study sessions in 
Vietnamese literature and mathematics, both of which are taught by the same teacher.  A monthly fee of 1 million 
VND is charged by the teacher to each student.  For comparison purposes, a particular tenth-grader going to a public 
upper secondary school attends extra study sessions in mathematics, physics, and chemistry.  Mathematics class 
sessions are held four days a week and charged for on a monthly basis (400,000 VND per month); physics and 
chemistry sessions are both given once a week and the charges are 100,000 VND and 70,000 VND per session, 




In addition to the extra-study payments, parents offer teachers other gifts, often monetary, 52 on 
special occasions and these serve as important sources of additional income for teachers.  Such 
occasions include Teacher’s Day (November 20th), Women’s Day (October 20th), Mid-Autumn Festival, 
the beginning and the end of the school year, and the Lunar New Year.  Needless to say, most of the 
migrant parents and guardians cannot afford such gifts or private classes, given their marginal economic 
condition.   
A retired schoolteacher reflected on how monetary gifts to schoolteachers, or phong bì gửi thầy 
cô giáo, began to prevail.  Although there has long been a norm in Vietnam that you offer a gift when you 
ask someone a favor, it was not, he told me, until after the advent of doi moi that gift-giving from parents 
to teachers on various occasions became common.  At first, gift-giving took a non-monetary form.  Fruit, 
such as oranges, was a most popular gift item for Teacher’s Day.  But with the growing circulation of 
money as part of the shift to a market economy, gift-giving increasingly has taken a monetary form.  
Looking back on his teaching days, this retired schoolteacher shared with me his recollection of an 
encounter with a mother who was trying to get her son admitted to the school where he was teaching:   
About ten years ago, I met a poor widow whose husband had just died and left her with a 
son.  She came to see me and asked for my help in getting her son enrolled at the school 
where I was teaching at the time.  I told her that our school would be willing to take him, 
in because it catered to children from disadvantaged families just like him.  I then asked 
her to come to our school the next day with her son, and to bring his grade reports from 
his previous school as well as his birth certificate.  The following day she and her son 
turned up at my doorstep, not at school as I had specifically asked her to, with his school 
documents, a bag of gifts, and an envelope in hand.  I told her that I understood her hard 
living conditions and that she would not need to bring me any gifts because I was willing 
to help her and her son no matter what.  After I asked her to come back and see me the 
next day at school, she left.  However, they never showed up the following day.  Then 
about two weeks later, I saw her son at school.  I later learned that after she came to see 
me, she approached another colleague of mine for help and gave him the gifts in 
exchange for her request; he gladly received them.  You see, I turned down the gifts out 
of kindness but she did not get that, unfortunately.  She must have thought I refused her 
gifts because I thought they were too little or I wanted more money.  I felt very sorry for 
her, because I really wanted to help her and her son without any compensation.  As the 
Vietnamese saying goes, “There is no such thing as a free gift (Không ai cho không ai cái 
gì).”53  People often think you are expected to give gifts in exchange for a favor done, or 
                                                          
52 Most commonly parents present an envelope containing money, but sometimes they add a small gift to make the 
gesture more polite. While the amount of a monetary offering varies according to area, school, and budget of 
parent/guardian, anecdotal evidence suggests that the average monetary gift to public schoolteachers is 500,000 
VND per teacher; still, the amount is increasing year by year.  It is considered desirable that parents/guardians give 
these offerings to all the teachers their children are associated with.  As a child advances through the grades, from 
the pre-primary to the tertiary level, the number of teachers requiring an offering, as well as the amount of the offering 
to each teacher, will rise, along with the number of subjects taught by the various teachers.  
 




in anticipation of a favor.  The mother must have taken it that I would not return her favor 
because I did not accept her gifts.  
 
Migrant families’ inability to pay private-class fees or to offer gifts disinclines some teachers to 
give attention to migrant students.  As its worst this syndrome can even extend to the manifestation of 
outright discriminatory behaviors by teachers toward migrant parents, guardians, and students.  In one 
such instance, Huynh’s mother claimed in tears that she and her children were treated harshly by the 
children’s schoolteachers.  Her children had attended a local state primary school for several years before 
they transferred to a charity class.  Because of their limited finances the parents could not afford to buy 
any gifts for the schoolteachers, or to send their children to attend their extra-study classes.  One day the 
mother was called to the school by their teachers, who bluntly told her that Huynh and her brother should 
transfer to other schools.  The official reason they gave was that the family’s ho khau was not registered 
in the district where the school was located.  Given that this had not been an issue for years subsequent 
to the children’s admission to the school, and that there were other students whose ho khau were not 
registered in the district but were attending the school with impunity, the mother contended that the real 
reason the teachers wanted her children to leave the school was that they were unable to bring “benefits” 
to them in the form of gift-offerings or attendance at “extra study.”    
 Like Huynh’s mother, Ms. Hanh asserted to me that her eldest son had been maltreated by his 
primary schoolteacher, who she claimed was not paying him as much attention as she did most of his 
classmates.  “You know why? Because we cannot afford to buy her any gifts!” she said agitatedly.  Initially 
her son was attending the extra-study classes offered by the teacher but eventually he had to discontinue 
them because his parents could not keep up with their ever increasing fees.  Since his withdrawal from 
“extra study,” he has been given a cold shoulder by his teacher: nowadays she rarely gives him the 
opportunity to speak up in class, and he no longer gets called upon to write answers on the blackboard.  
The teacher’s behaviors have led Ms. Hanh and her son to believe that she no longer cares much about 
him as a student.  Lamenting the teacher’s discouraging behavior, the mother said with a sigh and a 
disappointed look, “Had I been able to “bribe” her with some gifts and send my son to her extra-study 
classes…she would have been more attentive toward my son!”  





 In contrast to the financially challenged migrant parents, those enjoying better economic 
conditions and thus able to fulfill the teachers’ informal financial needs can gain preferential treatment for 
their children.  Huyen, mother of a four-year-old girl attending a preschool in the Hang Dau district, told 
me how her daughter’s teacher had changed her behavior since she gave her a monetary gift of 200,000 
VND on one of the gift-offering occasions for teachers.  Before Huyen offered the gift, the teacher would 
greet her only casually when Huyen came to preschool to drop off and pick up her daughter.  After the 
gift-offering, however, the teacher not only became more sociable and friendly, greeting her with smiles 
and asking her how she was, but also started to share more about how her daughter was doing in class.  
“I must admit that I had mixed feelings about how she changed her behavior just like that, you know? But 
I’m really happy that she is more caring and paying more attention to my daughter now.  That’s all that 
matters to me as a parent,” said Huyen.  
One must refrain from drawing any too-hasty conclusion as to what actually triggered these 
teachers’ deficiencies in attentiveness and their discouraging behaviors toward some migrant students.  It 
would be wrong to do so without examining a more sufficient body of substantive evidence accrued via 
class observations and interviews with the students in question, their classmates, and their teachers.  
What can soberly be said, however, based on the sort of testimonies we have been hearing from both 
migrant and non-migrant parents and guardians, is that within the sphere of Vietnam’s current educational 
practice, and especially in state-school settings where the teachers’ salaries clearly are inadequate, 
parents/guardians’ financial capacity to contribute to teachers’ supplementary income matters.  Moreover, 
lack of access to the extra-study sessions means that the children are at a disadvantage in relation to 
their classmates who come from wealthier households, when it comes to taking competitive examinations 
(London 2007).  
It also cannot be doubted that the government’s promotion of “socialization” in the education 
sector has placed greater financial burdens on individual households and thereby made it harder for low-
income families, having only limited resources to allocate to tuition and other school-associated fees, to 
send their children to mainstream schools, be they public or private.  Not only do non-tuition school fees 
and extra-study sessions add up to far more than tuition, but the combined amount keeps rising as 




national level, the proportion of the average Vietnamese household’s budget devoted to educational 
expenditures has been estimated to be over 50 percent.  Given the 3:1 disparity in household 
expenditures on education between urban and rural areas, and the 6:1 disparity between the wealthiest 
and poorest quintiles (General Statistics Office as cited in London, 2011b), one can readily understand 
just what the urban migrant poor are up against, as they struggle to put a portion of their hard-earned 
money aside to pay for all the manifold aspects of their children’s schooling.  
Furthermore, the state’s increased imposition of financial responsibilities onto households raises 
the vexing question of educational and social equity.  Placing even more of the responsibility for 
educational services on the recipients’ shoulders is hardly in conformity with the state’s endorsement of 
charge-free provision of primary education as stipulated in the Law on Protection, Care, and Education of 
Children.  At the same time, the upsurge in fee-charging practices even within the public educational 
establishments is steering the children of socioeconomically marginalized families away from attending 
state schools and extra-study classes, which flies in the face of the state’s professed commitment to 
universal accessibility and social equity in education as laid down in the Education Law.  Thus, the irony 
is sadly inescapable: the state’s education policies, with their inevitable emphasis on “socialization” given 
the new socialist-oriented market economy, have only served to exacerbate inequalities by creating 
differential access to education resources, especially within the arena of formal education.  Or to put the 
matter differently, those richer in the financial assets that can be used to grease the wheels of their 
children’s education—e.g., members of the state elites and of the newly emerging urban middle class 
(London, 2011b, p. 93)—are gaining preferential access, as compared to their socioeconomically 
disadvantaged counterparts, to formal schooling.  The result is wider educational opportunities for just the 




Regulatory aspects continue to play a major role, though not in absolute terms, in determining whether 
children can access formal education.  Two such key regulatory forms are birth certificates and ho khau.  
In principle, in order for children to enroll in state schools, both their ho khau, confirming their permanent 




are treated as a passport to no just registration at state schools but also free health checkups and 
medical treatment in the place of current residence (Le et al., 2011).  As for the child’s possession of 
permanent residency, it entitles her/him to enter one of the state schools in the locality where her/his ho 
khau is registered.   
 The two absences, of birth certificates and of ho khau, often are in fact intimately intertwined.  If 
migrants fail to return to the place of origin where their ho khau was registered after their temporary 
migration to somewhere else, their names are likely to be removed from the register after six months 
(Hayton, 2010).  Then, when such unregistered migrant couples decide to get married or to deliver babies 
at the place of destination, they are sure to face various difficulties; for one thing, neither their marriage 
certificates nor their baby’s birth registration is likely to be issued.  Estimates made in 2000 suggested 
that over a quarter of the babies born in 2000 were undocumented, which equaled roughly 250,000 
babies.  
If a migrant child wished to be transferred to a state school in the locality of the current residence, 
s/he would need to return to the place of origin where the parents’ ho khau was registered in order to 
obtain a copy of her/his certificate.  Alternatively, s/he could ask the hospital where s/he was born to 
reissue the birth certificate, but some hospitals fulfill such requests only for a steep fee.  Although the new 
laws and regulations introduced in 2004 now allow the registration of babies with the People’s Committee 
at the location where they are born, not necessarily in the place where their parents’ ho khau was issued 
(UN Viet Nam, 2010a), the regularization of this practice has been met with reluctance on the part of the 
local authorities.  Some migrant children do not have birth certificates because their parents were too 
poor to pay for hospital fees and their mother ran away from the hospital just after giving birth.  In such 
cases the request for reissuance of the certificate is unlikely to be accommodated.  Moreover, the birth of 
a baby needs to be registered with both the local People’s Committee and the police within 60 days of the 
baby’s delivery.  When that set of processes does not get done in time, the parent(s) are liable to be 
fined.54   
                                                          
54 For instance, the local police demanded that a permanent resident in the Thanh Ninh area who was not aware of 
this 60-day rule pay 1.5 million VND, simply because she had failed to register her baby in time; after negotiation, the 




The socioeconomic significance of the all-important birth certificate is such that it can spell the 
success or failure of a child’s attempt to gain entry to a state school.  In the case of Phuong, a 4th-grader 
in the charity class, because of a simple, mistake forced her to forsake her dream of attending a state 
school.  When she was born in 1998 her grandmother went to the administrative office in the locality 
where her mother had ho khau, to register her birth.  Alas, she inadvertently wrote her name wrong, as 
Huong instead of Phuong.  This tiny mistake later proved to be costly indeed to poor Phuong.  When she 
reached primary-school age she applied for admission to a public school in the Thanh Ninh area that her 
elder sister already was attending with financial aid from an NGO; the school eventually turned down her 
application, pointing out that the name on her birth certificate did not match the name on her ho khau 
record.  The tendering of a monetary bribe (or “gift”) to local officials, along with a request to have her 
name on the birth certificate changed, might have helped to set her record straight, but such a ploy was 
beyond the financial capacity of Phuong’s family.  
The prerequisite of possessing valid birth certificates and ho khau documents therefore 
represents an impediment blocking access to mainstream education for temporary-registered and 
unregistered migrant children.  Due to the overloaded status of state education facilities,55 children 
without permanent residency are by no means guaranteed a seat in a public primary school if the school 
is already full (Save the Children, U.K., 2006; UN Viet Nam, 2010a; UNDP, 2011).  Some migrant parents 
who lack permanent residency but have superior economic wherewithal and social connections56 manage 
to get their children enrolled in mainstream schools by paying higher fees to the state schools than do 
                                                          
55 The lack of classrooms, and the poor physical infrastructure of those that do exist, has been a continuing problem 
for primary education in Vietnam, a place where the number of school-age children is significantly greater than that of 
classrooms in state schools.  Double-shifting or even triple-shifting of classrooms has been widely utilized as a way of 
tackling the problem in an era of inadequate financial resources (Trinh, 2006), but this practice has generated 
consequences.  On the one hand it has resulted in an expansion of enrollment in compulsory education (Cobbe, 
2011).  On the other hand the limited hours of classroom teaching, combined with the low salary of schoolteachers, is 
conceived to be responsible for the growth of teachers’ side-jobs, the most popular of which are the extra-study 
classes.  Hanoi, with its high rate of population growth, has been hard hit by the shortage of school facilities and its 
resulting challenges.  
 
56 It should be noted, however, that in less frequent cases some migrant children (e.g., Phuong’s elder sister) are 
granted admission to state schools via an introduction and assistance from NGOs even when their parents/guardians 
cannot afford to send them there.  In such instances NGOs normally bear all the costs, including tuition and other 
school-related fees.  One also could turn to a personal connection, but even doing that would not guarantee one’s 
child a permanent place in a public school.  Minh, the mother of two children, told me that even though her son did 
not have a birth certificate at the time, he once was admitted to a public school simply because Minh knew the school 
principal personally.  Her son was doing well there but when he reached the third grade the principal resigned and the 
school demanded, out of the blue, that her son submit his birth certificate.  When he failed to do so, he was asked to 




their permanent-resident counterparts, or by sending their children to semi-public or private schools that 
have even higher costs; neither of those options is affordable for most low-income migrant families.  The 
Migration Impact Survey, conducted by the Institute for Social Development Studies in 2008, revealed 
that 43 percent of the children of those surveyed said they could not go to school; of those children, 84 
percent could not go because of their non-permanent residential status—that is, they held no ho khau at 
the place of residence (Le et al., 2011).  Moreover, and as previously mentioned, the residence-based 
policy excludes non-permanent migrant residents from benefiting from public support, such as those 
governmentally subsidized programs for the poor which include, among other things, exemption from 
school fees and provision of school supplies.57   
The only remaining educational service available to migrant children who wish to enroll in school 
but do not have birth certificates, ho khau, dependable social connections, or disposable income is 
alternative education.  Both existing research and the data drawn from my field research suggest that 
affection classes—one of the major forms of alternative education—are the most probable and practical 
option.  Migrant participants in my study whose children were attending the “charity class” confirmed that 
their children’s lack of birth certificates and/or ho khau, as well as the extra fees imposed upon non-
permanent residents, were the chief reasons preventing their children from going to public primary school.  
The charity class, like many other affection classes, does not require incoming students to submit birth 
certificates or ho khau, or to pay any fees.  A small-scale survey conducted in one of Hanoi’s migrant-
concentrated neighborhoods by Save the Children, U.K. (2006), as part of their larger analysis of the 
plight of migrant children, found that only a small number of them were attending mainstream state 
schools; from the 17 families, 9 children were attending mainstream education, 13 were participating in 
affection classes, and 14 were not going to school at all (pp. 81-83).   
And yet, as described in the preceding section, when these affection classes are compared to 
their full-fledged public school counterparts, they are seen to suffer from disadvantages that hinder 
students once placed in alternative education from smoothly reintegrating into mainstream education.  For 
                                                          
57 In one case of a permanent-resident household in the Thanh Ninh area that has benefited from a government-
subsidy program, the family has been provided with a year’s supply of stationery (i.e., notebooks, textbooks, and 
pens) as well as food (e.g., rice and traditional Vietnamese rice cakes or banh trung for Tet). The head of this 
household was a retired woman in her sixties who previously had worked in a state-owned factory.  Since her 




instance, one of the remaining challenges for students who have at least found their way into affection 
classes has to do with their attempts to move up to state secondary schools.  Most affection classes 
teach basic literacy and arithmetic skills, and thus are at best equivalent to the primary level of education; 
indeed some classes, such as this study’s charity class, issue diplomas to students who successfully 
complete the fifth grade.  And yet the widespread bias against the diplomas issued by non-public, 
alternative education establishments, especially when that works in tandem with the lack of birth 
certificates, often militates against students’ gaining admission to public lower secondary schools.   
 What seems to be problematic about the government’s stance vis-à-vis its current education 
services is not only its imposition of regulatory prerequisites in order to access formal education but also 
its “conditional” commitment to universalization of compulsory education and education equality.  Two 
points must be made in the latter regard.  First, in order for Vietnamese children to benefit from the state 
provision of education services and subsidies they must satisfy certain conditions, above all possession of 
ho khau in the current residence and birth certificate.  This condition may be waived in exchange for 
increased financial charges, such as higher admission fees for non-permanent residents in the school 
locality58 and “bribery” to reinstate ho khau/birth certificates.  Having social connections can also help a 
household gain better access to the formal schooling of its choice even if it otherwise does not have such 
access, but it is likely to come with a commission fee.59  Understandably, such alternatives are not 
affordable by all non-permanent children’s families, let alone by migrant parents having little disposable 
income and lacking a broad circle of friends and acquaintances with connections to public schools.  
Second, the regulatory conditions sadly bespeak the state’s withdrawal from its role as an education 
provider proactively reaching out to that marginalized migrant population which, as of now, is so clearly 
being denied equal access to formal schooling.  The state’s stance, especially as it is paired with its 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
via the modest income she assembles from selling porridge on the street, and adding that pittance to her pension and 
her government subsidies.   
 
58 This imposition of higher school fees applies to all students whose permanent residency is outside the locality of 
the school.  For instance, a permanent resident child in one locality of the Thanh Ninh area was charged 7 million 
VND in admission fees at a public school in a ward outside her/his locality, in comparison with 2 million VND charged 
to incoming students with permanent residency in the ward where the school is located.  In some other cases 
entrance fees are waived entirely for students having permanent residency in the school’s locality.   
 
59 In one instance, the mother of a first-grade daughter paid 8 million VND to a schoolteacher who had helped her 
daughter to enroll in a school outside of the family’s locality—that coming on top of a 2 million VND entrance fee.  The 




promotion of the “socialization” of education, is exacerbating the unequal distribution of education 
services by discouraging the full-scale inclusion of those who do not meet the preconditions. 
 Moreover, the government’s reluctance to fully commit itself to ensuring universal access to either 
mainstream or alternative education, regardless of a child’s satisfactory “prequalification,” appears to be 
reflected in the absence of any systematized push, undertaken by state and local authorities in tandem 
with private education providers (e.g., private schools, affection classes, etc.), to identify out-of-school 
children and those at risk of becoming such.  The study conducted by UNICEF and MOLISA (2009), 
assessing Vietnam’s child protection laws and policies acknowledged that, despite the state’s 
endorsement of universalized primary education and the existence of a comprehensive national program 
designed to assist out-of-school children in resuming their schooling, currently there are no systems or 
preventive measures in place to detect out-of-school children and to provide the necessary assistance to 
vulnerable children and their families.  
In a similar vein, Save the Children, U.K. (2006) reported, based on their interviews with migrant 
families all across Vietnam’s regions, that few migrant families with school-age children had been 
approached by DOET, DOLISA, the former Committee for Population, Family and Children (CPFC60; now 
part of MOLISA), or local authorities or schoolteachers to ask about the status of their children’s school 
enrollment or to encourage their children to go to school.  The migrant families interviewed for the present 
study implicitly lend their support to Save the Children, U.K.’s study, for they told us that they have had 
few interactions with officials from the local governmental bodies or with local authorities, beyond the 
visits made by the charity-class teachers and the NGO staff members involved in the charity class.  When 
some of the charity-class students dropped out of state schools and were in search of alternative 
education opportunities, they either were contacted by the charity-class staff or turned to a small circle of 
migrant friends who then put them in touch with the class.  
 Some government and local authorities might say that the problem they have in identifying out-of-
school migrant children derives from the fact that many of the latter are either temporary or unregistered 
residents.  And yet in my meeting with DOET personnel in Hanoi, an official involved in alternative 
                                                          
60 As a government body charged with the state administration of child protection, CPFC is responsible, among other 




education proudly claimed that there were no out-of-school children in Hanoi, brandishing as he said this 
a list of all the students enrolled in recent years in the alternative education schools supported by the 
State.  But when I brought up the issue of the limited educational opportunities available to the children of 
non-registered migrant families, and asked about the availability of outreach activities initiated by the 
department, he responded hesitantly: “To be honest, there is no easy way to count or locate out-of-school 
children if they are not properly registered as Hanoi residents.  We do count students as long as they are 
enrolled in school regardless of their registration status, but otherwise we won’t know for sure.”  Anecdotal 
evidence drawn from Save the Children, U.K.’s study (2006), which itself was based upon interviews done 
with the local authorities in their study sites, suggests that it normally takes six months of residence in the 
area (which also happens to be the period of maximum temporary residence for KT4 migrants) for them to 
detect families having out-of-school children and to then allocate budgetary support for those children and 
place them in one form or another of alternative education.  In other words, newly migrated children with 
temporary residence permits of less than six months, let alone non-registered migrant children, are 
entirely out of the picture when it comes to the public provision of assistance for school enrollment.  One 
can only lament the fact that at the moment there are no proactive and systematic measures in place to 
identify out-of-school children, much less those at risk of soon entering that category.  
It must also be admitted, however, that many migrant families do not proactively seek out public 
support, relying instead upon their own networks for assistance when it is needed.  With respect to 
unregistered migrants in particular, the very fact of their unregistered residential status impedes them 
from accessing the public education resources that normally are available to the marginalized.  
Understandably, their “unlawful” status in their current residence discourages them from approaching the 
local authorities.  The result, however, is a vicious cycle: heightened dissociation between those facing 
regulatory obstacles and those not even aware of them and the increasing vulnerability of the former, as 
that is evidenced notably, but by no means solely, by their alienation from mainstream education.   
 
Case Study of Alternative Education: Hoa Hong River Charity Class 
This section focuses on the Hoa Hong River charity class in the Thanh Ninh area, describing how it was 
founded and how over the past quarter-century it has managed to provide a basic education to children 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




who have fallen away from, or never had access to, formal, mainstream education.  It examines how the 
relative value of the charity class, and thereby of all types of non-formal education, is perceived by 
migrant parents and guardians (largely in relation to potential socioeconomic outcomes) and by the 
children themselves.   
 
How It Started 
The charity class was founded in 1988 on the initiative of Mr. Tuan, a longtime schoolteacher who began 
his teaching career in Hanoi in 1970.  Following his military service from 1972 to 1976 and a subsequent 
two-year assignment to work in the Hanoi office of the DOET, he was appointed to teach at the Truong 
Thu Do education center beginning in 1978 (Ni Thư Quân Đội Nhân Dân, No 14221 of 8/12/2000, P1-2).  
Back in those days the Truong Thu Do, with its mission of eradicating illiteracy, was primarily targeting 
adults without basic education skills.61  After he began teaching at Truong Thu Do, however, he learned 
that a significant number of children in the Thanh Ninh area were not even attending primary school.  
These included the children of impoverished and migrant families, as well as migrant street children who 
had come to the city without their parents.  In order to see for himself their living and educational 
circumstances and thereby gain a better understanding of them, he decided to explore the Thanh Ninh 
neighborhoods of the brown village and its adjacent wards along the dyke.  As he strolled through these 
neighborhoods in the evening, after he had finished teaching his class at Truong Thu Do, he was 
astounded to discover that there were children who did not know how to write, read, or count accurately.  
“At first, no one believed me when I told them that there were literally ‘illiterate’ children out there.”  
Mr. Tuan encouraged the parents he encountered to send their children to school, but it was not 
easy for him to convince the reluctant ones.  Some parents were indifferent about their children’s 
education because they, too, often were illiterate or had very little education.  These parents would say, 
“Look, our children are not going to school but they are still alive!” (không có học mà vẫn sống!).  Children 
in the brown village, in particular, were hesitant to talk to strangers; they did not seem to know how to 
communicate with people outside of the village, Mr. Tuan recalls.  Living on a boat throughout the year, 
these children spent most of their time with their own families and their neighbors and friends; they would 






rarely “go ashore” (lên bờ) and there interact with outsiders.  Many parents were worried that sending 
their working children to school would mean losing their important income-earners, leading to a 
deterioration of their livelihoods.  Mr. Tuan was undeterred, however: “Without being given a chance to 
attend school, I felt that these kids were being left out of a life-cycle that every child follows, which would 
include schooling.”  
Inspired by Mr. Tuan’s persistent efforts to promote schooling for out-of-school children in the 
Thanh Ninh area, his colleagues at Truong Thu Do joined in.  They proposed to Truong Thu Do 
management that the center, as an institution whose raison d'être is to eliminate illiteracy, administer a 
charity class and create a place of learning for those children.  Given the distance of about 5 km between 
the Truong Thu Do and the Thanh Ninh area, they suggested that the class be set up in the Thanh Ninh 
area as opposed to holding it on the premises of Truong Thu Do.  That way, not only would the children’s 
class be within walking distance of where they were living but it also would have more visibility in the 
community.  A handful of parents, seeing Mr. Tuan and his colleagues striving to open the class and 
reaching out to recruit out-of-school children, began to lend a hand.  They assisted the teachers in 
organizing the class and encouraged both their own children and neighborhood kids to join it.  Mr. Nam, a 
longtime brown-village resident whose youngest son attended the charity class until its relocation in 2013, 
fondly remembered the days when he and his neighbors got involved in its start-up: “At first I was 
skeptical about what those teachers were trying to do, because school education was something new to 
us.  Back then, almost all the children in our village were illiterate.  Seeing them keep visiting us with such 
enthusiasm eventually made us want to become part of their efforts and see what happened.”  
As noted, since its establishment in 1988 the charity class has been imparting a basic primary 
level education.  At the time of the startup the class essentially relied on voluntary contributions from the 
individual teachers’ own funds. Because of the limited budget, its initiators could not afford to rent a room; 
they decided the class would be held in the house of one of the students whose parents had agreed to let 
them use one of their rooms.  The word that the class was being offered to children in the Thanh Ninh 
area free of charge rapidly spread through the grapevine, and soon it started to draw a large number of 
children who had no access to schooling.  In the meantime, Mr. Tuan and his colleagues’ efforts to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




convince the Truong Thu Do to take part in the operation of the charity class were slowly bearing fruit.  In 
1991, it officially came under the auspices of the Truong Thu Do.  
 
Recent Administrative Changes and Future Prospects 
Since its establishment in 1988,  the charity class has opened up innumerable educational opportunities to 
children who have had difficulty accessing the regular public schools, equipping them with basic literacy 
and numeracy skills.  It continues to admit students on a year-round basis and accepts children without 
“papers,” meaning those who have neither birth certificate62 nor household registration in the locality.  
Since so many students do not accurately know their birth name or their date of birth, and give different 
information every time they are asked, the charity-class teachers need to keep updating such information.  
At the time of my fieldwork during the 2009-2010 school year, the charity class was administered 
by the Truong Thu Do in coordination with an international NGO, which began to provide funding in the 
2008-2009 school year.  The class was held in a rented space on the ground floor of a private two-story 
house located in a tiny alley off a street that is always full of noisy traffic.  At the entrance to the house 
someone had put up a modest sign that read “lớp học cộng đồng” (community school).  Near the entrance 
to the classroom was a small parking space that could hold several bicycles and motorbikes, and a spiral 
stairway led up to the second floor where the landlady’s family lived.  The classroom itself comprised an 
area of about 25 square meters and had the basic set-up: ten two-person desks with green plastic chairs; 
a blackboard, desk, and chair for the teacher; beside the blackboard, a water-dispenser and a dish rack in 
which to place mugs; and a wall-mounted electric fan.  At the back of the classroom was a locked glass 
cupboard in which textbooks, workbooks, and other students’ readings were stored; on the top of shelf 
several game boxes were stacked.  Attached to the classroom was a bathroom with a toilet and a faucet 
for washing hands.  
The class was held every day from Monday through Friday.  Until 2011 it was divided into two 
sessions, morning and afternoon.  In principle the first-to-third-graders were assigned to the morning 
session lasting from 7:30 to 10:30 with a 15-minute recess, while the fourth- and-fifth-graders attended 
the afternoon session from 2 to 5 with a 15-minute recess.  Since the class followed the same school 
                                                                                                                                                                                           





calendar as other public schools, the new school year began in September and ended in May.  The first 
semester ran from September to January, the second from January to May.  During the summer months 
from June to August the class was held three days a week (as opposed to five during the regular school 
year), but students’ attendance was not mandatory.  At the time of my fieldwork during the 2009-2010 
school year two female teachers, Ms. Linh and Ms. Duong, had been appointed to teach the class, with 
each session being instructed by one or the other of them.  Because it was a multi-grade class, the 
teachers needed to take turns teaching students of different grades simultaneously.  Ms. Linh was in 
charge of the morning class and Ms. Duong taught the afternoon class; both teachers also were teaching 
at the Truong Thu Do.  While Ms. Linh, the newer and younger teacher, had a teaching certificate for both 
the primary and the lower secondary grades, Ms. Duong, the longtime teacher, was a certified teacher for 
the lower secondary level only.  In the mainstream education system, teachers are allowed to teach 
students only at the level for which they are certified.  Ms. Duong and other former teachers who had 
been appointed by the Truong Thu Do to teach the charity class were certified to teach either at the lower 
secondary or the upper secondary level but not at the primary level.  This somewhat unusual 
arrangement was due to the fact that the Truong Thu Do, the parent organization of the charity class, is a 
continuing education institution that targets lower secondary and upper secondary students.   
The charity class imparts arithmetic and Vietnamese literature at the primary level, following the 
government-approved curriculum of continuing education for these two subjects.  The students must take 
final exams at the end of the first and second semesters, and only those who pass the exams are allowed 
to move on to the next grade in the following school year.  At the end of the 2009-2010 school year, 27 
out of 34 students passed the end-of-the year exam and thus advanced to the next grade.  Out of those 
27, 5 students successfully completed the fifth grade and graduated from the charity class.  The 7 
remaining students out of the 34 were to repeat the same grade in the 2010-2011 school year, either 
because they had failed the exam or because they were unable to complete their year-long studies since 
they had been transferred to the charity class in the middle of the 2009-2010 school year.  Over the last 
few years a steadily increasing number of students who have completed the fifth year have gone on to 
study in a lower secondary program at the Truong Thu Do.  There were 3 fifth-grade graduates at the end 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




of the 2010-2011 school year and four in the 2012-2013 school year; all 7 moved on to the first year of a 
lower secondary education program at the Truong Thu Do.  Since the charity class gained the 
endorsement of the MOET in 2000, after years of tenacious negotiation by the Truong Thu Do 
management, its students are now, in principle at least, allowed to transfer to a mainstream primary 
school if they so desire, and those of them who have successfully completed the fifth grade can apply for 
admission to lower secondary schools.  In reality, however, it remains difficult for them to transfer to a 
mainstream school or to move on to any lower secondary school other than the Truong Thu Do.  
At the time of my fieldwork in 2010 the NGO was organizing various activities for the students, 
ranging from free meals (breakfast or lunch, depending on the session they were attending) to basic 
health checkups (including height and weight checks, health education, and the distribution of deworming 
medicine) to presenting the students having the best attendance rates with free school supplies and other 
gift items, to staging recreational activities for special occasions (e.g., Têt, International Children’s Day on 
June 1st, and Têt-Trung-Thu or Mid-Autumn Festival, which is held on the 15th day of the 8th lunar 
month), to gift-giving at the graduation and end-of-school-year ceremony.  Above and beyond their in-
class activities the NGO staff members would make home visits to check on how the students were doing 
at home and to keep their parents/guardians informed about their progress in the class.  
Over the years the charity class has gone through a series of administrative changes. Not only 
has its physical location changed more than a few times but its shaky budgetary situation contingent as it 
generally is upon outside funding, also has resulted in a high turnover of teachers and considerable 
fluctuations in student enrollment.  According to Mr. Tuan, the class managed to receive funding from 
various NGOs, both local and international, from 1997 to 2012, with the exception being the 2007-2008 
school year during which it relied on self-funding.  Beginning in the early 2000s the class benefited from 
the largesse of international NGOs, with their generous funding covering a large proportion of its 
administrative costs, including teachers’ salaries and rental fees for the classroom.  These NGOs also 
attracted an increasing number of incoming students by organizing a broad range of educational and 
recreational activities.  In its heyday in the late 1990s and early 2000s the charity class could boast over 
40 students and as many as 7 teachers appointed by the Truong Thu Do.   





The heavy reliance on external funding to keep the class running, purely positive as such funding 
might at first sound, has resulted in its institutional instability and caused the frequent departure of 
teachers who were reluctant to stay on due to low job security.  “We are constantly looking for potential 
donors, because we cannot count on our current donors to extend their support to us forever,” Mr. Tuan 
told me back in 2010.  Said another teacher, speaking out about job insecurity back in 2010: “We are on a 
short-term labor contract63 with the funding agency for our teaching job in the charity class, not with 
Truong Thu Do.  So if we lose our donors, there is a good chance that the class will dissolve and we will 
lose our jobs.  Even though we still belong to Truong Thu Do and teach several classes there, it’s unlikely 
we will be able to make up the difference in lost pay.”  The teacher who said that later left the class, when 
she landed a position at a public primary school in 2011.  The number of teachers of the charity class has 
been on the decrease over the years; as of 2013 only one teacher, who is slated to retire from teaching in 
2016, was in charge of the entire class.  The decreasing number of teachers, as that is compounded by 
the increasing workload on individual teachers, also is making it difficult for them to find the time to pay 
home visits and stay in close contact with each student’s family.     
The discontinuation of funding from an NGO, due to the project’s reaching its completion in 
December 2012, led to the relocation of the charity class from the Thanh Ninh area to the premises of the 
Truong Thu Do64 and thereby to a decrease in the number of students.  The student enrollment has 
dropped by almost 60 percent since 2010.  At the end of the 2009–2010 school year, there were 34 
students; at the time of my follow-up visit in September 2013, there were only 14.  As a result, the class 
now is being offered only in the morning.  Several reasons were given by the charity-class teacher and 
the founder of the class, Mr. Tuan, for the reduced enrollment numbers.  First, the relocation of the class 
put it literally beyond the reach of students who had been commuting on foot and who now had no means 
of getting to it, such as a bicycle or a parent who could take them to and from school by motorcycle.  
Second, ever since the peak period of student enrollment in the late 1990s and early 2000s—which 
coincided with a surge of migrant children, with or without their parents, coming from rural villages in 
neighboring provinces to the center of Hanoi—the number of students has continued to decrease, which 
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may bespeak a declining need for the class.  While it is not easy to determine the extent to which the 
decreased enrollment numbers in the charity class are due to a reduction in the demand for charity 
classes in general, and/or to migrant and impoverished children’s increased access to public schooling, 
the readily available funding from various organizations for disadvantaged children, plus the relaxation of 
admission policies in some public schools, may also serve to explain why the class is shrinking.  Since 
the discontinuation of the NGO’s project funding the class has still been offered free of charge but 
students no longer receive extra benefits, such as free meals and gifts of school essentials.65   
 
Parents’ and Guardians’ Perspectives on Schooling  
How do the parents and guardians who are sending their children to the charity class see the value of 
such schooling, and its utility for their children’s future?  Anecdotal evidence drawn from my interviews 
with migrant parents and guardians suggests that they have a general sense of satisfaction that the 
charity class has given their children at least a minimal level of education.  In the case of migrant families 
whose children work on the street, in particular, the ability to read, write, and count money accurately is 
considered an essential skill for doing well at their street job.  Yet other parents and guardians attribute 
the value of schooling in general to its expected role of fostering a sense that one is a moral member of 
the society and thereby repelling unwanted bad influences, such as “social evils.”66  Both the parents and 
guardians of working children who stand at greater risk of being exposed to “social evils” as well as those 
without such children expressed their belief that a school education would allow their child to become a 
“useful person” (người có ích) who can make a contribution to society, as opposed to someone acting in 
opposition to the social mores.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
64 The class is now being held in a classroom of the Truong Thu Do, which is located about 5 km from its previous 
site.  
 
65 Some of the current students are, however, receiving financial support and school materials from outside aid 
organizations.  
 
66 Despite their financial instability, a good number of migrant parents and guardians shared with me their hesitation 
about having their children work outside, even though that could help the family to supplement its income.  One major 
reason they cited is their unwillingness to have their children work on the street and thus pick up bad habits and/or 
get involved in disorderly conduct.  When children break the law, parents often are accused of being responsible for 
their children’s misdemeanour, which is viewed as a consequence of bad, irresponsible parenting.  In Vietnam, where 
xấu hổ or shame plays an important role in structuring the social order, there is a deep-seated prejudice against law-
breakers.  They are labeled as those who are shameful and thus morally unfit to live in society.  Moreover, if a 
member of a family breaks the law and gets sent to prison, all the members of the immediate family, and even their 
relatives, are treated with contempt and excluded from the community.  Such practices are particularly common in 




 Some parents’ and guardians’ responses also attested to their faith that schooling can lead their 
children to a better future.  Citing their own experience, whereby low levels of education have kept them 
from having a better life containing a wider range of lifestyle choices, they stressed that they would do 
whatever it takes to put their children through school so that they do not follow in their own footsteps.   
Thao, a 34-year-old mother of three daughters from Thanh Hoa province, said that schooling is extremely 
important and that she would never want her children to lead lives like hers.  After she had finished her 
primary education, she stopped going to school and started working on the farm to help out her family.  
Later she migrated to Hanoi to work as a domestic servant.  Eventually she returned to Thanh Hoa and 
married a man from the same village, with whom she has had three daughters.  They worked hard, 
raising such farm animals as pigs and chickens.  Five years after their marriage, they managed to build a 
house in the village.  However, an outbreak of the bird flu, which occurred just a year after they had 
completed the house, had an adverse impact on their farming business, and this eventually caused her 
husband to migrate alone to Taiwan in 2007 while Thao and their daughters remained in the village.  
During the first year and a half he would send remittances to his family, but suddenly he stopped doing so 
for no reason.  Unable to get in touch with him, Thao decided to migrate to Hanoi with her children so that 
she could pay off the debts she owed to a local bank and to her relatives.  Since their relocation to the city, 
Thao has worked at a small vegetable-and-fruit stand near the charity class.  Her oldest daughter assists 
her by tending the stand after school, but Thao told me that she refuses to picture her daughters working 
on the street all on their own.  Another mother of two daughters in the brown village, a primary school 
dropout, said that she has to live a hard life owing to her low level of education and her early marriage.  
After her own mother went into bankruptcy, the family sold their house in Ninh Binh province and moved 
to Hanoi to live in the brown village in 2000.  The mother was the sole caretaker and breadwinner, selling 
drinks on the bridge; her husband became physically disabled after being involved in an accident when 
working at a construction site.  “The last thing I want for my daughters is that they will follow the same life-
path as I did!  That’s why I’m doing my best to keep them in school, and not to make them drop out to 
work on the street with me.”  Similarly, Nhu, a widowed single mother from Thanh Hoa province whose 
only son was attending the charity class, indicated that she was willing to sacrifice herself in order to let 




education and thereby gaining a brighter future.  “Neither my [late] husband nor I had sufficient education.  
We both graduated from the primary school and that was it.  Because of that, we have suffered a lot and 
had a life full of hardships.  At the end of the day, education really matters.”  The mother and son 
migrated to Hanoi after the fisherman father died in a sea accident.  When I met her she was providing for 
her son by working all day at a com binh dan in the Thanh Ninh area.  “If we were to go back [to our home 
village] there would be no future for him, except becoming a fisherman like his father, and that’s the last 
thing I want.  I don’t want to lose my only son like I did my husband!”  
Despite their conviction that schooling will lead to a better future for their children, these parents 
and guardians tend to shy away from getting involved in school matters.  Not only do they rarely attend 
PTA meetings but they also feel that, because of their low educational backgrounds, they are not well 
qualified to help their children with their schoolwork.  On top of that, it is not easy for migrant parents who 
work outside the home for long hours to spend enough time to work closely with their children and check 
up on how their classwork is going.  Even the parents who occasionally did attend PTA meetings confided 
that their educational and financial background always made them feel timid; and indeed, they rarely 
spoke up.         
Their inactive school involvement, along with their diffident behavior, has left a widely held 
impression among schoolteachers that migrant parents and guardians leave everything to the school.  As 
a charity-class teacher put it, “they don’t think that children’s schooling is part of their responsibility, but 
that it’s all ours!”  Also referring to parents’ heavy reliance on schoolteachers, another teacher remarked 
that the teachers must find ways to foster parents’ interest and encourage their active involvement in the 
children’s school affairs.  
It is worth mentioning that some families managed to send their children to mainstream public 
schools with financial support from NGOs, even as their siblings attended the charity class.  These 
parents’ responses seem to suggest that they assess the utility of schooling based on their various 
children’s intellectual capacities and ages.  In referring to their children who were attending the charity 
class, these parents (or guardians) often would emphasize that they were slow learners.  “My daughter 
has been going to the charity class for more than a year, but she is not a fast learner like her older brother 




joining the charity class Huynh attended a mainstream public school in the Thanh Ninh area, where she 
repeated the first year for three years in a row67 and eventually dropped out.  After having been 
transferred to the charity class, there she was when I came on the scene, still enrolled as a first-grader.  
“Hopefully, she will complete the first-grade this year and move on to the second grade,” said the mother. 
Huynh’s brother has been attending a local public school courtesy of a scholarship given to him by an 
NGO, on the condition that he maintain his academic record in the superior range.  Similarly, a 
grandmother, who was helping to support her two granddaughters as well as her mentally and physically 
challenged middle-aged son by selling porridge on the street, noted how pleased she was with her 
younger granddaughter, a charity-class student, for getting at least a basic education.  “She is assiduous, 
but not very bright.  As long as she knows how to write and do the math, I think she will be fine.  If she is 
going to become a street-vendor like me in the future, she will at least need to know how to count.”  By 
contrast, she had high hopes for her older granddaughter, who was attending a public secondary school.  
“She is very smart and studies very hard.  I hope she will continue to excel in her studies and land a job in 
the government sector.  She tells me she wants to become a police officer in the future,” said the 
grandmother proudly; she added, however, that it was ironic that the granddaughter desired to become a 
police officer, given that her parents were in prison for selling drugs.    
In addition to the children’s intellectual capacity, age is seen by parents and guardians as being 
another issue when it comes to who is better suited to a non-formal type of education such as the charity 
class.  As noted, it was not uncommon to see older children studying there in grades lower than those 
appropriate to their age.  Some, like Huynh, would repeat the same grade for more than a year, each time 
failing to pass the end-of-the-year exam.  Others would join the class so as to resume their schooling after 
an extensive out-of-school period.  Thanh, a 19-year-old girl from Bac Giang province, was one such 
student who was studying in the charity class along with her younger classmates.  Although occasionally 
the class would admit an older-aged student such as she, those students tended not to stay long because 
they not only had a hard time balancing study with work but also found it uncomfortable to be studying 
with young “peers” half their age.  When Thanh was studying in the morning session with other 
classmates in the lower grades, her ardor caught everyone’s attention.  She was commuting from outside 
                                                          




of the Thanh Ninh area, a half-hour bicycle ride, but she would never miss the class, even in a heavy 
rain.68  Since her migration to Hanoi in 2008 at the age of 17 she has been working as a live-in babysitter 
and apprentice for the family of a younger sister of her foster mother, who runs a tailor shop.  Thanh was 
adopted by her foster mother in Bac Giang, a local schoolteacher, after her biological parents were 
divorced when she was just a toddler.  After the divorce her mother remarried, to a new Chinese husband, 
and left Thanh in the care of her foster mother, who was one of her neighbors.  Even though Thanh was 
hoping to continue her schooling all the way through the lower secondary and upper secondary levels, her 
aunt, the foster mother’s younger sister, brushed off such a crazy idea.  “Frankly speaking, it’s of little use 
for her to study in the charity class.  I mean, she is too old to study at the primary level anyway. . . .  I 
keep telling her to go to a vocational school instead, so she can acquire more practical skills and get a job.  
But she never listens to me.”  At that point the aunt sighed.  “I’m not saying that she is intellectually 
challenged or anything like that.  In fact, she knows how to read and write and understands the basic 
math.  But look at her, she’s nineteen, almost twenty now, and yet she is still studying as a fifth-grader. . . .  
I just don’t think her studying in the charity class will get her anywhere.”  The aunt once offered to lend 
Thanh money so she could start up a business on her own but Thanh turned down her offer, insisting that 
she wanted to continue her schooling.  “Thanh says she wants to become a teacher like my sister, or 
even a doctor, but neither me nor my sister thinks it’s going to happen.  It’s just unrealistic, and she needs 
to understand that,” said the aunt bluntly.   
In summary, most of the parents and guardians of the charity-class students perceive the value of 
schooling as a pathway to success.  They want their children to acquire a basic education not just to 
improve the literacy and numeracy skills needed for daily survival but also to develop social morality, and 
thereby keep at arm’s length the undesirable social influence typified by “social evils” so as to become a 
person who makes a contribution to society.  Such hopes and beliefs uneasily coexist with their inability, 
owing to long working hours, and reluctance, owing to a shameful awareness of their low educational 
backgrounds, to get actively involved in school affairs.  The responses of the parents and guardians who 
have children attending public schools or the charity class indicate that they evaluate the worth of 
                                                          
68 Because of poor drainage facilities in Hanoi heavy rain, even for just a few hours, can cause water to pond and 
thereby produce traffic congestion.  In the charity class, if the attendance rate was very low on rainy days, the class 




schooling relative to the level of each child’s intellectual ability and her/his age.  Among the charity-class 
students are underachieving children, slow learners who repeat the same grade, and students who do not 
meet the age requirement for admission to the regular public schools.  Understandably, the parents and 
guardians have higher expectations for their better-performing children enrolled in public schools than for 
those attending the charity class.  The unfortunate result has been a reinforcement of the idea that non-
formal types of education such as the charity class are suited strictly to those who do not meet the 
“standard,” not only in regulatory and financial but also in intellectual terms.          
 
Children’s Perspectives 
How do children see the value of schooling and its utility for creating their own futures?  The data drawn 
from my interviews with the charity-class children suggest that most of them, beyond an exceptional case 
such as Thanh’s, take a cynical view of schooling.  Their somewhat pessimistic responses with respect to 
its potential to help them build their future life stand in stark contrast to the expectations of the class 
providers, by which term I mean the teachers, the founder of the class, and the members of the NGO that 
was offering funding for the class at the time of my fieldwork.  They would share with me their high hopes 
that the charity-class education would boost their students’ self-confidence and integrate them into the 
wider society, enabling them to lead a life of greater socioeconomic self-sufficiency because they can fill a 
wider range of occupations.  And yet the children themselves almost never shared with me any such 
vision of how the acquisition of a basic education would help them to climb up the academic and social 
ladders.  Virtually all of them said that most likely they would follow in their parents’/guardians’ footsteps, 
engaging in casual laboring jobs or working in the informal sector.  Just as their parents and guardians 
were largely content to have the children obtain just the charity-class minimal level of education, so too 
the children had no desire to pursue education at a higher level, beyond the upper secondary or even the 
lower secondary school.  Rather, they were quite exclusively concerned with how they can have a more 
financially stable life in the future.  One female student told me she probably would work as a bar hostess 
just like her big sisters69 (who also had attended the charity class), and would be glad to do so because 
they were making good money.  Another female student said, “Many people ask me what I want to do for 




want to suffer financially like my parents when I grow up.”  A male student responded sarcastically, when 
Huyen and I asked him how he thought the charity class would help his future, “How do you think it will 
help us to get a good job in the future?  Do you really think that the knowledge we are taught in this class 
will take us somewhere, say, to go to college eventually?”  As illustrated by these students’ remarks, there 
was a general sense of resignation among the charity-class students, a feeling that the mere acquisition 
of a basic education would not help them to climb up the academic and social ladders.  
 Thus, the charity-class students would rarely talk about their academic ambitions, instead making 
more critical and realistic assessments of what kind of future most unlikely lay ahead for them.  One 
possible option for them, if they were to stay on the basic-education track, was to go to a vocational 
school.  Hung, a social worker who was helping out at the charity class in 2010, said, “In my personal 
opinion, the charity-class students should be encouraged to go to a vocational school if they don’t have a 
choice, or the means to go to a lower secondary school.  That way they can make the most of what they 
studied in class, acquire professional skills, and get a job more quickly.  Many migrant children, like our 
students, are pressured to work to support their families by the time they reach the secondary school 
ages.  I do think that the charity-class provides a great entry to education for these kids, but it takes an 
enormous amount of time and money to stay on to higher education.  Unfortunately, many migrant 
families cannot afford that.”  
 
The next chapter will turn its attention to migrant families’ access, or lack of it, to cultural resources.  More 
specifically, the chapter identifies the various types of informal networks to which migrants have access, 
networks that offer them varying degrees of material, financial, and moral support, social collectivity, and 
a sense of trust.  It also will show that the mutually exclusive nature of social relations in the urban 
settings of today’s Vietnam has led to increasing social differentiation among Hanoi’s residents and to the 
segregation/peripheralization of the city’s migrants.  
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CHAPTER VI: CULTURAL RESOURCES AND THEIR CONSTRAINTS 
 
The collectivity, and thereby the cautiousness, of migrants can be both a system of support and a burden.  
On the one hand, it strengthens community ties and builds cohesion among migrants who belong to the 
same social network; on the other hand, it hinders the surer integration of migrants into the mainstream 
society, exacerbating social differentiation and segregation among migrant and non-migrant residents 
having varied degrees of financial means.  
In what follows, I first will examine how cultural resources provide migrant families with 
opportunities to build their lives in the destination area. In so doing I will take up two primary types of 
informal migrant networks: village-based networks—comprised of migrants having the same place of 
origin, including kindred—and non-village-based networks made up of migrants having different places of 
origin.  As illustrated in Chapter IV, migrants often turn to informal social networks as a source of personal 
referrals for housing and jobs, among other things, before and after their relocation to urban centers.  
Anecdotal evidence culled from my field observations suggests that the migrants deem the village-based 
networks of social relations more trustworthy, and resort to them more frequently than they do to the non-
village-based networks.  Although both networks serve as support systems for migrant families, the 
difference between them appears to have to do not just with the rigidity of social boundaries and the 
recruitment of membership (Smith, 1998) but also with the fact that the former system rests on moral 
foundations of communalism that run deep beneath the village congregations of northern Vietnam, 
whereas the latter system remains confined to the exchange of material and moral support, without the 
ultimate goal of fostering social solidarity and equity among the parties involved.  
 
 
Social Relations and Networks 
Migrant Neighbors  
One major component of the non-village-based migrant network is migrant neighbors who have come 
from different places of origin and with whom migrant families get acquainted after they have relocated to 
Hanoi.  While short-term or newly arriving migrants often stay in nha tro, long-term migrants, and 
especially those accompanied by their families, tend to reside in private rental properties.  One finds, in 
the informal settlements that are within walking distance of the Thanh Ninh market, cluster housing where 




approximately six square meters is taken up by three to four residents, normally coming from the same 
household.  They use communal shower and toilet facilities.   
Huyen and I often would pay a visit to one such complex where several of our research 
participants were living.  Chi, whom the reader met earlier—a woman in her mid-30s, living there with her 
three children and “common-law” husband—was one of the participants we regularly would visit.  When 
we came by her shelter at around 9:30 on a Saturday morning, we found her sitting inside with her two 
sons and newborn baby.  As we stood at the entrance of her shelter to greet her, she greeted us back via 
a faint smile, beckoning us to enter.  Knowing she had growing children, on our way to her place we had 
picked up a big bag of snacks, bread, candies, and packages of milk, which we now gave to her.  After 
thanking us for the food she asked her two sons to take the goods out of the plastic bag and divide them 
into shares, to be given away to their neighbors in the same complex.  As we were chatting the boys were 
taking out the food, one piece after another, and showing some excitement when they saw their favorite 
snacks.  Once they had finished the initial task, the mother instructed her younger son to take each share 
to one or the other of their neighbors.  Cradling food and drinks in his small arms, the boy made several 
trips.  Virtually all the “supplies” were gone in the blink of an eye; the only things left in their shelter were a 
piece of bread, two packages of snacks and of milk, and a few pieces of candy.  On our way back, Huyen, 
noticing my look of surprise at the way they had divided up the things we had brought, and at how quickly 
most of them had disappeared, said to me, “I hope you didn’t mind that she gave the food away to their 
neighbors.  That’s how they support each other, you know?  That way you can show your generosity, and 
when you have some trouble, you too can ask your neighbors for help, even though you can’t always 
expect they will help you in return.”  
As this incident illustrates so well, sharing life-staples is a common practice among migrant 
neighbors who interact with one another on a regular basis.  Huyen’s remarks get to the heart of the 
matter, however, for they rightly suggest that providing help to one’s neighbors is the essential first step to 
be taken by anyone who finds herself or himself within this sort of exchange system.  Sharing food and 
taking care of children are among the most frequent ways of offering assistance to neighbors.  Later I 
learned that when one of Chi’s neighbors needed to return to her home village with her husband for 




their parents came back.  The daughters, as well as some other kids in the same compound, would often 
come by Chi’s shelter to play with her newborn baby.  Occasionally the older girls were asked to babysit 
the baby when Chi had to run errands outside, with that “swap” showing us, in the mildest and therefore 
the truest way, how this “circle of mutual assistance” tends to function.  
 Aside from sharing material things, such as food and babysitting help, migrant neighbors 
sometimes appear to form a sort of “protective mechanism” to ward off unwanted attention or interference 
coming from outsiders.  My first encounter with Thu, a twelve-year-old girl from Nam Dinh, provides us 
with an excellent example of this phenomenon.   
 It was a rainy day on the fifteenth day of a lunar month.  Huyen and I decided to go to a pagoda in 
the city center, hoping to meet and have some informal conversations with “begging children.”  Huyen had 
convinced me that because such children often are migrant children, we would have a good chance of 
making some connections with them and their families.  As noted earlier, the first and the fifteenth are the 
days of the month when a large number of people flock to pagodas to worship, and thus some begging 
children invariably turn up, begging in exchange for grace.  When we arrived in the late afternoon the 
pagoda already was packed with worshipers, and it took us a while to locate any begging children.  
“Maybe because it’s raining today.  Usually, you would easily catch sight of people begging,” Huyen said.  
As we walked up the stairs to enter the pagoda and then moved further inside, we saw a girl and a little 
boy, who appeared to be siblings, sitting and nestling up to each other in an exterior corridor.  Right 
beside the boy was a green-colored plastic bowl, in which five or six small bills had been placed.  The girl 
was slightly dark of skin and wearing a soiled pink T-shirt, a pair of jeans, and a pair of yellow sandals; 
her disheveled hair was escaping from a loosely tied knot.  The little boy, with long eyelashes and a runny 
nose, was blinking as he looked up at the girl’s face.  In contrast to the girl’s relatively light clothing, the 
boy was wearing a heavy sweatshirt and cords with a frayed hem.  As we walked toward these two, the 
boy snuggled up next to the girl, kissing her cheeks and neck as if seeking reassurance, and the girl 
looked at us from beneath lowered brows.  Huyen slipped a ten-thousand-dong bill into the bowl and the 
girl bowed her head slightly.  We greeted her and the boy and asked how they were doing.  “I’m okay, but 
my brother is having a cold,” she replied.  After chatting with her for a while, we asked if she would mind 




years old.  She and her four-year-old brother, Khanh¸had two other siblings, and they lived with their 
parents in the northeastern end of the Thanh Ninh area.   
 As we were talking to Thu and Khanh, I noticed that a middle-aged woman with shoulder-length 
hair was squatting cater-corner to us.  Apparently she too was begging for grace, for a dark-green 
communist helmet had been placed on the floor of the corridor, upside-down.  Wearing a long-sleeved 
white shirt, a pair of trousers of a black-and-white pattern, and a dark-green cloth cap, the woman was 
sitting on the floor with her shoulders hunched and with no shoes on.  Putting a fishy look on her face, 
she kept staring at us the entire time that Huyen and I were approaching Thu and Khanh, and then 
chatting with, and seating ourselves beside them.  Not long after we had started chatting, I saw her make 
eye contact with Thu and call something to her from a distance, which I was unable to make out.   
As it later turned out, the woman had recognized Huyen, having seen her before on the street 
when she was with another former street friend, who now works as a social worker for an NGO.  The 
woman’s and Thu’s families were neighbors, and both receiving financial assistance from the NGO:  full 
tuition expenses for the children, plus a part of their living expenses.  Huyen, too, recognized the woman’s 
face; she told me she had seen her in her neighborhood, but did not really know who she was.  As it 
turned out, the woman was trying to tell Thu that she need not worry about us, because we were friends 
of the NGO woman.   
After that subtle exchange had passed between the woman and Thu, she seemed to feel more 
relaxed about talking to us. Thu later said that at first she thought we were journalists, seeking a cover 
story about poor kids or something like that.  But the woman—and not just any woman, but one of her 
migrant neighbors—had told her not to worry; that brought her big relief.   
Thu and her brother Khanh always would come out together to the pagoda on the first and 
fifteenth days of every lunar month.  She said that when they were at the pagoda they could make about 
200,000 VND in a single day.  They would sit and beg from morning until late at night, around 10 p.m.  
Even as we chatted, worshipers were dropping cash into the plastic bowl as they walked by us.  Once the 
bowl was full of bills, Thu would collect them, empty the bowl, and place the bills in a small pink bag.  She 
repeated this procedure three or four times during our conversations that lasted for only a total of a little 




 Five days after our visit to the pagoda we again met up with Thu, this time on the street where 
she regularly works alongside her parents.  During our encounter at the pagoda we made a promise that 
we would come by the place where her family works regularly and say hi.  While she and her mother sold 
tourist items such as caps, postcards, and fans, her father, a xe om driver based on the same street-
corner, waited for customers.  Her mother, Hien, and her father, Ngoc, greeted us, and we introduced 
ourselves.  Hien, modestly dressed in a simple white, half-sleeved shirt and a pair of gray trousers, shook 
hands with me and with Huyen, smiling into our eyes.  Ngoc, wearing a pink striped shirt and a pair of 
blue jeans, also greeted us, putting a friendly smile on his tanned face with a mustache.  Thu, who looked 
a little tired, waved at us from her perch on a low plastic stool.  Dressed all in black with a clean T-shirt 
and a pair of knee-length pants, and sporting a beaded hairband, she looked neater than she had the first 
time we saw her at the pagoda.  Behind Thu, her brother Khanh and two other little boys were playing 
around.  As I was talking to Hien another woman came out of nowhere, greeted me, and joined our 
conversation.  Huyen, too, noticed her sudden appearance and exchanged words with her.  The woman 
then tapped my shoulder and asked, “Don’t you remember me?”  Not being able to figure out who she 
was, I replied, “I’m sorry, but would you please remind me where we met?”  “At the pagoda! Remember 
me now?” she said back to me, with a big smile.  It took me a short while to get my head together and 
realize that this was indeed the same woman from the pagoda; she looked completely different, for then 
she had been begging in a sleazy outfit and with empty eyes.  This day she was all smiles and very 
upbeat, and smartly dressed in a body-fitting pink polo t-shirt and a pair of orange-colored skinny jeans.  I 
now learned that this woman’s name was Nguyet, and that she is a single mother of two boys from Thai 
Nguyen province.  Indeed, one of the boys playing with Thu’s brothers was her son.  She and Thu’s family 
know each other because, as noted earlier, they live in the same neighborhood in the northeast end of 
the Thanh Ninh area.  
 This story has been shared simply because it attests to the fact that migrant neighbors from 
different places of origin offer each other support not just in material but also in non-material forms.  The 
solicitousness of Nguyet’s behavior directed toward Thu at the pagoda seems to have been one aspect of 
a protective mechanism based on a sense of fellowship.  Migrants keep a wary eye on outsiders, people 




who may not have their best interests at heart.  In this case the protective mechanism worked well for all 
concerned, both insiders and outsiders, but of course the possibility exists that at certain times it seals 
migrants off too effectively from the outside community and that at other times it keeps the newer 
migrants from making contact with those who migrated to Hanoi some time ago.   
Luckily, in the case of the pagoda incident it worked out well for us, because Nguyet recognized Huyen as 
someone falling within their inner circle, and this allowed Thu to lower her guard and chat with us more 
unreservedly.  The mechanism, of course, could work both (in positive and negative) ways when one tries 
to establish connections with some migrants.   
 
 
Village Circles  
We noted earlier the important fact that within migrant networks, it is the village-based network that often 
plays the most vital role of building interpersonal relationships and thereby allowing a migrant to form a 
sense of community along with her/his fellow country people, both prior to and after the migrants’ 
relocation to new destinations.  In contrast to those relationships with migrant neighbors from different 
places of origin that are constructed after migrants have arrived at their destinations, the village-based 
social relationships do a better job of offering support throughout the migration process.  Village-based 
social relations include, among other groupings, kindred, friends, peer groups, and neighbors from the 
migrants’ place of origin.  Prior to relocation, rural migrants often turn to contacts within their village-based 
network so as to establish connections in the destination area, find job opportunities, and arrange 
accommodations.  Some migrants move along with other people from the same village.  Then, after their 
arrival in the cities, migrants seek and generally gain emotional support and moral encouragement from 
their fellow migrant villagers.  
There can be no doubt that one’s place of origin plays an important role in building interpersonal 
relationships and forming a sense of community with one’s fellow country people upon migration.  Child 
and adult migrants having strong village connections best weather the migration process, and do the best 
job of making their village ties part and parcel of their lives during their time spent in the urban 
destinations.  
Huyen, a longtime resident in Hanoi in her late 20s from Hung Yen, first migrated to Hanoi to 




selling from one of her neighbor friends, back in her village days.  One summer, that girl and her mother 
left for Hanoi on a temporary migration of a few months.  After their return from Hanoi, their lifestyle 
clearly seemed to have changed for the better: her friend started putting on new, pretty clothes and shoes, 
and her family members were similarly well attired.  When Huyen asked her friend what she and her 
mother had done in Hanoi, she replied that they had worked as street-sellers and had made a lot of 
money doing so.  Seeing up close her friend’s sudden change to an improved life-condition introduced 
into Huyen’s mind the idea of migrating to Hanoi.  Later she acted on her plan in order to help her 
divorced mother, who was raising three children on her own, meet the family’s expenses.   
As Huyen recounted her experiences as a street child, she told me that she and her girlfriends 
from the same village of Hung Yen had formed a group whose purpose was to always keep an eye out for 
each other.  At the time more than twenty street children had come from different villages and provinces 
and were working around the Hang Dau lake; these children all assembled themselves into groups based 
on their places of origin.  “For us, it was our way of protecting ourselves in the city,” Huyen said.  “At one 
time, one of the street girls from another provincial village group got pregnant after she got involved with a 
white man.  We all knew the man, because he would often hang out in the lake area and would talk to us.  
He was Australian, and appeared to be in his fifties or sixties.  We were pretty fond of him because he 
would treat us to sweets and was also a very generous customer.  He would often buy a bunch of stuff 
from us, like postcards.  The man promised the girl he would take care of her and the baby and even fly 
them back to his country, telling her that he would make the necessary arrangements so they could all 
live together in Australia.  Well, guess what happened?  He never came back and we never saw him 
again!  After having seen what happened, my girlfriends and I from the same village made a pact that we 
would never go out with a foreign man alone.  We also promised each other that if someone from our 
group got invited for drinks or meals by a man, the rest of us would accompany her so we could watch out 
for her.”  Huyen added that having her village friends around, providing their moral support both on and 
off the street, gave her much comfort and emotional security when she was struggling to adapt to the 
unfamiliar city environment.  Even though she got acquainted with, and even befriended, some of the 




nowhere near as strong or solid as her relationships with her village friends.  “There were some nice kids, 
too, but you can’t really trust them as much as you can your village friends.” 
The collectivizing tendency seen among Hanoi’s rural migrants is nicely evidenced by their 
settlement patterns during their stay in temporary accommodations.  This is especially true when it comes 
to the temporary migrants, those who migrate but stay in the city for just a relatively short period of time.  I 
had a chance to visit several nha tro in the Thanh Ninh area and see firsthand what such 
accommodations look like and how the migrants live—or perhaps exist is the more accurate word—in 
them.  Typically, migrants of the same gender and from the same home village stay in a shared room 
within a nha tro.  If there is a married couple in the group they may take up a room of their own, but many 
temporary migrants are not accompanied by their spouses, be they legal or “common law.”  As in hotels, 
the amount of the daily accommodation-charge for nha tro depends on the comfort, privacy, space, and 
so forth allocated to each tenant.  In general the owner of the house rents out some or all of the rooms to 
migrants who need a place to stay in Hanoi for varying periods of time, ranging from a few days to several 
months.  Chi Mai is one such nha tro owner.  She and her husband run a variety shop on the first floor of 
their house while they rent out the third and fourth floors to temporary migrant workers.  Most of their 
tenants are casual laborers at a nearby wholesale market; they work during the night as porters, carrying 
boxes of vegetables and fruits between trucks and the market.   
 
 I met Nguyen through Huyen.  One day Huyen told me that her aunt, her mother’s older brother’s 
wife, was in town and staying with her village women from Hung Yen province in a nha tro in the Thanh 
Ninh area.  I of course said yes when she asked me if I was interested in visiting her, and we found that 
the place where her aunt Nguyen and her village friends were staying was, like most such nha tro, a plain, 
multiple-storied house with no sign saying “Nha Tro” or anything of that kind.  The house is on a street 
crammed with small shops selling daily necessities, noodle shops, cafés, and other simple eateries.  
Huyen said that her aunt always stays in this place whenever she and her fellow village women come to 
work in Hanoi.   
When Huyen and I visited her aunt at around 9 a.m., Nguyen and her village friends were chatting, 




Each had in front of her a big, transparent plastic bag filled with underwear for both men and women and 
hair accessories in every color.  All of them work as roving vendors, carrying their products on a pole.  
Nguyen told us that she and her friends had been coming to work in Hanoi for about ten years.  They do 
so several times a year during the slack seasons on the farm,70 to accrue extra income for their 
households.  Each time they stay for from two weeks to a month.  When they come to Hanoi they share 
the bus ride and stay in the same room.  The first thing they do upon their arrival is go to a large 
wholesale market in the central district where they buy the products that soon they, too, will be selling.  
Nguyen and her village women work from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m.  In the past they would start off their work 
earlier in the day, but since the police began to crack down on street-vendors they have delayed their 
starting-time.  During the early rush hours there are a good number of police officers on the street, but 
after 9 a.m. there are fewer.  On good days the women can make about 70,000 to 80,000 VND.  Their 
daily expenses run to around 30,000 to 40,000 VND, which includes accommodation fees (7,000 VND per 
night per person) and meals.  Because their work requires them to keep walking around all day they 
choose to eat filling food, but avoid noodles because then their hunger returns too soon.    
To some extent the village-based relational networks, the reality and efficacy of which we have 
been given a glimpse of by partaking briefly of Huyen and Nguyen’s experiences, have commonalities 
with non-village-based relations, most basically in that both seem to serve as a protective mechanism 
whereby the associates look out for each other.  Nonetheless, to my mind the village-based relations 
constitute a more solid sort of commitment and a more profound sort of trust in both spatial and moral 
terms.  As will be further elaborated upon in the ensuing sections, some migrants display a notable 
wariness toward their migrant neighbors of different places of origin, even though they reciprocate help 
when needed and generally are empathic to one another.  At any rate, and even though I realize that both 
Huyen and her aunt Nguyen’s stories reflect just their experiences as temporary single migrants 
unaccompanied by their families, their accounts of village-based networks led me to reflect on the 
profound sense of collectivity and solidarity fostered by village ties, which in turn made me want to gain a 
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September, the months that fall between the first planting in February and the harvest that lasts from May to June 
and between the second planting in July and the harvest from October to November; it is common for women in her 




deeper understanding of how a sense of community has historically been shaped in village settings.  We 
turn to that topic now.   
 
Social Collectivity in Rural Northern Villages 
The existing literature on the sociocultural dynamics that make themselves felt in different parts of 
Vietnam points to striking differences between the North and the South.  One oft-cited regional difference 
in social organization is that between the tight-knit network of social relations often found in the North and 
the more loosely integrated nature of social relations in the South.  In his study of socioeconomic 
differentiation and transformational dynamics in post-doi moi Vietnam, Luong (2003) argued that the 
stronger collectivity of the social networks identified in rural northern Vietnam, as well as in many central 
coastal villages, is associated with both a traditionally high degree of village endogamy and the presence 
of a more strongly egalitarian ideology. On the other hand southern rural villages, where exogamy is more 
common and indeed preferred, are operating on more loosely-knit networks.   
The north-south difference in degree of social collectivity has been found to show up in migrants’ 
settlement patterns and coping strategies.  Hardy (2003b), for instance, noted that migrants to Hanoi 
come mostly from the northern provinces, whereas a composite of migrants to Ho Chi Minh City 
represents a wider range of regions.  He also pointed out that the settlement patterns of migrants in the 
two urban centers are notably different: while migrants in Ho Chi Minh City tend to be scattered, and their 
residential preference is based on proximity to place of work, those in Hanoi “live and work in clusters by 
district/village of origin, excluding outsiders” (Hardy, 2003b, p. 129).  Similarly, Luong (2003) suggested 
that migrants from northern and central villages have a propensity to “cluster together residentially and 
occupationally” (p. 104); they also bring their village associations into play to provide themselves with 
mutual assistance in their city life, and these therefore form an essential part of their coping strategies.71   
As we seek to unearth the root causes of the collectivity and solidarity so notable in the social 
relations of the northerners, the logical first step is to look at how socioeconomic and moral arrangements 
have shaped social relations in those rural villages of northern Vietnam from which most migrants to 
Hanoi originated.   
                                                          
71 As will later be noted, however, a village-based “safety net” is not available to all migrants. This is particularly the 




 Scott (1976), in his early, seminal study of Vietnam’s peasant economies, illustrated how rural 
peasants in Nghe-Tinh72 on the north-central coast of Vietnam consistently exhibited a “subsistence ethic” 
that structured their normative behavioral patterns in making economic decisions and forming social ties. 
Scott argued that the peasants of the early 1900s in Nghe Tinh coped with economic and political 
upheavals by adopting the safety-first maxim, with its emphasis on risk-averse behavior and securing a 
“minimum income.”  For peasants having only modest resources, the basic organizing principle was to 
stabilize and secure their subsistence income rather than amplify their individual profits or lift their levels 
of income.73  Retaining her/his subsistence rights was critical to a peasant’s capability, as a member of 
village society, not only to obtain sufficient resources to carry out her/his ceremonial and social 
obligations by fostering ties with other fellow villagers but also to fully engage in patron-client relationships 
with other better-off villagers, landowners, or officials via the mutual reciprocity of exchanges and 
redistributions of resources.  In turn, any breaching of the rule of reciprocity or the right to subsistence 
was deemed a violation of the village’s unwritten moral codes.  When and if such ruptures reached an 
intolerably high level, they were sure to be met with protests and perhaps even rebellions.   
 Revisiting Scott’s study (1976), Mcelwee (2007) found that “moral economy” continued to exist as 
a guiding principle for social relations and economic decision-making in contemporary Nghe Tinh.  Her 
field observations in five different villages in the Cam Xuyen District of Ha Tinh province in the early 
2000s revealed that reciprocal help between relatives and neighbors constitutes an essential part of 
village social relations and their norms; among other things, labor exchanges with respect to farming, and 
food-sharing (e.g., meals, garden products, extra rice) with those in destitution, were commonly practiced 
and strongly encouraged.  Despite both the government’s campaign to introduce to the province 
alternative cash crops (e.g., peanuts, sesame, corn, beans) to replace rice with its low economic 
productivity and an uptick in the trade in forest products (e.g., rattans, medicinal herbs and plants, wild 
meats), the villagers resolutely stick to rice-production as their primary source of investment and their 
chief livelihood strategy; thus the wealth of village households continues to be assessed based on their 
                                                          
72 This is the geographical area that encompasses the two provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh.  Thus it is where a 
series of revolts in opposition to the colonial French regime, initiated by Vietnamese peasants, commonly known as 




self-sufficiency in rice.  Moreover, tinh cam or social sentiment still serves as an essential lubricant for the 
denizens of the tight-knit village communities in Nghe Tinh where endogamy prevails.  Demonstrations of 
social sentiment toward fellow villagers, which range “from inviting neighbors to share meals to loaning 
them equipment for their fields” (Mcelwee, 2007, p. 71), are highly valued and serve to forge social bonds 
and create mutual trust among villagers.   
 Such moral dimensions embedded in the social relations of the village world of northern Vietnam 
have also been elaborated upon in Malarney’s (1996) study of ritual reformation and revitalization in Thinh 
Liet Commune, on the outskirts of Hanoi.  In this village characterized by highly differentiated 
socioeconomic strata in relation to age, status, wealth, and so forth, quan he tinh cam or sentimental 
relations are the key ingredient fostering a sense of social solidarity and equity in the village.  As 
Malarney has put it, “To ‘live with sentiment’ or ‘be rich in sentiment’ were positive moral evaluations in 
village life.  To earn such an appellation individuals had to be attentive to other families, conscientious in 
assisting others in times of need or crisis, and willingly assertive of their commonality with others in social 
life” (p. 547).  Among ritual practices, funerals provide the greatest opportunity for villagers to express and 
publicly display their sentiment toward others through the exchange of gifts and debts.  While villagers 
offer trays of food presentations to the family of the deceased for use at funeral feasts, the family 
reciprocates their generosity by giving back to those who made the donations according to the value of 
the gifts received.  
 Furthermore, the existing literature has underscored the fact that collectivism, which has long 
characterized the dynamics of political economy in Vietnam’s northern and central regions, largely stems 
from the communal institutions, and respects the strict social boundaries, that prevail there.   Associated 
with the ideology of the “subsistence ethic,” the ubiquity of communal institutions—communal land and 
village rituals, among other things—is conceived to have played an important role in fostering social ties 
and collectivism among village residents who are socioeconomically highly differentiated.  
Historically, communal land served as a shared resource and survival safety-net for village 
inhabitants in times of hardship.  Access to communal land and food allowed the less well-off residents of 
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Vietnamese peasants as “rational economic agents” acting on individualistic behavioral principles so as to maximize 




the village to gain social protection in exchange for their service and their loyalty extended to such 
patrons as better-off village residents, village officials, notables, and mandarins (Scott, 1976).  Communal 
land also has functioned as a mechanism fostering more equitable resource redistribution, for the income 
made from the land often is used for such collective purposes as defraying the expenses of communal 
rituals, schools, village feasts, and ceremonies (Luong, 2010).  During the colonial period the amount of 
inalienable communal land within the cultivated acreage was significant in the nation’s north and center, 
at an average of 21 percent and 25 percent, respectively—a stark contrast to the south, where a mere 3 
percent of the people occupied communal land.  Luong (2010) argued that although the land reforms in 
the postcolonial period led to the growing disappearance of communal land, the relatively easy 
accommodation of land collectivization in the northern and central villages, in comparison with southern 
villages after the reunification, reflects the ongoing sense of communalism and collectivism derived, to no 
small extent, from people’s awareness of the preexisting communal land in the north and the center.  
Village rituals constitute another social element that has contributed to the high degree of 
communal unity in the northern and central villages.  In his longitudinal study of Son-Duong village in the 
Red River delta of northern Vietnam, Luong (2010) has revealed how the collective worship of tutelary 
deities, along with the strong village endogamy, communal land, and nucleated settlements has played an 
important role in cultivating a sense of communal collectivism and exclusivity.  He found that full access to 
communal resources, such as participation in the village rituals devoted to worshipping tutelary deities 
and eligibility for periodic redistributions of the communal land to adult male villagers, was not granted to 
ngoai tich  or outsiders (i.e., those born outside of the village) but only to noi tich or insiders.  Remarkably, 
it could take as long as three or four generations before “new” village residents, whose progenitors came 
from outside the village, were fully accepted as “insiders.”  These rigid conceptual boundaries of village 
membership, Luong argued, not only were “reflected in and reinforced by an extraordinarily high level of 
village endogamy” (p. 57) but also “underlay the northern and central tradition of great formality in 
interaction with outsiders” (p. 270).  By contrast, such differentiation of membership was not so strict in 
southern villages, where a higher degree of geographical mobility and a preference for exogamy were 





 In sum, while both village-based and non-village-based networks provide channels through which 
the migrants’ mutual support and reciprocal favors can flow, a strong collective spirit and close social ties 
are more evident in the social relations of the former sort of network.  The historical climate that has 
fostered exchanges of reciprocal help and collectivism in the northern and central villages still seems to 
pervade the tight-knit communal relations exemplified by Hanoi’s migrants of the same place of origin 
from the north.  It also has been noted, however, via our look at the firm social boundaries of village 
membership in a northern rural village, that collectivism and exclusivity are two sides of one coin.  In other 
words, our observations of the migrant and non-migrant residents of the Thanh Ninh area, and of the 
ways in which they interact with one another, appear to confirm one’s suspicion that social solidarity and 
discrimination go hand in hand.  
 
I will now illustrate how mutual distrust, exclusivity, and segregation are experienced by both 
migrant and non-migrant residents of the Thanh Ninh area and then suggest what cultural implications 
these have for migrant families who are able to access only limited economic and social resources.  
Doing so will allow me to demonstrate the presence in the area of a multi-layered structure of inclusion 
and exclusion.  Exclusive attitudes and behaviors certainly have been identified, both between migrants 
and non-migrants and among the migrants themselves.  In order to better show how such distrustful 
exclusiveness plays out on multiple levels (e.g., conceptual, demographic, social, moral), I have classified 
the residents into the following categories: (1) migrants and non-migrants; (2) villagers from the same 
place of origin and villagers from other places of origin; (3) permanent residents and non-permanent 
residents; (4) middle-class and lower-class residents.74   
 
Social Exclusion and Stigmatization  
                                                          
74 If one adopts the classification by Smith (1998) of “social units” and “collectivities”—those being the two sub-
components of social structure, with their differential boundaries and memberships—then the social groups 
recognized among the Thanh Ninh area residents and discussed in this study’s introduction may be classified as 
follows: (i) migrants/non-migrants: collectivities; (ii) villagers from the same place of origin/villagers from other places 
of origin: social units; (iii) permanent residents/non-permanent residents: social units; (iv) middle-class 
residents/lower-class residents: collectivities.  Whereas the resident’s membership in her/his village as place of origin, 
and her/his permanent residency in Hanoi, appears to be fairly clear-cut and rigid, the boundaries between migrants 
and non-migrants and between middle-class and lower-class residents often are unclear. The degree of communal 





Prevailing Discrimination  
The most generalized categorization that divides Thanh Ninh residents is one’s status as a migrant or 
non-migrant.  This distinction often is drawn in the public discourse, as well as in the conversations of 
Hanoi’s non-migrant residents.  Little wonder, then, that migrants so often are lumped together regardless 
of their native provinces; all that matters is that they did not originate from Hanoi.  It should be 
remembered, however, that the development of Hanoi itself has historically been attributed to the 
generations of people who have migrated there from its neighboring northern provinces.75  As mentioned 
previously, the Thanh Ninh area, which has been attracting spontaneous migrants from outside of Hanoi 
ever since the early 1990s, also holds a mixture of migrant and non-migrant residents.   
 What seems to be characteristic of Hanoians’ categorization of “migrants,” as opposed to “non-
migrants” or “local residents,” is that the criteria for being a migrant tend to entail repugnant qualities:  
unsophisticated, dirty, uneducated, and so forth.  Migrants are perceived as bringing social problems to 
the city and thus often are associated with te nan xa hoi or social evils—anti-social behaviors that 
jeopardize public order and security such as crime, alcohol abuse, drug addiction, gambling, prostitution, 
vagrancy, human trafficking, and the spreading of HIV/AIDS (Cohen, 2003; Hardy, 2003b; Human Rights 
Watch, 2006; Save the Children, U.K., 2006; UN Viet Nam, 2010a).  Such stigmatization is all too likely to 
exacerbate the social isolation and marginalization of the city’s migrants.    
All of which is not to say, however, that a discriminatory attitude toward migrants flourishes 
throughout the Thanh Ninh area or in Hanoi generally.  Thao was one of the newcomers to Hanoi, having 
moved to the city with her two daughters from Thanh Hoa province just two months prior to my meeting 
her.  She told me that she had not thus far run into any discrimination expressed or acted out by the 
people she had met; to the contrary, they sympathized with her family’s situation.  She admitted, however, 
that she associated herself only with a handful of people, such as her landlady and neighbors.  Similarly, 
Long’s mother said she had never been maltreated by her neighbors, or by bosses or customers at her 
previous or current workplace.  At the com binh dan where she had previously worked, the customers 
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were very supportive.  Some of them sympathized with her tale of woe76; so much so, indeed, that they 
would give her a large tip for her service.  Then too, a migrant father of three children, who has been 
working as a beggar for over fifteen years, told me that at least with respect to his next-door neighbors, he 
had never felt a sense of discrimination.  All his neighbors are longtime migrant residents who earn their 
living just as he does, by working on the street, and they too come from disadvantaged socioeconomic 
backgrounds.  “Besides, I don’t have much contact with outsiders except when I am at work, begging, you 
know,” he added with a chuckle.  
A few of the children of the migrant families whose members I interviewed seemed to be blessed 
with sympathetic classmates and understanding teachers.  A good example in this regard is Huong’s 
second oldest son, who at the time of my first visit was a second-grader, attending a local public school 
with the financial support of an NGO.  He was the only child in his entire class to come from a 
socioeconomically disadvantaged family, but he told me that his classmates and his teacher had shown 
support and compassion for him.  At a recent PTA meeting, the teacher took the trouble to explain the 
situation of this boy’s family and asked the other parents to understand why they were being exempted 
from paying their PTA dues.  
That one anecdote must not, however, be taken as entirely representative of the situation.  The 
members of many migrant families and the people working with them did not hesitate to reveal to me their 
encounters with the discriminatory attitudes manifested by local non-migrant residents.  Reflecting on the 
challenges that go along with running the charity class, Mr. Tuan, its founder, indicated that one of the 
continuing challenges the class faced, apart from the administrative ones, was that of confronting the 
deep-seated prejudice against migrant children among local residents.  “Some [non-migrant] residents are 
not happy with having the class in their neighborhood.  They think that the class is a bad influence to the 
community.  In their mind the class attracts migrant children from poor family backgrounds, and those kids 
and families are much of the root of the unwanted influence, like the ‘social evils.’”  He added that even 
though some of the neighbors were sympathetic to the children and to their family’s life-conditions, the 
unwelcoming attitude still remained strong among most of them.  The class teachers had even been 
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worked in a com binh dan to which she had been referred by one of her village acquaintances.  In order to support 




approached by the neighbors, who complained that their students were too loud and too dirty-looking or 
suggested that they should find another location for the class. Some neighbors even contacted the police, 
who came and quibbled with the operation of the class, clearly trying to extort bribes.  
 
Diffident Migrant Children 
Even non-migrant children add to the stigmatization of their migrant peers.  In the study sites visited by 
the authors of the Save the Children, U.K.’s study (2006), local non-migrant children were asked in group 
discussions what they thought about children who came to the cities from other provinces to stay and 
work with their migrant parents.  They responded that they would not play with them, even though they 
sympathized with their circumstances.  They further claimed that their “migrant counterparts” were not 
well mannered, listing such reasons as their use of bad language, slovenly appearance, habit of 
wandering in the streets, and poor study habits.   
Migrant children working on the street are an easy target for thoughtless, discriminatory slurs.  
Thu and her younger sister Hoa told me that when working on the street, some adults would call them 
bon vo hoc or illiterate kids right to their faces.  Understandably, this hurt the sisters’ feelings and pride; 
Thu told me that on one occasion she had snapped back at them: “Give me some math problems with a 
pen and a sheet of paper, and I can solve them for you!”  In 2010, at the time of my initial fieldwork, Hoa 
was attending a public primary school with financial support from an NGO, whereas Thu had been out of 
school for almost four years.  She dropped out when she was in the second grade; she has been working 
full-time as a street-seller alongside her parents ever since.  When we had last met in 2010 she was 
hoping to return to school once the new school year started in the fall, with some help from the same 
NGO that her sister had been assisted by.  Speaking nostalgically of the days when she was in school, 
Thu once showed me her old, well-thumbed textbooks and workbooks.  “I miss studying in school, and I 
can’t wait to go back to school soon so I can prove everyone that I can read and write and that I’m not 
some stupid, uneducated child!” exclaimed Thu.77   
It seems that the pervasive mistrust of and discrimination against migrants casts a shadow on 




some migrant children after they have repeatedly been called “poor migrant child” or “migrant child with 
bad social influence.”  Sadly, the negative effect of such catcalls impacts even the parents and guardians 
who are struggling so hard to provide for their families by working on the street.  A grandmother who was 
working as a roaming street-vendor said that her granddaughters occasionally would lend her a hand 
when they had some spare time after returning from school.  However, her elder granddaughter often was 
reluctant to work alongside her because she felt humiliated whenever her classmates saw her working on 
the street.  When her son (i.e., the granddaughter’s father), who was rumored to have been put in jail for 
dealing drugs, died of lung cancer shortly after his release, the girl went straight back to school right after 
her father’s funeral, so that no one would find out about her family.  
With the exception of the case of Chi’s son, the children who were attending or previously had 
attended public schools said they kept a low profile there, so that their classmates would not find out that 
they were from underprivileged migrant families.  Other children told me that they hardly ever played with 
the neighborhood children either, because they were afraid of getting teased or of being called a “bad 
influence.”  Those working with the charity-class students maintained that the migrant children often were 
ashamed of their family backgrounds, which in turn contributed to their lack of self-confidence.  Mr. Tuan 
said, “I know that many of our students feel disrespected by society because of their difficult 
socioeconomic circumstances.  That’s why they keep to themselves and stay away from the outside 
community.  Poverty and lack of education often make people underestimate themselves and lose 
confidence in themselves. . . .  I really hope that our students will find the courage to seek out what they 
want to do with their lives and take the responsibility for what they set out to do.”  
Thus an important fact revealed through my interviews with the migrant children is that many of 
themhave few social interactions with their peers, either in the neighborhood or at school.  Quynh told me 
she rarely went out of her house except to go to the charity class.  Ha, another migrant child attending the 
charity class, said she had no friends except for a handful of classmates from the charity class.  When I 
asked what they did together outside of the class, she answered that they went around their 
neighborhood, chatting; when her friends weren’t around she would stay home, watching TV or chatting 
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with her elder sister at home.78  In the case of some children, especially boys, who do not work outside 
like their street-working peers, one of their favorite leisure activities is to play games at the online game 
shops spread around the neighborhood.  They even would sneak out to play games during the class 
breaks, said one of the charity-class teachers.  
Working migrant children have less free time than do their non-working counterparts, but that 
which they do have they use to hang out with their siblings or other working friends/peers on the street.  
During my visit to the shelters of migrant families working as street-sellers I would see children, in their off 
hours, freely coming and going to and from their own and neighbors’ houses to play together.  Girls also 
would babysit or play with their neighbors’ babies, soothing and cradling them in their arms.  And yet Lan 
and Ha, sisters who work together on the street with or without their parents’ surveillance, said they would 
rather sleep than play with their friends.  They would come back home from work late at night, usually 
after 9 or 10, feeling beat.   
Thus we see that migrant children have only limited social contacts in their daily lives.  While the 
students in the charity class did make friends with one another, the children attending public schools and 
those who had done so in the past indicated that they seldom hung out with their classmates.  Instead 
they spent much of their time alone or with their siblings at home, while occasionally playing with other 
migrant peers whom they know well.  Working migrant children, due to their long hours of work, do not 
have much time to play in the first place, but when they do, they spend the time with their siblings and 
working peers of similar family backgrounds.   
 
Social Representations of Migrants 
The public portrayal of migrants as constituting an unwanted influence upon the community affects in 
varying degrees the ways in which migrant people see themselves and interact with others outside of their 
small circle of friends and acquaintances.  Where do such pervasive negative perceptions of migrants 
come from?  The question seems all the more pertinent, given the fact that migration has been part and 
parcel of the historical formation and the recent development of the city.  A closer look at how migrants 
are narrated in the governmental discourse, as well as in the everyday context, indicates that it is the 
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During the interview with her grandmother, which lasted for over an hour, Ha chatted with her elder sister and played 




state discourse, and policies emphasizing the need to exert tighter control upon spontaneous migration, 
which underlie the pervasive view of migrants as being an undesirable component of the city.  As a 
consequence, not only are the contributions and latent benefits of migrants to the city scanted, but their 
social position thereby becomes all the more peripheral.    
 The following examples will show that depictions of migrants as being “social evils,” people who 
make “the community ‘dirty’, ‘polluted’, ‘noisy’, ‘disordered’, ‘over-populated’, ‘congested’ and ‘unsafe’” (Le 
et al., 2011, p. 11), are very evident in the context of local administration.    
A local online article about “in-migrants in Hanoi” (“Nhập cư vào Hà Nội,” 2009) well captured 
these negative conceptualizations of migrants on the part of local, non-migrant residents and authorities.  
The article depicted the current state of inward migration in Hanoi and discussed the control measures 
that are currently in place.  It started out with a description of the rapid growth of the incoming migrant 
population to Hanoi over the last decade, then went on to reveal the migrants’ low standard of living, the 
difficulty they have securing affordable housing, and the high cost of rental housing.  Taking as an 
example Phuc Tan ward, one of the highly migrant-concentrated areas in the central part of the city, the 
article elaborated upon the enhanced measures to maintain social order that had been introduced into the 
ward, according to the article, by its chairman.  New measures had been taken to ensure that lodging 
house (nha tro) owners and their migrant tenants comply with the regulations for temporary registration 
during the latter’s stay in the ward.79  The measures, according to the article, were intended “to ensure 
public security and order, declaration of temporary residence in/absence from the ward, environmental 
hygiene and prevention of drugs.”  The ward’s chairman commented that these problems relating to 
migrants had been happening for many years and had taken a toll on the ward’s officials.  He also called 
for the migrants to be held to more stringent standards, so that urban management could be better 
administered.  
 In keeping with the tone of the article, which implicitly ascribes increased social disorder to 
migrants, Hardy (2003b) cited administrative anxieties consistently being felt by security officials in Hanoi. 
Referring to the effects of migration to the city, a ward-level official in the Hai Ba Trung district said this:  
                                                          
79 Presumably these measures were taken in order to counter the nha tro owners’ widespread practice of unlawfully 
renting rooms to migrants without gaining permission from the ward to do so; their tenants are not able to apply for 





From the time laborers from other provinces started coming to this area, the political and 
security situation, as well as social order and safety, has undergone complex problems. 
Their living conditions are unhygienic, disputes over work involving fights and arguments 
have taken place, furniture is left on the pavements and streets. In addition, there has 
been gambling, thefts and swindling. (Hardy, 2003b, pp. 131-132) 
 
 In the eyes of security officials who are dealing with day-to-day urban management down on 
ground level, so to speak, migrants are the root cause of a deterioration in social order in their 
communities.  At the very least such officials find it hard to manage and control migrants’ disorderly 
activities by using the traditional tools of law enforcement.  They further expressed their frustration as to 
the lack of clear regulatory guidelines helping them to administer incoming migrants.  Yes, there is the ho 
khau system, but it continues to emphasize preferential rights and has little legally binding force.  Thus it 
is an ineffective tool of population management, in the currently market-driven yet nominally socialist state.   
 The treatment of “migrants” in the public discourse as a phenomenon that reeks of social disorder 
is also reflected in the logic of the government-initiated “clean-up campaigns.”  As noted earlier, a series 
of such campaigns has been deployed by the government with the aim of cracking down on street 
businesses and “social evils,” both of which often are associated with migrants, who are implicitly cast to 
play the role of the villain bringing disorder to the streets (Cohen, 2003).  The targeted villains are in 
theory removed from the streets by having their products and equipment confiscated and by being 
charged fines or even being arrested and sent for “re-education”—only, of course, to come back to the 
street.   
Hayton (2010) criticized such campaigns to counteract antisocial behavior via “exclusion” and “re-
education” as being nothing more than “the old ways of dealing with social problems” (p. 62).  On the one 
hand, as Hayton rightly argued, the government’s approach has failed to address the underlying causes 
prompting the emerging growth of social problems.  On the other hand, the campaigns seem largely to 
have been successful in instilling into local residents, as well as city administrators, the idea that keeping 
migrants off the street will automatically bring orderly, “civilized living” to the city.  Street children and 
itinerant vendors often are derided or even harassed by non-migrant residents such as local shop-owners 
and neighbors, who support the campaigns and feel themselves vindicated by the public discourse that 
deems migrants to be strictly an unwanted and deleterious social presence in the city.  Such a parochial 




whose interviews with local authorities revealed their hope that unskilled migrants would leave the capital 
and return to their places of origin (Save the Children, U.K., 2006).  In the joint research conducted by 
Villes en Transition Vietnam, the Centre for Sociology and Development Studies Ho Chi Minh City, and 
the Institute of Sociology Hanoi (as cited in Save the Children U.K., 2006), close to 50 percent of local 
(KT1 and KT2) respondents voiced the unease they feel about having rural migrant residents in their area.  
Their concerns were centered on the disorderly behaviors evinced by street-vendors, scavengers, and 
those not complying with the regulations for traffic, garbage disposal, and so forth.  Quite simply, in their 
view migrants are a threat to “civilized living.”   
 What I for one find intriguing is that the actual records fail to corroborate the derogatory view of 
migrants that pervades both civil and governmental discourse.  For instance, police records in the Thinh 
Liet ward of Hanoi, where the presence of migrants is significant, show that the number of permanent 
residents arrested for criminal violations and drug abuse was three times greater than that of non-
permanent (KT4) residents (Save the Children, U.K., 2006).  So too, a discussion that transpired within 
the Department of Public Security in Ho Chi Minh City confirmed the fact that there is no significant 
variance between migrants and non-migrants when it comes to rates of urban crime (Parliamentary 
Committee for Social Affairs, as cited in Save the Children, U.K., 2006). 
 
“Nha Que” and Its Cultural Connotations  
In Hanoi, the differentiation of migrants and non-migrants tends to be associated with that of nha que 
(country bumpkins) and nguoi o than pho (city people), or more precisely nguoi Hanoi (Hanoians).  This 
propensity derives from the fact that most migrants come from rural areas, usually the northern provinces. 
Similar to the categorization of “migrants” in Hanoi as described earlier, the term nha que carries cultural 
connotations: traits, mannerisms, and speech-patterns that are conceived to be somewhat 
unsophisticated.   
One of the questions Hanoians frequently ask in their first encounter with someone new is where 
s/he is from: nguoi o dau?  In my initial encounters with the migrant families I, too, was almost always 
asked about my place of origin, and would I ask them back what part of Vietnam they were from.  Curious 
to know whether the duration of their residential period in Hanoi was affecting their self-identification as 




regardless of their period of habitation in the city, would immediately reply that they still considered 
themselves to be “country people” and definitely not “Hanoians.”  A widowed single mother from Thanh 
Hoa province said without hesitation, “Of course I’m nguoi Thanh Hoa!” [“a person of Thanh Hoa”]  I will 
continue to live in Hanoi as long as I can and I may end up dying here, not in my native village in Thanh 
Hoa. Still, it will never change that [I am a person of Thanh Hoa].  Besides, look at me, I am quê mùa 
[rustic, cloddish] in every way!”  She went on to say that even though she and her son were treated nicely 
by her neighbors, as well as by the owner and customers of the com binh dan where she was working, 
she always felt shy around strangers, especially “city people,” and did not have much confidence in her 
looks.  
Like their migrant parents and guardians, children who came to Hanoi with their families 
responded that they identified themselves as nha que regardless of their duration of residence in Hanoi.  
While they appreciate their city life, which gives them more comfort than they knew in their former rural 
life, their current living conditions as migrants, and the very fact that they were not born in Hanoi, appear 
to make it virtually impossible for them to adopt the status of “Hanoians.”  For instance, two migrant 
sisters who have been working as street-sellers for years said in unison that they were nha que.  “But you 
have been living in Hanoi all these years.  What makes you say that you are nha que and not Hanoian?” I 
dared to ask.  They explained that even though they have not been back to the Nam Dinh countryside for 
years and have not seen their cousins or friends over all those years, they were not born in Hanoi.  The 
elder sister added, “Besides, we are still poor, and our family is surviving hand-to-mouth.  We don’t miss 
our life in the countryside, though.  We had blackouts all the time, and the life was even harder!” 80  By 
contrast, a handful of children of the second generation—children who were born in Hanoi but whose 
parents had migrated to Hanoi prior to their birth—responded that they were “Hanoians.”  
 As the aforementioned single mother’s remarks suggest, the association of the term nha que with 
a certain physical appearance is common.  A mother who was living in the brown village with her migrant 
husband and their daughters was born in Hanoi and raised there as she grew up.  And yet even though 
she has never been a “migrant” and might well be regarded as a “Hanoian” by outsiders, neither she 




are still living with their respective families in this neighborhood in Hanoi where I grew up.  Every time I 
see them they always make fun of me and say that I now look like nha que, not Hanoian.  You know why?  
That’s because my skin has gotten thicker and darker ever since I moved down here.  You may not 
believe it now, but when I was young, I had really fair skin.  Because I do a lot of farm work here under 
the sun and it’s hard work, I’ve gotten thinner and my skin has turned very dark.  At one time I was even 
mistaken for a drug addict because of my physical appearance!” 
Speech-patterns are another of the aspects that makes certain people nha que.  Huyen, originally 
from Hung Yen but a longtime resident of Hanoi (for over a decade), recently successfully transferred her 
ho khau to the Thanh Ninh area after she and her husband bought a piece of land and built their house 
there.  She once told me this, after getting off the phone with a lady from another province:  “You know 
who I was talking to?  She is this lady from Ha Thai province.  She reminds me a lot of my female 
relatives in my home village.”  I asked her why.  “Country people often talk loud, in a friendly and casual 
manner, even to someone we have never met or someone younger than us.  Because I am not from 
Hanoi originally, I know the way my country folks talk to each other and this lady just reminded me of 
that,” she explained.  “What about Hanoians? Do they speak any differently?”  I asked her back.  “To me 
Hanoians, especially women, are often more soft-spoken than countrywomen, and are very particular 
about their wording.  They sound more polite and formal.”  
 Aside from one’s appearance and speech-patterns a third factor distinguishing the non-migrant 
from the migrant is house ownership.  Owing a house, as opposed to “perennial renting,” brings a nha 
que person one step closer to being a true Hanoian.  It must not be forgotten, however, that many 
migrants are confronted by a much more basic challenge posed by city life: that of finding an affordable 
place to live.  The lodging house or nha tro may be suitable as a temporary dwelling-place for seasonal 
migrants but when it comes to longer-term residence, low-cost rental housing is sought out.   
A migrant woman originally from Bac Giang province has been running a tailor shop in Hanoi for 
thirteen years.  At the time I met her for an interview in August 2010, she was renting two floors of a 
house rented out by a live-in landlord: the front space of the first floor for her tailor shop, and rooms on 
the second floor for her family’s residential space.  The landlord’s family takes up the rest of the space of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




the four-story house.  She told me that it has been a real disadvantage for her to keep living and running 
her business in a rental space.  Her family and tailor shop are always at risk of eviction, if they cannot 
keep up with the payment of their monthly rent.  At the time of the interview the family was paying 4.5 
million VND per month, their residential and shop space included.  Since she started her tailoring 
business she has changed the location of her shop/home twice, in each case due to a rent increase.  
Each time she relocated, she informed her customers of her new location.  While some loyal customers 
kept coming back wherever her shop moved, others stopped coming after the relocation because of the 
distance, so she had to find new customers.  Although her case may be somewhat unusual in that her 
rental situation involves both her business and her residential space, it nonetheless reflects how migrants 
living in rental housing struggle to keep up with the city’s standard of living.   
Another intriguing aspect of owning a house in the context of the nha que/Hanoian axis is 
associated with marriage.  Because of the limited residential space in general and the high standard of 
living in Hanoi, it is common for newly married Hanoian couples to live in the groom’s parents’ house for a 
while until they can afford to get their own place.  What happens when a migrant husband takes a 
Hanoian wife?  I was told on various occasions that men of nha que are under a lot of pressure to buy a 
house in Hanoi.  Owning a house is considered a milestone for Vietnamese men in general, for it 
demonstrates their financial security and earning-power as marriage partners.  If a migrant man wishes to 
marry, or is already married to, a Hanoian woman, buying a house in Hanoi---however small it may be---
has an even more significant meaning: that he is one step closer to becoming a Hanoian.   
A conversation I once had with Hue, a Hanoian girl in her early twenties, nicely summed up how 
the status of Hanoian women typically accompanies their perceptions of self-worth and the expectations 
they hold for their marriage partners, as well as the cultural connotations linked to the term nha que.  
Author (hereafter A): I recently heard someone make a comment like, “He is good-
looking but I don’t think he is from Hanoi, because he’s got facial features that are more 
nha que.” That got me thinking about what makes “Hanoians” and about the real meaning 
of nha que.  Do you actually believe that people from the countryside look physically 
different from “Hanoians?” And how many generations does it take for a person to be 
recognized as a “Hanoian,” anyway?  
 
Hue (hereafter H): Well, yes, there are some differences in physical features, I suppose, 
although I can’t pinpoint them off the top of my head right now. . . .  To me, mannerism 
and demeanor makes it more obvious who are nha que and who are “Hanoian.”  In terms 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




of generations, people would say three generations or even five generations, but I’m not 
really sure. In my case my grandparents were intellectuals who migrated to Hanoi from 
Hai Phong, so I’m the third generation.  Ever since I was little my parents and 
grandparents taught me manners, like how to eat properly.  For example when we eat a 
banana, we must split it in half, even if it’s a monkey [miniature] banana.  If I ever tried to 
eat the whole banana, my Mom would slap me!”    
 
A: Wow, then I am nha que for sure!  
 
H: No no, it doesn’t matter if you are a foreigner!  It only applies to a Vietnamese person.  
I have some friends from school whose family migrated to Hanoi in their parents’ 
generation.  The friends were born and grew up in Hanoi but they are just different, 
definitely not “Hanoians” in my opinion.  It’s their mannerisms. . . .  You can easily tell 
who are nha que by looking at how they behave, at school and at home.  They are often 
loud and boorish.  Besides, the “value” of Hanoian girls is high.  This may sound a bit 
strange to you, but it’s a pretty big deal for a man from the countryside to marry a 
Hanoian woman.  There is one unspoken agreement, though: If he is to marry a Hanoian 
woman, he should make every effort to buy a house in Hanoi once they get married.  
Many Hanoians still think that it’s unfavorable for married couples to continue living in a 
rented house.  And this applies not only to Hanoian women and their husbands living in 
Vietnam but also to those living abroad.  I have a cousin who lives in France.  She was 
born in 1977 and had been single until recently, so if she had been here she would have 
been called e chong [“old maid”].  She is very bright, has two Master’s from French 
universities, and has been working in Paris.  After she got married to a French man last 
year she told her husband that she didn’t want to live in a rented apartment anymore, and 
talked him into buying a house in the suburbs of Paris.  When she told me that story I 
thought that even someone like her, who has lived overseas for so long, still keeps a 
Hanoian spirit in herself!   
 
Thus we see that migrants deemed to be nha que are looked down upon owing not just to their 
appearance but also to what one might call their cultural connotations: their rural mannerisms and 
speech-patterns.  Even some migrants themselves refer to themselves as being a country person, and do 
so with a touch of self-derision.  By contrast, a certain conceptual prestige is attached to “Hanoians,” with 
an image of sophistication radiating out of their looks and behaviors.  The bulk of my anecdotal evidence 
suggests that what makes a “full-blooded Hanoian,” in the eyes of both migrant and non-migrant residents, 
is at least three generations’ worth of personal history in the city.  While there is no fixed or written 
definition of “Hanoian,” it is clear that longtime residency as a migrant, or even having permanent- 
residential status in Hanoi, does not suffice.81  Furthermore, the high cultural value placed on owning 
one’s home serves to further marginalize most migrants, given that they reside in rental housing.  In 
addition to the city’s rising living cost that migrants struggle to keep up with, administrative edicts often 
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hamper them from owning a house in Hanoi.  Thus, a migrant man marrying a local Hanoian woman 
comes under pressure from her and her parents to buy a house; if he succeeds in doing so he may be 
entitled to the status of “semi-Hanoian.”  
 
Distrust toward Other Migrants  
As we have seen, village-based networks, imbued as they are with a fairly exclusive and strong sense of 
communal unity, serve as much-needed safety-nets for migrants.  Two of the most frequently cited 
locuses of such village-based networks, within the migrants’ notably restricted social worlds, are the nha 
tro and the workplace.  Agergaard and Thao (2011) revealed that the female migrants working as porters 
in the Thanh Ninh area rarely strayed far from their lives’ twin foci: their lodging house and the nearby 
wholesale market where they worked.  Even though they moved from one nha tro to another during their 
temporary migration in Hanoi, they invariably shared bed space with co-villagers.  Thus their social 
contacts occurred almost entirely within their own network of fellow porters and villagers, which fed their 
feeling of isolation and of not being integrated into city life.  
This feeling of isolation and segregation from the local community is experienced not only by the 
seasonal migrants who often stay in nha tro on a temporary basis but also by those inhabiting the area on 
a semi-permanent basis but without legal, permanent residential status.  Unlike seasonal migrants who 
often congregate with people from the same village in nha tro, or at least reside in the same 
neighborhood, longtime migrants prefer to stay in low-cost rental accommodations on their own.  While 
these longtimers are loosely connected to people of the same place of origin who also are living in the city, 
they see each other only occasionally unless they work in the same neighborhood as street-sellers, 
motorbike drivers, and so on.  While longtime migrants who left their children in the countryside maintain 
strong social ties with their home villages by paying regular home visits and sending remittances to 
support their families, those who settled in the city with their children do not seem to maintain a similarly 
strong connection to their native realms.  Among the longtime migrant participants whom I interviewed, 
those who brought their children with them to the city return to their home villages once or twice a year at 
most, and only for special occasions such as Tet.  They seldom send remittances to their parents or 
relatives in the village, for usually they have their hands full just feeding their own immediate families in 




with limited social bonds share with other migrants having a stronger sense of village connections is a 
tendency to be secluded from the local residential community.  Longtime, non-seasonal migrants who 
have few remaining ties to their place of origin in the city or the village, and whose non-permanent 
residential status hampers them from attaining full social participation, are susceptible to a greater risk of 
social isolation and segregation.  
 What underlies the increasing isolation of some longtime migrants, like those who participated in 
this study, is the exclusive nature of migrants’ emotional attachments to their own village.  Similar to the 
sense of distance and mistrust felt mutually by migrants and non-migrants, as described earlier, a 
person’s place of origin can make a significant difference when migrants interact among themselves, too 
often fomenting a sense of mutual exclusivity and distrust between migrants from one place of origin and 
those from another.   
Many instances of such distrust of other migrants cropped up in the course of my interviews with, 
and observations of, participants who live or have lived in an environment in which a mixed group of 
migrants live next to each other.  One of the things that caught my eye upon my visits to migrant families 
was that even some of the most economically disadvantaged families often keep big dogs.  This is 
especially true of those living in complexes along with other migrants from different places of origin.  I 
once visited the dwelling-place of Dat, one of the charity-class students, which was located in a complex 
catering to low-income migrants in the Thanh Ninh area.  He lived with his grandmother and his younger 
siblings in a modest shelter only about 12 square meters in size; there was a large wooden bed that took 
up much of the space, along with a small wooden table and an old TV.  In addition they were keeping one 
big dog and four small puppies.  I asked the grandmother why the family kept so many dogs.  She replied 
that they did so to protect their shelter from burglaries.  She went on to say that they had had their TV 
stolen in the past, and that was why they had started to keep the dogs.  “As you know, our [migrant] 
neighbors often hang out with untrustworthy, anti-social people like social evils.  We got our TV stolen by 
one of those people. With the dogs around, we have better protection.”  
Similarly Minh, a migrant, widowed woman living on the Hoa Hong River, also was keeping a 
medium-size dog and a cat.  She said that while the cat caught mice around the house, the dog was of 




she had raised them as a single mother since her husband’s death in 2009.  “I work as a tea- seller on the 
Thanh Ninh bridge, along with my neighbors of the brown village. I make around 1 million VND, with 
which I am barely able to provide for my children.  On good days I can make about 150,000 to 200,000 
VND, but on other days I make as little as 50,000 VND or even less. When it rains, I can’t work because 
there is no shelter.  It’s really unstable, you see. . . .  While I’m working at night they are left all alone in 
the house and I worry about them, especially my daughter.  Even though I’m acquainted with my 
neighbors, I don’t really trust them.  Having the dog around at least gives me some sense of security 
while I’m away” (see Figure 6).  
Recalling the days when she shared a room with other migrant coworkers from different places of 
origin, a migrant woman from Thanh Hoa province told me that she was habitually cautious.  Initially she 
migrated to Hanoi on her own, leaving her only son Long with her mother.  She would return to her home 
village once every month to see them.  In her early days in Hanoi she worked as a waitress at a small 
com binh dan in the Central Square.  She was introduced to its owner by one of her fellow villagers who 
had just returned from Hanoi.  He provided her and the other waiters/waitresses with free meals and 
accommodations, with the latter meaning that she shared a room with a group of migrants from different 
provinces.  She always would ask her boss to pay her salary only right before her trip back home to see 
her family.  I asked her why, and she replied bluntly, “Because I never trusted my roommates.”  She 
asserted that if she had been paid on a regular basis and had kept her money in the shared room, there 
would have been a great risk that her “roommates/coworkers” would steal it.  Eventually she quit her job 
and returned to her hometown, after she had earned enough money to support her family.  But then in 
2010, not long after her happy reunion with her son, she came back to Hanoi with him in tow to work at 
yet another com binh dan in the Thanh Ninh area.  “Are you still asking your current boss to give you your 
salary only when you are about to go back to the countryside?” I asked.  “Oh no, not anymore,” she 
replied.  “After moving back to the city I opened a bank account, and I have started depositing my salary 
every month.”  I asked her how she learned how to deposit money in the bank, and she said that her 
current boss had taught her how to do it.  “Do you also exchange information with your coworkers or with 




workers, she would not get actively involved with them.  “My son and I are living a rather solitary life in 
Hanoi,” she said.  
 
Figure 6. House dog and cat 
 
In summary, the senses of solidarity and exclusivity that village-based networks provide to 
Hanoi’s migrants is like the two sides of a coin.  On the one hand they serve as important support- 
systems, helping fellow villagers to cope with the challenges of city life.  On the other hand the 
exclusiveness of village ties, or the corresponding mentality created by a complete lack of such ties, can 
serve to discourage the formation of bonds of trust between migrants from different places of origin.  The 
real-world result of all this is that migrants tend to either constrain their social worlds within their own 








The division of Thanh Ninh residents into those lucky enough to have permanent residency and those 
sadly lacking it is directly linked to one’s possession in Hanoi, or more precisely in the Thanh Ninh area, 
of ho khau, and thereby of all the associated rights and services granted within the place of residence.  
Although permanent residents often are equated with non-migrants, it is misleading to assume that all 
permanent residents in the Thanh Ninh area were born in the area and have continued to live there ever 
since.  Technically, permanent residents include not only people who have lived in the area since their 
birth but also those who initially migrated from other districts or provinces and later succeeded in 
transferring their ho khau to their current places of residence. Conversely, non-permanent residents are 
those who do not have ho khau in their current place of residence, regardless of their birth or extensive 
residential period in the area.   
Lack of permanent residency in a person’s current place of residence can lead to a type of social 
exclusion resulting from the residence-based policy practice.  Both anecdotal evidence and existing 
studies point to the low level of non-permanent residents’ social participation in their communities.  Le et 
al. (2011) found that very few of the non-permanent resident migrants whom they interviewed had ever 
participated in cultural and sport activities organized by the community (3.2 percent) or community 
meetings arranged by local authorities (1.2 percent).  Asked why they had not participated or attended, 
most of these people replied that their non-permanent residential status did not permit them to attend 
(92.7 percent). So too, among the migrant research participants interviewed for this study, none of the 
non-permanent migrant residents had participated in communal activities or meetings.  They all indicated 
that they neither had been invited to attend, nor had they voluntarily asked if they could.  The general 
consensus across both the permanent and the non-permanent residents was that migrants without 
permanent residential status, let alone unregistered migrants, are allowed to participate.  In the same vein, 
the UNDP (2010) assessment of urban poverty in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City reported that migrants 
without permanent residency did not actively participate in civil society.  In the study, social inclusion was 
classified into four different categories of activity: (i) participation in social-political organizations (e.g., 
youth union, women’s union); (ii) participation in neighborhood social activities (e.g., local meetings); (iii) 
receipt of social services (e.g., obtaining information about public health); (iv) social relations in the 




non-permanent residents in (i), (ii) and (iii) were about half, or less than half, of the rates of permanent 
residents.  In the UNDP study that included both temporary registered and unregistered migrants, 
approximately 10 percent of the non-permanent migrant residents remarked that the lack of a residence 
permit in their current residence hampered their involvement in (i), (ii) and (iii).  
This low level of social participation also applies to children.  In the study done by Save the 
Children, U.K. (2006), it is reported that when recreation activities were organized by local officials for the 
children residing in one of their study sites in Hanoi, on the occasions of Children’s Day (June 1st) and 
the Mid-Autumn Festival, non-permanent-resident migrant children were not invited or permitted to play 
with the other children.  They were even told by adults at the site to get out, and that the playground 
belonged only to local children.  The study stated that this tendency to exclude or at least discourage non-
permanent resident children (especially those within KT4-registered migrant families) from participating in 
communal activities was also common elsewhere, and that such children’s chance of becoming part of a 
youth league, or a union member, was slim.  
The combination of the financial factor (low-income) with the social one (lack of permanent 
residency) clearly does serve to strongly discourage the social participation of non-permanent migrants. 
Nor is this a merely abstract concern, for the above-referenced urban poverty assessment (UNDP, 2010) 
found that deprivation of social inclusion had a high correlation with the poverty level of non-permanent 
residents, and that this was particularly the case in Hanoi.   By contrast, no such correlation was 
established for permanent residents. Interestingly, regardless of residential status, low-income residents 
were less likely to participate in social activities because they felt they were not being included, whereas 
higher-income residents were less likely to participate because of lack of time.  The most basic inference 
one draws in this regard is that low-income residents lacking permanent residency are the migrants most 
likely to have a disconcerting sense of social exclusion, and the least likely to get involved in social 




Aside from the differentiation between migrants and non-migrants, this study’s data also reveal that 
virtually all the residents of the Thanh Ninh area —villagers from the same place of origin and villagers 




based on a class-conscious division into two categories: awareness of themselves as being either middle-
class or lower-class residents.   
 
Perceptions of Middle-Class Residents  
In the Thanh Ninh area where people with markedly different living standards live relatively close to each 
other, dismissive attitudes sometimes were exhibited by some of the better-off residents toward their 
neighbors who were leading a life more socioeconomically disadvantaged than their own.  
Characteristically, the complaints and accusations made by the better-off residents against their less well-
off counterparts focused on the latter’s unhygienic practices and on security issues.  The following 
conversation I held with the members of a middle-class permanent-resident family that had moved across 
neighborhoods in the Thanh Ninh area illustrates how middle-class residents’ encounters and interactions 
with some of their impoverished neighbors can instill a feeling of distrust.   
Thanh My, a permanent resident who runs a small variety shop on a street-corner adjoining a 
neighborhood comprised of both poor migrants and middle-class residents, complained that often she 
was awoken early in the morning by her migrant neighbors, drunkenly shouting on their way home after 
working the night shift at the nearby wholesale market.  As her customers include those poor neighbors, 
she sympathizes with their financial distress.  In the past she even let them defer payments, although her 
mother-in-law was against it.  She admitted, however, that some of her customers never paid her back 
even when they had promised they would.  “You see, as much as I want to, I can’t really trust them,” she 
said, with a resigned tone of voice.  
Hearing what Thanh My was saying, Huyen, her sister-in-law who was living in a newly built 
house cater-corner to Thanh My’s shop, echoed Thanh My’s concerns, saying that she too was having a 
hard time living next to those neighbors.  “I know that their life is hard and I feel empathic toward them, 
because I also grew up in a humble family in the countryside myself.  So, I feel like I can relate to them.  
But the way they act in our neighborhood, like throwing their garbage on the street and leaving their dogs’ 
mess there without clearing it away, that’s just disgusting and I can’t stand it!  I always end up cleaning up 
the mess that they spread in front of my house by myself.”  She added that each household of local 
residents, like her and Thanh My’s family, was required to pay 3,000 VND once every three months for 




neighbors who leave litter behind are mostly unregistered migrants they never pay such fees, which of 
course only adds to the anger felt by Thanh My and those like her (see Figure 7). 
Security is another issue.  After Huyen moved to what was, as of 2009, her current location, she 
ran into “unexpected intruders” several times.  Prior to moving into that newly built house she and her 
family had lived in a rented one, in a neighborhood located even further north of the market.  Although the 
neighborhood was a mere 500 meters or so from her new residence, it was made up mostly of middle-
class residents who either owned their houses or could afford to pay the rental fees ranging from 400 to 
600 USD.  Her new home, on the other hand, was located in an alley adjoining a neighborhood containing 
both shelters for low-income migrants and the houses of middle-class residents.  When she first moved in 
she often would leave the door to her porch unlocked, as had been her habit in the old house.  Her new 
neighbors advised her that she should always lock the porch, but she didn’t take their advice seriously.  
Then one day, as she came down to the kitchen on the ground floor, she found a stranger trying to carry 
her TV out of the house.  She screamed at him, and the thief ran away empty-handed.  It later turned out 
that the intruder was a migrant neighbor living in a nearby shelter.  It comes as no surprise that after a few 






Figure 7. Litter piled up on a street-corner 
  
 Middle-class residents, who take pride in their relative economic well-being in comparison with 
their impoverished neighbors, shared with me their resentment at the public perception of the whole 
Thanh Ninh area as being a deprived one.  A longtime local resident who has been living with her 
husband and two children in a four-storied house recounted how she and her husband had some 
unpleasant experiences when they arranged for the delivery of some furniture and electronic products 
that the family had purchased.  “Every time we gave our home address to shop staff to ask for deliveries, 
they would give us this look as if there were no way we could have afforded to buy!  It was really 





Brown Village    
The brown village residents who inhabit houseboats on the river arguably comprise the most 
impoverished population in the entire Thanh Ninh area.  Just to remind the reader as an aid to 
visualization, a few dozen houseboats, each containing a family, are spread out adjacent to the 
midstream island, and the latter is accessible by foot only from the middle of the bridge that crosses the 
river.  As one heads down the stairs of the bridge to step onto the island, one sees fields all around.  The 
scenery makes one feel that one is in the countryside, for from the hustle and bustle of the city.   
The first batch of migrants began to live in boats in the 1980s, but as compared to the rapid 
expansion of informal settlements on the opposite shore, the development of the brown village was slow.  
A woman who migrated to the brown village in the late 1990s from Binh Dinh province, in southern 
Vietnam told me that there were about eight families when she first moved in; all were living in tiny little 
boats, about half the size of the houseboats in which most of the village’s residents now dwell.82 Just like 
this woman, people made the decision to live in boats because they were too poor to pay for rental 
houses or rooms elsewhere.  Those who did not have even enough money to buy boats started squatting 
on islands, but their shelters soon were demolished by the local police.  The current head of the village, 
one of the early settlers from Ha Dong,83 worked as a garbage collector when he first came to Hanoi in 
1979.  When he ran out of money he could not pay his rent, so he camped out under the bridge in the 
village area for a while.   
According to its village head, the number of residents gradually increased over the years to reach 
over 20 households or nearly 150 residents.  As the media began doing stories about the “brown village” 
and its residents’ impoverished lives, several NGOs started to come in and offer assistance in improving 
the livelihoods of village residents.  Since 2004, one of the NGOs based in the Thanh Ninh area has 
provided assistance in the forms of food and refurbishment of the residents’ houseboats.  (Every time the 
area is hit by heavy rain and wind, especially during the typhoon season, their boats get badly damaged.)  
                                                          
82 I have been unable to access comprehensive data on the price of houseboats, but one resident who moved into 
the brown village and purchased her family’s houseboat in 2008 told me it cost her 6 million VND. Her house was 
average in size for the village and formed of two small connected boats: one was used as the family’s living room and 
kitchen, the other as their sleeping room.  While the prices of houses on the other side of the river in the Thanh Ninh 
area and outside of the brown village proper, must vary greatly due to the mixed-class nature of the area, houses on 
the eastern edge of the Thanh Ninh area, in a flood-prone area facing the river and thus considered to be on the low 





Even though the government no longer bothers trying to chase the villagers away, as they frequently did 
in the past, no public assistance, not even provision of emergency food and clean water in times of 
natural disaster or of the not uncommon massive blackouts, will come to the village residents.  
Despite its unofficial name of “brown village,” no resident in the village makes a living by fishing.  
Instead most of the village residents work as collectors of trash and recyclables, although some women 
work on the bridge as tea-sellers from noon to midnight and a few villagers are tenant farmers.  Outsiders 
largely write off the village residents as “social evils,” but the villagers shrug off such characterizations 
with a smile.  Some residents, however, including the village head, admitted that many of the village 
residents had at some point in their lives been engaged in such antisocial activities as robbery, 
prostitution, and drug-dealing.  The village head, who has played that role for more than ten years, stated 
that one of the reasons the residents voted him village chief is that he has never been a “social evil.”  
While the village’s residents have come from different parts of Vietnam, most of them are unregistered in 
Hanoi.  Some men who initially migrated to Hanoi alone and got married afterward have lost ties with their 
home villages and are not registered anywhere.84   
The public image of village residents as lower-class “social evils,” which is lent credibility by the 
backgrounds of some of the residents and by their illegal occupations in the area, is one that the 
landholders of the island presumably would have no trouble embracing.  Many of these landholders live in 
the suburban Gia Lam district in the eastern part of Hanoi.  They would invariably give the cold shoulder 
to the brown-village residents when they passed them, according to those residents themselves.  When 
some local government officials burned down some of the residents’ boats in the course of destroying the 
shanties inhabited by squatters, no landholder lifted a finger to stop them.  Things started to change a bit 
in the mid-2000s, when the brown village began to draw the attention of the media and NGOs.  The 
village residents told me that nowadays the landowners, as well as some local authorities, will greet them 
and even pay a visit to their houseboats.  A few of the residents now work part-time as tenant farmers on 
the landholders’ vegetable farms on the island, thereby making 1-2 million VND a year.  “After twenty 
years, they finally came to realize that we are not all evil but kindhearted and honest human beings,” said 
                                                                                                                                                                                           





a man who was one of the earliest settlers in the village.  He added that “they,” the landholders and some 
local authorities, even went so far as to raise their voices against the central government when it tried to 
demolish their settlements recently.  
And yet despite their improved relations with the landholders of the island and some local 
authorities in the Thanh Ninh area, brown-village residents still encounter prejudice that runs deep.  A 
sense of segregation was shared by all the migrant children and family members I spoke to in the village.  
They said that some people outside of the village would even be so cruel as to call them bui doi, a term 
often used to refer to people living or working on the streets such as vagrants and street children (Human 
Rights Watch, 2006) and sometimes extended to include the rural migrant poor, come to work in the cities.  
“Outsiders dislike us and call us bụi đời.  They think we make the city dirty and messy,” said a woman 
who migrated to the brown village from Ninh Binh province with her husband in 2001.  Another longtime 
resident, Mr. Nam, asserted that discrimination against the brown-village residents remains all too real: 
“The government is still trying to chase us away from the river, because they don’t want Hanoi to look like 
a shabby and unclean city!”  A staff member of the NGO providing support to the charity class divulged 
how an extracurricular activity they recently had organized in the brown village went nowhere with parents 
and guardians living outside the village.  The NGO personnel planned the activity not only in the hope that 
the vast outdoor space of the brown village would allow the class’s students to get out of the small 
classroom and scamper across the fields but also because they saw a great opportunity for students and 
parents/guardians from both inside and outside the village to gather and get to know each other.  No such 
luck!  While four out of seven students from the brown village and a few of their parents/guardians did 
participate in the activity, only a handful of the students from outside the village came, and none of their 
parents/guardians showed up.  As for the students from outside the brown village who did not attend, they 
claimed that their parents/guardians would not let them do so, citing their sense of uneasiness about 
having their children associate with those from the brown village.  
 In contrast to the ongoing tensions between brown-village residents and outsiders, it appears that 
a sense of solidarity is retained within the village to some extent.  The village chief expounded on how the 
villagers offer mutual help in times of crisis.  “When some troubles occur in the village, they will be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




brought to my attention.  If it is about disputes between the village residents, I will visit the homes of each 
party to intervene to stop the fight, and will advise them on how they can better handle the matter in 
question and be reconciled peacefully.  When the trouble involves financial matters, I will make visits to 
each household to ask their help for fundraising for the family concerned.”  On a more mundane but no 
less inspiring level, the village women who work as tea-sellers during the nighttime hours always make 
the trip to and back from the bridge, their workplace, together, so as to watch out for each other.  
Normally they work from noon till midnight.   It takes about fifteen minutes on foot to get from the edge of 
the village to the bridge: the women risk being attacked when walking outside alone, particularly after dark, 
because there is no streetlight along the way in the field.  When some women sell out their night’s supply 
drinks and snacks faster than the others do, they help their comrades to sell out theirs and wait until 
everyone else has finished her job, so that all can return to the village together.  
 Heartwarming as such conduct is, the degree of solidarity and communal unity among the fishing- 
village residents does not appear to be as high as that produced by the village-based networks of social 
relations illustrated in a previous section.  Said one longtime female resident: “What connects us here is 
sorrow.  We come from many different places, but the thing we have in common is that we are all leading 
hard lives.  Some ran away from their countryside and cut ties with their families, some committed crimes 
and got arrested, some are living with sick spouses and physically disabled children.”  Another woman 
who moved to the village three years ago with her two children, after her husband died, said: “We do help 
each other whenever we can around here, but I’m trying to keep a low profile.  I don’t want my kids to get 
associated with other residents’ children either, because as you know, some of the residents have drifted 
into crime.  And I don’t want them to get a bad influence as they grow up.”  Having lived in the southern 
part of the Thanh Ninh area prior to moving the brown village, she shared with me her desire to move out 
of the houseboat and return to the “opposite shore” once she had accumulated enough money to rent a 
place for her family.  “All my friends from the neighborhood are still there, so I sometimes hang out with 
them when going over to the other side of the river.”    
In sum, the brown village, this impoverished community made up of unregistered migrants, 
provides us, owing both to the nature of its residents and to its geographical distance from other 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




residential neighborhoods in the Thanh Ninh area, with the ultimate image of social segregation and 
stigmatization.  Yes, tensions between village residents and those dwelling in what feels like “the outside 
world” have eased somewhat in recent years, but the still widely heard aspersions of the residents as 
being mere bui doi suggests that the deep-seated prejudice against them hasn’t gone away.  The disdain 
displayed by the Thanh Ninh residents outside of the village tells us that the village residents are 
envisioned as comprising the bottom of the social pyramid.     
 The brown village differs from the rest of the Thanh Ninh area not only in that does it retain a 
certain degree of self-governance under the leadership of the village chief; it also fosters a sense of unity 
among the village inhabitants as unregistered migrants and “social outcasts.”  Such a sense of 
congregation is rarely seen in other parts of the Thanh Ninh area where neighbors of mixed social class, 
residential status, and place of origin live close to each other and yet scarcely intermingle with one 
another. Nevertheless, and as noted earlier, a feeling of mistrust expressed by some village residents 
toward their village neighbors suggests that the degree of solidarity and social ties within the brown 
village is not as intense as that produced by the village-based networks, which are imbued with a sense 
of implicit trust, with “social sentiment” (tinh cam). 
 
It is clear that multi-layered class tensions pervade the Thanh Ninh area.  Not only do its 
geographical location and the external appearance of the houses serve as markers of class divisions, but 
the residents’ remarks and attitude toward their less-well-off neighbors often illuminate their class 
awareness.  As we have seen, other Thanh Ninh residents mentally assign brown-village inhabitants to 
the very bottom rank within the area; the combination of their poverty, their informal, floating settlements 
attached to an isolated island, and the previous backgrounds of some residents deemed “social evils” 
serves to reinforce people’s widespread conception of them as being not “underprivileged” and thus 
deserving of their compassion but rather as mere bui doi, dust of life.  
It comes as no surprise that middle-class residents of the Thanh Ninh area, many of whom are 
permanent residents, expressed feelings of resentment at being bracketed with their less well-off 
counterparts in the area by outsiders (i.e., city residents living outside of the Thanh Ninh area).  Better-off 




problems.  In their minds, their low-income migrant neighbors are the ones putting a strain on urban 
infrastructure and threatening public security.  Such a mindset, in turn, impedes the building of community 
spirit and the fostering of social interactions among residents of varying social classes. 
Growing social tensions and a sense of fear that derive from class-consciousness in urban 
neighborhoods are being similarly reported in other parts of the world.  For instance Caldeira (as cited in 
Scheper-Hughes & Hoffman, 1998) noted that some residents in mixed-class neighborhoods of São 
Paulo had built protective barriers out of a fear of violence and social insecurity.  People of greater 
affluence could afford to protect themselves by living in high-rise apartment buildings with security guards 
or in gated communities with electronic surveillance systems, while using private shopping centers.  
These physical barriers serve to reinforce class divisions and thereby foster discrimination.  Caldeira’s 
study thus demonstrates how social segregation can be achieved not only in geographical and symbolic 
terms but also in material forms, in cities where residents of different social classes live in close proximity.   
One can see in the Thanh Ninh area, as well, the separation of mixed-class residents taking 
concrete shape, as when its better-off residents inhabit multiple-storied, spacious, solitary houses as 
opposed to flat shelters or houseboats packed with poor migrant families, and when even middle-class 
residents of modest means and living close to low-income neighbors make sure they keep their sturdy 
porches locked.  A difference that this study has identified in the Thanh Ninh area, however, is the 
existence of a mechanism designed to protect a resident from not just neighboring residents of a lower 
social class but also those of socially equivalent status; we have seen how the keeping of dogs is a 
popular “security system” that low-income migrant residents utilize to prevent their own neighbors from 
breaking in and burglarizing them.  
 What appears to permeate Hanoi’s urban space, thereby creating a vicious cycle of social 
segregation and discrimination, is the idea that those who symbolically and/or materially represent 
poverty, lack of hygiene, and “social evil” need to be wiped out—or at least rendered invisible.  They 
should be cleared away because their presence represents a threat to those values of “civilized living” 
deemed to be virtually synonymous with modernity: “middle-classness,” neatness, and social order.  At 
least one can take a bit of comfort from the fact that this syndrome is not, as noted earlier, confined to 




staked out sophisticated urban neighborhoods that stood in stark contrast to their appearance and social 
status, only to thereby bring on social rejection, confinement, and the elimination of their presence 
(Scheper-Hughes & Hoffman, 1998).  So too, the impoverished migrant residents of the Thanh Ninh area 
are continually confronted by the impulse of better-off, middle-class residents to disperse or better yet 
banish them.  And just as Brazil’s street children were labeled as “a class of people [who] were 
considered dangerous and untrustworthy, a blight on the urban landscape [,]” (Scheper-Hughes & 
Hoffman, 1998, p. 356), so too the low-income residents in the Thanh Ninh area are stigmatized as 
constituting the disorderly, distrustful poor, a “class” that is the root cause of virtually all social problems.  
In the end, mounting distrust and heightened exclusivity will only serve to further undermine the social 
integration of urban residents by exacerbating class divisions.  
 
Implications of Social Segregation  
This chapter has sought to show how the migrants’ various networks of social relations serve as valuable 
cultural resources but also present them with challenges as they strive to build new lives in the city.  While 
migrant families establish and maintain multiple networks throughout the migration process, I have, in 
order to highlight their varying degrees of collectivity and reliance, classified them into two primary 
groups: village-based networks and non-village-based networks.  While the former type has rigid social 
boundaries in the sense that membership normally is restricted to people from the same place of origin, 
the latter type’s membership is more amorphous, even including loose connections to migrant neighbors 
and fellow migrant workers from different places of origin.  Both types provide the migrants with support 
by facilitating their reciprocal exchanges of both material and non-material forms of assistance.  Still, the 
crucial difference exists that the village-based networks often are turned to in a spirit of unqualified trust, 
whereas the non-village-based networks are perceived as being strictly a last resort and thus are apt to 
be deficient in a sense of communal unity.  
What appear to underlie the strong sense of solidarity and fellowship observed in village-based 
social relations are those moral foundations of communalism that have been nurtured in the rural village 
societies of northern Vietnam.  The pervasiveness there of such communal institutions as communal land 
and village rituals, as well as the emphasis on quan he tinh cam or sentimental relations, tell us that an 




differentiation within the village.  And yet the tight-knit communal relations have not only elicited mutual 
obligations of help but also have spawned a sense of the exclusivity of membership.   
In urban residential neighborhoods such as those within the Thanh Ninh area that are comprised 
of local permanent residents and migrants from different places of origin and of different backgrounds, the 
formation of such closely knit but closed-off social relations can serve to limit migrants’ interactions with 
people outside of their inner circles, impeding their integration into the local community.  Both anecdotal 
evidence drawn from my field observations and existing studies show that migrants, adults and children 
alike, have only limited social contacts in their daily lives.  Even though the residential status of migrants 
in the city does not directly affect migrant families’ access to cultural resources per se (unlike their 
restricted access to economic and social resources due to the residence-based policies), their mere 
presence as non-permanent migrant residents allows the public discourse to cast a shadow of blame and 
guilt on them and thereby implicitly condone the mistreatment of them by their local non-migrant 
counterparts.  
The loosely connected social relations with neighbors that we have noted in the Thanh Ninh area 
seem to have some commonality with Xom Chua Van Tho, a poor neighborhood in Saigon (currently Ho 
Chi Minh City) studied by Hoskins and Shepherd (1965) in the 1960s.  The then up-and-coming urban 
quarter contained approximately eight hundred households and an estimated four thousand inhabitants.  
It attracted people of very varied ethnic, religious, and regional affiliations (Vietnamese, Chinese, 
northerners, southerners, Catholics, Buddhists) and economic levels; about 43 percent of its household 
heads had originated from northern Vietnam.  What the researchers found to be characteristic of this 
neighborhood is its fairly loose social ties and the lack of community spirit among the residents.  They 
were divided into small, intimate groups and would interact only with those of similar backgrounds.   
Hoskins and Shepherd reasoned that the extensive networks, reaching well beyond their residing area, 
that the resident families, and especially those from the North, had forged were largely responsible for the 
absence of feelings of community membership.  Though of different epochs and regions, Xom Chua Van 
Tho and the Thanh Ninh area are strikingly similar in this: the non-corporate nature of people’s social 




derives from residents’ propensity to interact mostly with those of similar backgrounds via close 
relationships forged by preexisting networks—in the case of the Thanh Ninh area, the village-based ones.    
 At any rate, there can be no doubt that the social exclusion and discrimination that pervade the 
Thanh Ninh area precipitate social divisions among its residents.  Mutual distrust and a sense of 
segregation arise both between migrants and non-migrants and among the migrants themselves, and 
these have demographic, conceptual, social, and moral impacts.  While we are speaking of categories, let 
us remind ourselves that this study has categorized its participants within four complementary pairs: 
migrants and non-migrants; villagers from the same place of origin and those from other places of origin; 
permanent residents and non-permanent residents; middle-class residents and lower-class residents.  
The differentiations between migrants and non-migrants and between middle-class and lower-class 
residents are somewhat arbitrary when compared with the classifications of residents according to village 
connections and residential status, both of which have stricter criteria for inclusion and exclusion.  The 
only factor that all of the preceding categories have in common is their mutual exclusivity produced by the 
Thanh Ninh area residents’ disinclination to socially interact with members of different groups.  This 
hampers the social integration of neighborhood residents and serves to further marginalize the migrants, 
who already have scant access to economic and social resources.  
 The question that future studies doubtless will keep trying to answer is this: What, then, are the 
implications of such social collectivity/exclusivity for structuring a social hierarchy and shaping power- 
relationships in an urban residential neighborhood such as the Thanh Ninh area?  For the time being we 
must simply stay aware of the paradox that even though close-knit social networks often provide migrants 
with a solid support system as they struggle to cope with adversities, their very closed nature works 
against the better social integration of migrants in the destination area and their upward social mobility.  
As Agergaard and Thao (2011) rightly noted in their study of Hanoi’s female migrant porters, “while 
migration networks can be seen as valuable resources, they may also act as reproducers of social 
inequalities and power relations” (Jellinick, 1997; Silvey and Elmhirst, 2003; Resurrection, 2005, as cited 
in Agergaard and Thao, 2011).   
Looking closely at the dynamics of relatedness among the various networks that migrants have 




some light on precisely what social elements serve to facilitate or hamper the social integration of 
particular groups.  One such view already has been taken via the research done by Gardner and Ahmed 
(2006) on both the interconnecting dynamics among the in-migrants living in a Londoni (“a village with 
high levels of transnational migration to the UK”; p. 4) village fictitiously named Jalalgaon in Biswanath, 
Bangladesh, and their differentiated relationships with their overseas (out-migrant) employers.  These 
researchers have shown that the degree of closeness and patronage among connected parties is 
intimately intertwined with the poor’s livelihood strategies, thereby illuminating the highly contextual and 
differentiated nature of “the poor” as a social category.  Permanent laborers and seasonal or temporary 
migrants in Jalalgaon, acting as caretakers for the empty houses of absent Londonis, forge kinship links 
and longstanding relationships with their Londoni relatives/employers; colony residents who landed their 
jobs not via any immediate link but rather strictly through the grapevine remained outsiders, regardless of 
how long they resided in the village.  The close kinship ties that the former two groups retain with their 
Londoni relatives/owners grant them generous social protection in times of hardship, but such protection 
emerges strictly out of the unsavory patron-client relationship that obtains between the powerful Londoni 
and their powerless relatives/employees and that imposes some heavy moral obligations on both parties.  
The colony residents are blessedly unburdened by such patron-client relations but the blessing is mixed, 
for their lack of insider connections prevents them from accessing the strong forms of protection available 
to their counterparts and from gaining access to the Londoni village society.   
 Bringing these points of discussion back to the context of the present study, it can be seen that 
the migrant families’ minimal amount of relatedness to others outside of their village-based connections 
and thereby their limited access to resources serves to sustain their status in the Thanh Ninh area as 
outsiders.  We would do well to keep it mind, however, that just as the meanings of “the poor” vary in 
Jalalgaon depending on “who the local poor are, and what relationships they have with Londoni 
households” (Gardner& Ahmed, 2006, p. 33), so too it is unwise to lump together all of the “poor migrant 
families” in the Thanh Ninh area.  There are migrant families with and without access to various social 
connections ranging from village-based relations (including kin) at the destination area and/or their places 
of origin, NGO contacts and foreign individual benefactors, connections to local school personnel or other 




relation can bring a migrant forms of support or protection, the degree and nature of the relatedness, and 
the amount of the associated resources, vary widely.   The bottom line is that the migrants left most 
vulnerable are those with the fewest accessible social relations.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, 
the key to survival for the residents of Vietnam’s urban neighborhoods seems to be securing an optimal 
combination of the three resources: disposable funds (economic), permanent residency (social), and 
reliable and trustworthy social networks (cultural).  Evidently most migrant families have great difficulty 
securing them all, even though migrants with solid, extensive social connections, forged largely via the 
village-based networks, tend to do better than those without them.  Gardner and Ahmed (2006, p. 20) 
have summed this matter up perfectly: “One’s relationship to place, as well as who one knows (the two 
are inextricably linked) are therefore central social resources in accessing forms of protection and/or 
livelihoods that are key for survival amongst the poor.”   
 
 
The chapter that follows takes a closer look at the processes of social change in their relation to migrant 
families’ attempts at resource mobilization in the context of post-doi moi Vietnam.  By identifying the 
continuities and changes that cut across the patterns of their access to the three resources, the chapter 
will illustrate how (i) spontaneous urban-ward migration in Vietnam has not been able, in and of itself, to 
provide underprivileged migrant families with paths of upward mobility and (ii) the State’s reluctance to 
restructure its institutional structures in ways designed to upgrade its officials’ urban-management skills is 





CHAPTER VII: SOCIAL CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES  
 
Based on the findings of the three preceding chapters with respect to migrants’ access to economic, 
social, and cultural resources, this chapter points to the continuities and changes that may be observed in 
their patterns of resource mobilization in the context of post-doi moi Vietnam.  On the one hand, 
increasing “wiggle room” in certain public domains, and the growing circulation of cash within the 
education sector, signify the emerging bargaining power of money.  On the other hand, despite the 
migrant families’ efforts to cope with instability by diversifying both their income-generating activities and 
their social connections, these people who largely constitute “the poor” in Vietnam, its notably “second-
class citizens,” are to a great extent deprived of their rightful sense of social cohesion by the State’s 
failure to make those structural reforms that would facilitate more equitable resource allocation.  
For the time being, survival in the city can be achieved by expanding one’s disposable income (making it 
abundant enough to circumvent regulatory obstacles when necessary), by obtaining permanent residency 
in the city, and by establishing multiple, dependable social networks both inside and outside of village 
circles.  But of course the vast majority of migrant families have trouble reaching just one, let alone all of 
three, of those goals.  This means we are likely to see, if the State blindly persists in implementing its 
residence-based policies without making some fundamental changes that enable a greater social 
integration of migrants and redress the rising inequality among the city’s residents, just a further 
peripheralization of underprivileged migrant families.        
     
Increased Negotiability and Role of Money 
The rapid expansion of the market economy after doi moi has, as just noted, created more space for 
flexibility and negotiability within certain public domains.  Then too, the rapid growth of spontaneous 
migration from rural to urban areas, undertaken by people in search of economic opportunities, has led to 
the relaxation of state regulations on population mobility, thereby diminishing the role of ho khau as a 
population-control device.  As a result, an increasing number of migrants flow into the city for a temporary 
or an indefinite period of time without bothering to get their paperwork done (i.e., to obtain a temporary-
residence permit).  It is rather remarkable that even though many such migrants must know that their lack 




services, that awareness does not stop them from taking on the challenge of moving to the city in the 
hope of thereby improving their lives. 
 The growing cash economy also has heightened money’s glamour as an essential “trump card,” 
as the magic wand allowing one to circumvent regulations in the post-doi moi society.  The broad range of 
the examples cited in this study—admission to schools outside the locality of one’s place of residence; 
early release of street working children from detention centers; late but successful registration of a child’s 
birth; reinstatement of birth certificate, marriage certificate, or even ho khau; preferential processing of 
one’s “red book”—itself attests to the fact that now more than ever, cash is perceived as making things 
work for one’s purpose even while allowing one to sidestep the protocols.  
 This trend holds true for the transformation presently under way in the education sector as well.  
As discussed earlier, the state’s adoption of a “socialization” policy as a way of scaling back its role as the 
sole and full-scale service-provider while giving a larger role to market-oriented incentives in the sphere of 
education delivery has resulted in augmented financial responsibilities for households.  Not only do public 
schools openly charge tuition fees and other school fees despite the legal stipulation of “free education,” 
they also levy higher admission fees from incoming students who wish to attend a public school outside 
the locality of their permanent residence.  Although such an option is not affordable by many migrant 
parents having little disposable income, some migrant parents can afford and are willing to pay the extra 
fees.  Thus some public schools, with an eye toward increasing the sources of their funding, have in 
recent years started to offer admission to non-permanent residents more readily.  An interview I 
conducted with a ward administrative officer in 2013 (personal communication, September 21, 2013) 
indicated an increased presence of migrant children in some of Hanoi’s public schools.  In those schools 
the accelerating rate of migrant children’s enrollment was such that more than 50 students were crammed 
into one classroom that normally would hold 20 to 30 at most.   
In a similar vein, some schools have become more accommodating to those who do not meet the 
two-year principle stating that only children who are within two years of the class-entry age are eligible for 
admission to mainstream education.  While this is a welcome trend for children who have been out of 
school for more than two years, the greater flexibility actually bespeaks no greater sympathy or 




age issue is not as important as how much you can afford to pay to get your child into school and any 
personal connections may you have with the school.  In other words if you meet both of these conditions, 
your child will have a high chance of getting into a school regardless of his or her age.”  In brief, a 
combination of money and social connections can put the icing on the cake.     
Moreover, the growing pervasiveness of “extra study” and of monetary offerings to 
schoolteachers demonstrates that money has become intimately associated with moral obligations in the 
realm of education.  We have seen that students and their parents often are under pressure, even if not 
actually forced, to attend the extra-study sessions provided by their teachers.  The session fees not only 
serve as a valuable source of additional income for low-paid schoolteachers; students’ participation in 
extra study also demonstrates their own, and their parents’, commitment to receiving supplementary 
education from their teachers, regardless of the cost incurred.  In exchange students learn what 
sometimes was not covered in class, which in some cases includes vital exam-preparation materials.  
By the same token, the practice of making monetary offerings to schoolteachers (with or without 
non-monetary gifts on the side) sends the morally dubious messages that money can influence the 
intensity of a teacher’s stewardship of a student and that the provision of such money is one of a parent’s 
inherent obligation to her/his child.  The net result of this practice is that the student who attends a 
mainstream school and whose parents can afford to “grease the wheels” is in that favored educational 
position which the average migrant child can only dream about attaining.  
 
Lingering Influence of Ho Khau  
Despite the changes brought about by the growing influence of the market economy, there is a certain 
degree of continuity in the way preexisting social structures determine people’s degree of access to, and 
ability to mobilize, resources.  The most notably stabilizing influence in this regard is the state’s continued 
adherence to the ho khau system.  Even though the level of sanctions against those not abiding by its 
regulations (i.e., migrants relocating without obtaining formal permission) has been significantly reduced, 
the system continues to dictate one’s degree of access to public services: those with permanent 
residency in the current place of residence are granted a maximal level of privileged rights and social 
protection while those lacking it must pay a price if they wish to access services in a locality outside the 




pursue stable employment and to benefit from government-financed programs targeting the poor in their 
urban destinations (Dang et al., 2003).  According to Vietnam’s Institute of Social Sciences Information 
(Vien Thong tin Khoa hoc Xa hoi, as cited in Hardy, 2003b, p. 131), under Vietnam’s current constitution 
“free circulation and residence throughout the country, as well as the right to leave the country and return 
from abroad” has been stipulated as its citizens’ entitlement since 1992.  In reality, the state’s observance 
of the archaic ho khau system not only overrides the law but sustains preexisting administrative structures 
designed to restrict population mobility (Hardy, 2003b).   
 Some critics have proposed that the government recognize the legal status of migrants in the city 
so as to allow them more equitable access to social services (Le et al., 2011), but no major action to alter 
the prescribed course of migration policies has yet been taken by policymakers.  To the contrary, the 
government consistently reinforces its position that discourages spontaneous, urban-ward migration.  As 
we saw earlier the Capital Law, which came into force in 2013, includes regulations that significantly raise 
the bar of eligibility for permanent residency in Hanoi  (“Ha Noi tightens residency criteria,” 2013; “Hanoi 
to tighten immigration rules,” 2012; “Migration to Hanoi to be restricted from 2013,” 2012; Thao, 2012).  
Meanwhile, security officials who endlessly deal with day-to-day urban-management problems as they 
seek to regulate some migrants’ disorderly activities bemoan the lack of clear regulatory guidelines, 
beyond just ho khau, to administer the incoming migrants (Hardy, 2003b).  The fact remains that as of yet 
no institutional measure designed to streamline or integrate the management of spontaneous migration 
has been initiated.  Worse yet, there is no government agency whose exclusive mandate it is to manage 
matters related to spontaneous migration (Le et al., 2011). 85    
 It can no longer be denied that the state’s stance of sticking to the preexisting migration policy, 
with its emphasis on restricting free migration, has proven itself ineffective over the years.  In the absence 
of much-needed inter-ministerial administrative restructuring to enable the improved management of 
rural-to-urban migration, not only will the ongoing migration inflow put an even greater strain on urban 
infrastructure but the lives of the migrant poor will also likely become harder.  The State’s blind adherence 
to residence-based policies and its “clean-up campaigns” designed to crack down on street business and 
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“social evil” amount to little more than an attempt to sweep emerging social problems under the rug by 
dealing with them strictly on an ad hoc basis.   
 For migrant families who are at a disadvantage when it comes to resource mobilization achieved 
through formal channels, one way to cope with social and economic adversity is to reach out to informal 
sources of support.  Such support may be obtained from various internal social networks, with the village-
based networks being regarded as the most reliable and trustworthy.  Given the increased financial 
instability under the unpredictable market conditions, some migrant families strive to diversify their social 
connections outside of their village circles, reaching out to, among others, migrant neighbors with different 
places of origin, NGOs, and individual foreign benefactors.  Still, not all migrant families have such a 
broad range of social connections to count upon. And unlike seasonal migrants and other migrant parents 
whose children stay in the countryside, longtime migrant families are less likely to maintain close contact 
with village-based networks or to ask for their support, financial or otherwise.  
Moreover, the mutually exclusive nature of migrant networks and those formed by non-migrant 
city residents, due in part to the state’s ongoing endorsement of residence-based policies, continues to 
inhibit the social integration of migrants in the city.  On top of that, the public discourse on migrants not 
only shifts attention away from the state’s lack of institutional capacity for effective policymaking that 
addresses the trend of burgeoning spontaneous migration by portraying migrants as undesirable social 
presences in the city; it also seeps into mundane narratives in such a way as to intensify the social 
segregation and stigmatizing portrayals of migrants as the disorderly, distrustful poor.  As a result, 
migrants whose access to formal resources already is limited are facing an ever greater risk of 
marginalization.   
 
Coping Strategies of Migrant Families 
Observation of the environment surrounding migrant families living in post-doi moi Hanoi reveals how the 
market economy, the government’s residence-based policies, and cultural dynamics combine to shape 
the very different ways in which resources are accessed by migrant families and by their non-migrant 
counterparts.  While the heightened influence of market forces has transformed people’s modes of 
securing their resources, it also has widened disparities both between migrants and non-migrants and 




The continuities and changes manifested in the patterns of resource-access and -utilization reveal the 
growing bargaining power of cash, the lingering influence of the permanent-resident preferential policies, 
and the continued importance of social connections in providing people with channels through which they 
can negotiate access to resources.  Thus, migrants confronted by an intrinsically unfair social system 
must somehow summon up sufficient economic, social, and cultural resources to improve their chances of 
survival in the city: enough funds to circumvent regulatory constraints as necessary; permanent 
residency; and multiple and dependable social networks.  
 The harsh reality is that in the new atmosphere of increased flexibility and negotiability, the 
State’s transition to a “socialist-oriented market economy” is prompting greater self-reliance in resource 
mobilization, with people essentially being forced to turn to whatever individually oriented coping 
strategies they can muster.  As Hardy (2001) simply puts it, people are “increasingly [required to] take 
matters into their own hands,” (p. 207) with that fact sadly being exemplified by both the proliferation of 
“hidden costs” or “bribery” lurking within the administrative process and the growing financial burden 
borne by households in the education sphere.  Migrant families must somehow dynamically cope with all 
such challenges by exercising “their own ingenuity to negotiate [the State’s policies and their corollaries]” 
(Hardy, 2001, p. 207).  And even though financial constraints rarely enable them to get their way, they do 
constantly seek ways to expand their channels of access to resources and opportunities.   
The most basic of such ways is that of diversifying one’s income-generating activities (Berry, 
1993).  Some migrant families who make their living by street-selling work at several different locations, 
shift locations regularly, and/or work separately with other family members on certain occasions (e.g., 
sending the children to a pagoda on particular dates of the month to beg worshippers for mercy).  Many 
migrants certainly are on the lookout for the latest market trend, and they never hesitate to change their 
products or to work multiple jobs.  Chi Huong, a widow and the mother of four sons, has long been 
working as a street-seller targeting foreign and Vietnamese tourists in the city center.  When I met her 
during my return visit in September 2013 she was about to embark on her new business: selling bundles 
of incense sticks and fake bills.  “I’m pretty excited about this new job I’m starting!” she exclaimed.  “At 
first, I’m trying to stay flexible, maybe working a couple days a week at the temple, aside from my regular 




offering to the altar at a temple.  Built in 1070 and renowned for being the first university in Vietnam, the 
temple attracts tourists, Vietnamese and foreigners alike, as well as local worshippers.  A number of 
Vietnamese students and their families also visit the temple as a ritualistic way of praying for good luck in 
getting into college; as the announcement of the test results approaches in the fall, the number of 
worshippers increases even more.    
In another case, a pair of migrant parents who used to work as a street-seller (mother) and a xe 
om driver (father) started working together, as roving street-vendors, after their eldest daughter had left 
for Hai Phong to find work in 2012.  They said this when I spoke with them: “These days we are roaming 
across the city, from one tourist spot to another, instead of sticking around in the same location.  That way, 
we can improve our chance of generating more income.  We even go to peddle as far as Bac Ninh City.86  
Over there, there is much less competition than in Hanoi.”  After thus shifting their work-style, the couple 
changed their product-line as well: previously the mother and her eldest daughter had sold small touristic 
items such as postcards, folding fans, and logoed caps; the couple now are selling name-brand-imitation 
T-shirts, wallets, and clutch bags, which, they say, sell better.  Their three other children are attending 
public primary and junior secondary schools with financial support in the form of tuition fees coming from 
an NGO and an American benefactor; even then, the parents still need to make money to finance their 
children’s non-tuition school fees and to meet their family’s living expenses.   
 Yet another way of diversifying one’s channels of access to social and economic resources and 
opportunities is to build multiple social networks that one can count on.  Migrant families having few 
remaining village ties need to explore those non-village-based networks of which they must become part, 
if they wish to hedge their risk and better cope with income insecurity.  NGOs constitute one of the 
relatively accessible and reliable sources of support.  Several street children whom I interviewed during 
my initial fieldwork when they were attending the charity class are now enrolled in a public primary school, 
full-time, with administrative and financial support from an NGO.  This NGO also helped their family to 
move to a suburb of Hanoi where the living costs are lower but that still is within commuting distance and 
thus allows the parents to travel to the city center to peddle.  Some other migrant families I met also were 
                                                          




receiving assistance, both funding in support of their children’s schooling and some cash for living 
expenses, from more than one NGO.   
 In these two ways, then, migrant families try to cope with the implicit demand for increased self-
reliance in a time of economic instability: by expanding their income-generating activities in the informal 
sector and by forming multiple social networks.  In the best-case scenario, the diversification of such new 
informal networks allows them to devise more flexible and autonomy-favoring survival strategies.  Too 
often, however, the remaining demarcation of membership between permanent and non-permanent 
residents in the formal sector, and their mutual exclusivity when building social contacts, seem to hinder 
migrants’ social integration.  And with few work opportunities available outside the bottom of the informal 
sector, migrant families continue to struggle to escape poverty.     
The next section will examine how and why migration movements in Vietnam have not generated 
social transformation at the structural level, despite plenty of elemental changes occurring down on the 
grassroots level.   
 
Lack of Structural Transformation  
While migrant families dynamically engage themselves in trying to open up channels of access to fuller 
resources, the social changes occurring within the context of the post-doi moi reforms do not appear to be 
either entailing structural transformations on the societal level or enabling increased social mobility.  
People’s changing patterns of resource mobilization, as well as the emergence of new social meanings of 
money vis-à-vis the negotiation of social relations and of legitimacy, illustrate how endogenous and 
exogenous stimuli can generate processual changes in the fluid contents or segments of social 
institutions, without giving rise to substantial changes on the structural level (Smith, 1998). The 
stigmatization of migrants in both public and mundane discourse, and the continuing struggles of the 
migrant poor as non-permanent residents, bespeak their continuing positioning as “social outcasts.”  The 
growing bargaining power of money as that serves to structure social relations, when it is combined with 
the inequitable resource distribution all but mandated by the residence-based policies, has increased 





 That migration does not necessarily enhance social mobility or induce fundamental alterations in 
the larger social structure is a truth that applies not only to the current context of Vietnamese society but 
to other social contexts as well.  It is worth noting in this regard that Georges (1990), in her account of the 
experiences of migration, development, and cultural change in the community of Los Pinos village in the 
Dominican Republic, demonstrated how the international, circular migration between Los Pinos and New 
York City was not leading to any restructuring of the village’s social hierarchy or alteration of preexisting 
gender roles.  Georges grants that the migration movement did involve those processes whereby social 
relationships are dynamically formed and reformed in the transformation of family organization and 
household structure (i.e., an increase among migrant households of female household heads and of non-
nuclear families), and the expansion of a middle-income sector resulting from the remittances to migrant 
households of money and consumer durables.  Nevertheless, the fact that little structural transformation 
had taken place despite the elemental social changes is revealed by the lack of social mobility within the 
community itself among most Pineros migrants, who tend to have higher levels of education and thus 
higher economic status than do the non-migrants who predominantly are the landless poor, as well as by 
the continuance and reinforcement of gender relations whereby women typically serve as homemakers, 
housekeepers, and caretakers while the men hold more decision-making power within the household as 
the breadwinners and senders of remittances.  
That example of how migration has affected, but all the more so has not affected, the preexisting 
social institutions in the village of Los Pinos may help to shed some light on the factors underlying the 
continuing disintegration and marginalization of migrant families in the Thanh Ninh area.  On the one 
hand, some contextual differences between Los Pinos village and the Thanh Ninh area are evident.  First 
and foremost is the difference in types of migration: transnational as opposed to domestic (rural-to-urban) 
migration.  Second, the social settings and sites of the study populations also differ in certain respects: 
while Georges’ (1990) study was concerned with the impact of circular migration experiences on Los 
Pinos households in the village, the current study focuses on the circumstances of migrant families living 
in the city of Hanoi.  In Los Pinos village, the men as breadwinners migrated more whereas the women, 
due to the limited opportunities available to them to become wage-earners in the village, usually stayed 




women to migrate to the city, or even overseas nowadays, as seasonal migrants without their husbands, 
but migrant mothers in the Thanh Ninh area also wear both hats—income-earner and housekeeper—due 
in part to their city lives where more economic opportunities are available to them, particularly in the 
informal sector, than is the case in their villages.  
Nonetheless, some important commonalities of experience emerge from these two study areas.  
Georges (1990) argued that the government’s lack of substantive policies to assist migrants in channeling 
their savings and newly acquired skills into productive resources and economic opportunities resulted in 
an absence of social mobility.  In consequence Pineros migrants tended to take matters into their own 
hands, using the socioeconomic skills they had acquired prior to their migration and making the best 
possible use of their informal networks as a safety net.  So too in Vietnam, the State’s increasingly 
laissez-faire approach to spontaneous migration, implicitly adopted in exchange for withholding potential 
benefits from incoming migrants to the city by reinforcing preferential policies for permanent city residents, 
has forced the migrants to rely heavily upon whatever resources they are able to glean from their informal 
social connections.  Then too, neither in the Dominican Republic nor in Vietnam have initiatives been 
advanced by policymakers designed to put migrants’ assets to use in ways that spur upward mobility, 
address rising inequalities among residents, or redress rural-urban disparities.  Without a major shift in 
the state’s approach to spontaneous migration the migrant poor will likely continue to be adversely 
impacted, as the constant stream of migrants flowing into the city swells with each passing day.  
 Sad as such thoughts are, there is some consolation to be found in the fact that the State is not a 
hegemonic entity.  To the contrary, and as we have seen, different groups of people with different 
agendas—ranging from migrant and non-migrant residents to schoolteachers to NGO workers—are 
actively negotiating with the State to see to it that their needs are better met.  And yet the fundamental 
problem remains: when residence-based policies are used as an instrument of population control by a  
government that makes no effort to alter the underlying structural inequalities that drive people to migrate, 
they empower some people and not others.  If one takes a careful look at the recent changes in the 
patterns of resource mobilization in the wake of Vietnam’s market reforms, one sees that even with all of 




not changed at the structural level but has merely turned into “commercialized clientelism,” as Hardy 
(2001, p. 207) put it.   
 There has been a notable absence of debate in the socialist regime as to the best approach to 
building an urban society whose members, regardless of their residential status, can enjoy the benefits of 
urban living, above all by having equitable access to public services and gladly participating in civil society.  
That absence can largely be accounted if we will simply take note, yet again, of the State’s propagation of 
discourse that emphasizes how the incoming flow of the “disorderly migrant poor” needs to be curbed in 
order to achieve modernization and “civilized living” in the city.  The all-too-successful propagation of the 
idea that migrants are social burdens and threats to public security has garnered support from non-
migrant residents, and fomented mutual distrust between migrants and non-migrants, while allowing the 
government to dodge its responsibility to come up with better approaches to urban management.   
We seem to be learning, not just in Vietnam but globally as well, that opening up the market to 
abet the country’s economic growth is one thing, opening up a regime so as to make it first transparent 
and then capable of enacting needed structural transformations is quite another.  As Hayton (2010, p. 45) 
acutely pointed out, “development is both enriching people and tearing apart the old structures which 
gave them security and gave their lives meaning and purpose.”  The CPV has kept itself in power, without 
subjecting its existing administrative system to major restructuring, by using a carrot-and-stick approach 
whereby the carrot is fewer regulations and thereby heightened economic prosperity and the stick, in 
present theory and past practice, is strict surveillance of population movements and thereby of many 
other human activities as well.  Taylor (2004) has criticized the State’s lumbering response to widening 
inequalities, suggesting that its primary concern has been not to achieve social equity but rather to 
minimize any perceived threats to Vietnam’s becoming a strong, ideologically coherent, socially integrated 
nation.  In other words, as long as exacerbated forms of social exclusion do not put the party’s control 
over the society at risk, those inequalities most likely will be sustained.  As of now, gaining the support of 
Hanoi’s permanent residents in particular and Vietnam’s well-off individuals in general is conceived of as 
being a better way to secure social cohesion than would be the granting of a voice to the city’s 
administrative officers who face daily frustrations arising out of the cities’ unmanaged migration-influx or 




accurately, do-nothing approach has been the perpetuation and indeed the exacerbation of social 
differentiation and the smug toleration of the present inequitable access to, and distribution of, economic, 
social, and cultural resources.   
  
In the next and final chapter, the major points of discussion and findings of the preceding 
chapters will be restated, and the implications of those findings and discussions for policymaking will be 
considered.  The chapter then will address the methodological and topical limitations of this study and 
















CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION 
 
In the preceding chapters, this study has explored how (i) the resource-mobilization process of migrant 
families in Hanoi is intertwined with the State’s continuing endorsement of residence-based policies and 
(ii) their dynamic responses to the challenges imposed by the State’s policy practice of giving preferential 
access to rights and services to permanent residents demonstrates the lack of structural changes at the 
societal level in the face of widening inequalities after marketization.  This chapter begins by summarizing 
the chief findings and discussions laid out in the previous chapters.  It then attempts to draw out whatever 
policy implications they bear for creating an environment in which the residents of the city can, regardless 
of their household registration or socioeconomic status, more equally benefit from living there while 
acquiring a sense of belonging and mutual trust.  The chapter concludes by addressing the limitations of 
the study and pointing to some likely areas of future research.  
  
 
Summary of Findings and Discussions 
Amidst the increased commercialization and ongoing globalization characteristic of post-doi moi Vietnam, 
the nation’s residence-based approach to monitoring and controlling the influx of migrants into its cities 
has had a notably adverse impact upon migrant families’ attempts at resource mobilization.  Three major 
issues pertaining to the patterns of migrants’ access to, and use of, resources were identified: de jure and 
de facto discrepancies in enjoyment of rights and access to social services; migrants’ heavy recourse to 
informal channels because the formal ones are largely blocked to them; and migrants’ enforced need to 
be more self-reliant and to devise individually-oriented coping strategies.  The burgeoning number of 
migrants moving into the city has in recent years been correlated with the declining viability of the ho khau 
system as an institutional apparatus for population control.  Despite the legal stipulation of universal 
access to compulsory education and the constitutional acknowledgement of people’s’ free choice of 
residence, the system continues to operate as a mechanism promoting social differentiation, essentially 
by restricting migrants’ entitlements to those social services and other resources that flow through formal 
channels at the place of destination.  To cope with their economic and social adversities, migrant families 
turn to a variety of informal networks that offer ways of enhancing their productive resources and 




taking matters into their own hands is attested to by their endeavors to diversify their income-generating 
activities and social connections, by the new “wiggle room” of negotiability with the State (which often 
comes with hidden costs), and by the rising bargaining power of money in structuring social relations.  All 
of that is both being driven by, and further exacerbating, the increasingly differential access to, and 
distribution of, resources among the city residents, and thus is intensifying the already existing tendency 
to peripheralize Hanoi’s underprivileged migrant families. 
  
Within the economic domain, marketization in Vietnam has generated both opportunities and 
challenges for internal migrants.  A fast-growing economy in the urban centers, coupled with increased 
mobility due to a top-down relaxation of sanctions against migration effected without the approval of local 
authorities, has boosted rural residents’ incentives to improve their income and standard of living by 
seeking new opportunities in the cities.   Existing studies point to how both a rural-urban income gap and 
the limited rural availability of wage labor outside of farming have encouraged people to move urbanward 
in the hope of sharing in the benefits of economic growth and getting a taste of what city life has to offer 
(GSO & UNFPA Viet Nam, 2005; UNFPA Viet Nam, 2007; Guest, 1998).   
While such spontaneous migration has indeed allowed many migrants to achieve income- 
increases (GSO & UNFPA Viet Nam, 2005; UNFPA Viet Nam, 2007), unskilled and low-skilled rural 
migrants often end up working in small trading and service-related jobs within the informal sector.  Before, 
during, and after migration, people turn to their informally-arrived-at social connections, with the latter 
serving as, among other things, resourceful information-providers vis-à-vis the migrants’ ongoing quest for 
jobs and housing.  By contrast, when it comes to financial matters such as information available from 
government or private employment agencies (UNFPA Viet Nam, 2007), government schemes targeted at 
the poor (e.g., NTP, the Social Policy Bank), and bank loans and other formal credit sources, the migrants 
for the most part act as if those formal financial services did not exist.  This does not mean that they also 
do not know that they exist.  Many indeed do not, but the real impediment in most cases is that migrants’ 
temporary or unregistered residential status in the city means that they are, so to speak, last in line at the 





Given this limited access to formal financial resources, families who migrated to the city with their 
children, intending to settle for an indefinite period of time, do what any of us finding ourselves in 
comparable circumstances would do: they try to improve their economic security by expanding their 
income-generating activities.  As we have seen, some migrant children who work on the street alongside 
their parents make substantial contributions to their family’s survival.  The relative ease with which they 
elicit the sympathy of foreign tourists and other onlookers is, in the eyes of their parents or guardians, too 
important an asset to be thrown away lightly.  
In times of economic adversity, migrant families rarely borrow or lend money among themselves, 
beyond their immediate family members.  They also seldom ask their own relatives for help, mainly 
because the latter generally are incapable of lending a financial hand.  Moreover, longtime migrant 
families, as compared to seasonal migrants and other migrant parents who left children behind in the 
countryside with their grandparents, are not likely to have maintained close ties with their home villages, 
and thus there is little reason to look for help in that direction.    
The remaining options available to these families in great financial need include pawning their 
possessions, resorting to “hot loans,” and seeking help from NGOs and foreign benefactors who are 
willing to provide assistance with such expenses as children’s tuition and other school-related fees and 
the family’s living expenses.  Some families do manage to secure help from one or more NGOs and/or 
supporters but most migrant families have no such luck, and soaring indebtedness resulting from using 
non-formal credit sources renders some migrants even more financially vulnerable than they were before 
(Save the Children, U.K., 2006).     
 We also have seen that migrants often are prevented from accessing decent social services in 
the city.  The first fact to be pointed to as bearing much of the blame here is that of the significant 
disjunction between the de jure and the de facto education deliveries.  Legal provisions guarantee access 
to learning opportunities regardless of a citizen’s social status or economic condition, with the most basic 
such opportunity, a public primary education, being free of charge.  In practice, however, regulatory and 
financial barriers often block migrant children from gaining access to public primary schools.  On the 
regulatory front, temporary-registered and unregistered migrant children have more difficulty securing the 




the locality of their current residence.  But even when the ho khau requirement is waived, the overloaded 
capacity of state education facilities sees to it that children without permanent residency are not 
guaranteed a seat in a public primary school if it is already full (Save the Children, U.K., 2006; UN Viet 
Nam, 2010a; UNDP, 2011).  On the financial front, the process misleadingly dubbed “socialization” by 
those in control of public discourse has entailed the introduction of market-oriented incentives into the 
social services, thereby just imposing even more financial responsibilities upon individual households.  
The impact of socialization upon the education sector has meant that public schools not only have openly 
started to charge tuition fees and other school fees but also levy higher admission fees upon incoming 
students whose permanent residence is not in a school’s locality.   
In addition to the fees charged directly by the school, the growing pervasiveness of extra-study 
sessions and monetary gifts to schoolteachers take their toll on migrant parents and guardians who can 
allocate only a limited amount of money to their children’s schooling.  My interviews with migrant parents 
who once had managed to send their children to public schools revealed that their inability to pay for 
extra-study sessions or to buy gifts for teachers had resulted in some teachers’ failing to give adequate 
attention to their children, and in other cases to overtly discriminatory behaviors directed toward the 
parents and their children.  Equally dispiriting has been the revelation, via both cash-strapped non-
migrant parents and those having more financial capacity, that these financial aspects of the education 
process are now conceived of as being mandatory, despite their being presented as if they were voluntary 
and spontaneous in nature.   
 Given the thicket of both legal and extra-legal obstacles that underprivileged migrants have to try 
to hack their way through, it should not surprise us that their children, denied access to mainstream 
education, tend to seek educational opportunities in the informal sector outside the gamut of state 
services, as typified by “charity classes” or “affection classes.”  Often provided free of charge by NGOs, 
these alternative educational venues offer only the most rudimentary sort of education, one that purveys 
basic (primary level) literacy and arithmetic skills.  Something is assuredly better than nothing, but the fact 
remains that the unreliable quality of teaching in these classes, and the lack of breadth and depth in the 
education offered, have served to impede migrant children’s reintegration or transition into mainstream 




surrounding migrant children points up a growing social inequality between them and their non-migrant 
counterparts.   
  
 The study also has looked at how migrant families build various social networks in their places of 
destination and how they ascribe to them varying degrees of trust and collectivity, as well as cultural 
meanings and assumptions.  The two primary groupings of such informal affiliations are the village-based 
networks, comprised of migrants having the same place of origin, and the non-village-based networks, 
comprised of migrants of different places of origin.  Each can serve as a support system for migrants, 
providing them with ways to reciprocate material and non-material assistance when needed, but a 
significant difference exists between the two.  The village-based networks, as one might expect, given 
their more rigid membership boundaries, tend to be imbued with unqualified trust (Smith, 1998).  The non-
village networks, which extend out to migrant neighbors and work-related acquaintances, are more 
loosely connected and thus fail to foster any great sense of communal unity and mutual trust.  Given that 
most of Hanoi’s migrants originate from northern provincial villages, the study reasons that the village-
based networks draw their strength from the cultural practices and moral foundations historically 
characteristic of rural northern Vietnam—hence the consequently strong sense of internal collectivity and 
external exclusivity.  Such practices and foundations include, among other things, a high degree of village 
endogamy, the largely egalitarian ideology to which the communal land and village rituals attest, and a 
strong emphasis placed on tinh cam (social sentiment) in building relationships with fellow villagers 
(Luong, 2003; Malarney, 1996; Mcelwee, 2007).  By contrast non-village-based relations, despite their 
less exclusive nature, are confined to the exchange of material and moral support, an exchange that has 
as its basis no deep, organizing principle, centered upon fostering social solidarity and equity among the 
parties involved.  
What the village-based and non-village-based networks have in common is that their members 
essentially consist of migrants.  Not only seasonal migrants, who tend to retain a tightly-knit community 
with their fellow villagers, with whom they stay and work during their short-term relocation to the city, but 
also longtime migrant families, who are inclined to stay in low-cost rental accommodations on their own 




with non-migrant city residents in their localities.  The underlying reason for the social segregation 
appears to be that social unity and exclusivity are two sides of the same coin.  People’s full confidence in 
their village-based networks and their relatively closed-off associations with those having a migration 
background similar to their own are inextricably linked to their chariness when it comes to approaching 
those outside of their inner circles.  This propensity, in turn, seems to hamper migrants’ ability to cultivate 
a sense of belongingness in the urban destination or to integrate themselves into the social life of the city.  
When they are viewed in this equivocal way, non-village-based and village-based networks are seen as 
cultural resources that provide an important safety-net for urban migrants while nonetheless sometimes  
“also act[ing] as reproducers of social inequalities and power relations” (Jellinick, 1997; Silvey and 
Elmhirst, 2003; Resurrection, 2005, as cited in Agergaard and Thao, 2011, p. 624).  
It was never the intention of this study, however, to allege that migrants’ internal connectedness 
is to be blamed for their peripheralization in the city.  Rather, it sought simply to understand what 
underlies the growing social segregation among Hanoi’s various groups of residents and thereby 
stumbled upon the finding that, as the other side of the collectivity coin, mutual distrust and exclusivity are 
displayed both among the migrants themselves and between migrants and non-migrants.  In order to 
identify what lies at the root of the ongoing interplay between inclusion and exclusion and to discover why 
it ends up abetting the increasing stigmatization of migrants, the study looked at how power-dynamics 
play out in the contexts of public discourse and quotidian narratives in such a way as to benefit one group 
at the cost of marginalizing another.  Taking the primary research site of this study, the Thanh Ninh area, 
as a case study, the study also examined the ways in which residents in the area are classified into 
groups characterized by distinctive yet interrelated cultural presumptions.  
The first and most generic classification of the residents is that based upon their social positioning 
as migrants or non-migrants.  Regardless of their places of origin migrants are a frequent target of 
discrimination, with the latter’s forms ranging from associating migrants with the unsavory social 
phenomena lumped together as “social evils,” slurs directed against working children that call them “poor 
and illiterate,” and sly allusions to migrants as nha que (country bumpkins), a term that connotes 
repugnant qualities with respect to personal appearance, demeanor, mannerisms, and speech-patterns.  




among their children.  Even those attending local public schools alongside their non-migrant Hanoian 
peers keep a low profile at school, rarely hanging out with non-migrant classmates or neighborhood 
children for fear of being teased or called a “bad influence.”  
Public representations of migrants generally center on their being an undesirable social 
phenomenon because of their supposedly antisocial behaviors and disorderly conduct: robbery, alcohol 
and drug abuse, gambling, swindling, prostitution, littering, frequent disputes and fights.  Such 
representations were implicitly present in: the negative tone of an online news article which suggested 
that the soaring numbers of “in-migrants in Hanoi” (“Nhập cư vào Hà Nội,” 2009) were prompting the need 
for stringent measures to curb migrants’ inflows; security personnel’s concerns about the deterioration of 
social order and frustration over the lack of clear regulatory guidelines for more effective population 
management (Hardy, 2003b); and government-initiated “clean-up campaigns” aiming to crack down on 
street business and “social evils” (both of which often are linked to migrants) by pulling the “culprits” of  
disorderly conduct off the streets (Cohen, 2003) and reeducating them by sending them off to detention 
centers or prisons (Hayton, 2010).  Governmental discourse of this type serves to quickly undermine the 
migrants’ social position in the city by all too glibly portraying them as a social burden, while disregarding 
the patent fact that they are one of the driving forces of urban development.  
What is intriguing, but also dismaying, is the way governmental discourse which problematizes 
the presence of rural migrants in the city has filtered into everyday contexts and led people to talk about 
“others” in a falsely “knowing” way.  All the more ironically, it is migrants themselves who can most readily 
classify those “others” into such groups as those from different places of origin, those without permanent 
residency, and those of a supposedly lower social class.  Just as non-migrants besmirch migrants’ 
reputations by accusing them of being impoverished, uneducated, disorderly rural folks who exert a bad 
social influence, so too migrant residents express distrust of, and maintain a vigilant stance against, other 
migrants from different places of origin, especially those who fall outside the boundary of their close-knit 
inner circle.  We have seen that keeping dogs is a common practice among migrant families living in 
proximity to other migrant inhabitants from different home villages and intent upon keeping unwanted 
people out and scaring off burglars; migrants habitually assert that they do not trust some of their migrant 




evils.”  So too, the demarcation of residents according to possession/non-possession of permanent 
residency in the locality effectively pushes non-permanent migrant residents aside as social outcasts.  For 
given the ongoing impact of the residence-based policies, non-permanent residents not only are largely 
excluded from participating in social activities organized in the locality (Le et al., 2011; UNDP, 2010) but 
also are likely to experience hostility and exclusion at the hands of permanent residents—witness that 
earlier-cited case of migrant children being chased away by permanent-resident parents so that they 
would not get near their children during recreation activities catering to the local community kids (Save the 
Children, U.K., 2006).   
Class-consciousness, yet another classificatory device that produces social differentiation, also 
plays its baleful part in structuring the power-dynamics among the residents of the Thanh Ninh area.  
Lower-class residents, who typically live on tiny alleys bordering the river, are the target of complaints and 
accusations leveled by their middle-class neighbors.  They express both their discomfort with the lower-
class residents’ unhygienic practices (e.g., littering, leaving their dogs’ messes on the street) and their 
concerns about security issues.  Brown-village residents are perceived as dwelling at the very bottom of 
the area’s social pyramid, and thus are always rumored to be engaging (or previously to have been 
engaging) in “social evils.”  Brown-village residents cited neighbors’ references to them as bui doi, a 
pregnant term that simultaneously alludes to their unwanted presence in the society, bespeaks the 
landholders’ and local authorities’ longstanding animosity toward them, and reveals the unwillingness of 
migrant parents who live on the opposite riverbank to get their children involved with the latter’s brown-
village counterparts.  Not surprisingly brown-village residents, like most of Hanoi’s lower-class residents, 
are by and large migrants who come to the big city from villages in the neighboring northern provinces.        
Thus we see how governmental and everyday discourses intertwine to negatively depict and 
thereby segregate certain groups of people.  Lacking supportive presences that would help to buttress 
their weaker position within the power-dynamic of local discourse, the spontaneous migrants can only 
watch helplessly as the State’s take on them prevails: that their massive influx is placing excessive strains 
on urban infrastructure, leading to a deterioration of social order, and undercutting the city’s 
“beautification project” designed to give Hanoi an image of urban modernity and “middle-classness.”  




their expressions of distrust against, and disdain for, other less-well-off migrants who are glibly linked to 
“social evils”—has led not only to more pronounced social differentiation among the residents in the same 
locality but also to increased stigmatization and marginalization of migrants as a whole.  At one’s bleakest 
moments one feels that all the worst aspects of this problem are assembling themselves before one’s 
eyes, as the mistrust and social tensions rife within and among mixed groups of residents are heated up 
to such a degree that a cool-headed determination to create a sense of community and belonging is 
nowhere to be found.   
 
 The study also has pointed to the social continuities and changes that have been observed in the 
context of post-doi moi society, the enduring and yet shifting patterns that are formed as migrant families 
mobilize the three types of resources: economic, social, and cultural.   
 On the one hand, marketization has brought increased flexibility to certain public domains, which 
in turn has given people more capacity to negotiate the State’s policies (Hardy, 2001).  The relaxation of 
the legal sanctions pertaining to the formalities required in order for people to relocate from their 
permanent domicile has enabled those on the move to migrate more freely and to seek new opportunities, 
in urban destinations, to improve their economic security.  The rapid expansion of the cash economy has 
also intensified the bargaining power of money, and people have increasingly made use of it as a way to 
circumvent regulations and to structure social relations in such a way as to suit their own purposes.  This 
new trend has however imposed greater burdens on migrants of weak financial capacities.  In the 
education sector in particular, the financial burdens on parents and guardians have been getting heavier 
due to the proliferation of “extra study” and monetary gifts to schoolteachers, as well as to the de facto 
imposition of a wide range of school fees on individual households in the wake of the State’s introduction 
of the “socialization” policy.  Even though some public schools’ acceptance of children without permanent 
residency in the locality, in exchange for higher admission fees than are required of their permanent-
resident counterparts, has made it possible for some migrant children to access mainstream education, 
other children whose migrant parents and guardians cannot bear all those expenses are prone to be 
resented by their teachers or to attend one form or other of alternative education.  Both the remaining 




compliance with its own laws’ stipulations as to charge-free public primary education and citizens’ equal 
rights to access school education inevitably raise the issue of social inequity.  
 Despite the relaxation of certain aspects of their enforcement, the State’s adherence to and, just 
within the last few years, intensified commitment to residence-based policies continues to restrict 
migrants’ access to the resources available through formal channels.  Quite simply, their non-permanent 
residential status in the current place of residence prohibits them from gaining access to public social 
services or formal credit sources equal to that enjoyed by permanent residents.  As they try to cope with 
social and economic adversities migrants continue to resort to informal channels which include, among 
others, village connections, migrant neighbors, NGOs and individual foreign benefactors, and informal 
loan-providers and pawn shops.  They also strive to improve their financial stability by diversifying their 
income-generating activities in the informal sector and by tapping into social networks that may help them 
open the door leading to economic and social resources.  While their dynamic responses to social and 
economic challenges illustrate the migrants’ greater self-reliance and admirable exercise of ingenuity 
(Hardy, 2001) in resource mobilization, the lack of any structural transformations that could facilitate more 
equitable resource allocation among the city residents, regardless of their residential status, continues to 
hamper the social integration of the migrant poor and dims their prospects of upward mobility.  As a result 
they are left to settle for the status quo, that of “second-class citizens.”  
 The study then sought to understand what underlies the state’s enduring endorsement of 
residence-based policies, despite the obvious ineffectiveness of the ho khau system as an instrument for 
controlling population mobility.  Not only has the government yet to take the initiative in introducing some 
major institutional schemes designed to integrate and thereby streamline the management of 
spontaneous migration; it has consistently propagated discourse suggesting that (i) the soaring number of 
migrants needs be curbed at all costs by tightening regulations so as to discourage urbanward relocation, 
and (ii) their presence in the city is putting intolerable strains on urban infrastructure and undermining 
social order.  Some critics and intellectuals have contended that a mere reinforcement of existing 
regulations of the kind seen in the Capital Law which came into force in 2013 is not feasible, while also 
citing migrants’ substantial contributions to the development of urban centers and thereby the growth of 




of equal entitlements guaranteeing migrants equal access to decent social services (Le et al., 2011; Save 
the Children, U.K., 2006).  Nonetheless, little progress seems to have been made when it comes to 
reforming the residence-based policies or leveraging an inter-ministerial administrative restructuring that 
would bode well for improved management of rural-to-urban migration.  
 The study has speculated that the State’s continuing reluctance to undertake any such 
institutional restructuring can be traced back to two factors.  First, the dissemination of discourse in which 
migrants are portrayed as the disorderly perpetrators of “social evils” has helped the government to 
dampen public debate that otherwise might have heatedly taken it to task for its failure to address the 
problems associated with rapid urbanization and the ever-widening urban-rural gap.  Indeed, the idea that 
migrants are social burdens and threats to public security has permeated Hanoi so thoroughly that it 
frequently is invoked by non-migrant city residents as a way of justifying the discomfort they feel about 
associating with the migrants in their neighborhood.  Thus the trend toward the stigmatization of 
underprivileged migrants has in turn served to deplete the stock of trust between migrants and non-
migrants.  Second, the State’s current priority is to keep the CPV in power and the economy growing—
goals as opposed as can be from launching some radical administrative reforms designed to redress 
widening inequalities at the possible risk of undermining the State’s rule (Hayton, 2010).  One has to grant 
the State the logic of its position, for if its self-perceived mission is to excise any conceivable trend or 
unpleasant fact that could prevent it from building a strong, ideologically coherent, socially integrated 
nation (Taylor, 2004), then maintaining its preexistent institutional structures and currying the favor of 
Vietnam’s permanent and better-off urban residents clearly is a better way of securing social cohesion 
than is eliciting strong resentment from them by taking away their preferential rights for the sake of some 
impoverished migrants.  These are the sociopolitical facts of life that help one to understand, if by no 
means also to defend, the State’s stubborn adherence to the existing residence-based policies.  For the 
sour aspect of the latter seems to be offset by the sweet fact of the rising influence of market forces, and 
never mind that the sourness means the perpetuation of social differentiation and inequitable resource 





 The next section seeks to throw a bit of light on the implications of the study’s findings for 
policymaking.  More specifically, it considers what operational modalities can be proposed that might 
create an environment in which underprivileged migrant families become better integrated into, and less 
stigmatized in, their urban destinations.  It also addresses the need for policymakers to go beyond the 
elimination of the technical barriers presently keeping migrants from reaching their goals.  That would be 
no inconsiderable achievement, but their ultimate goal should be to build a society that encourages its 
inhabitants to share more or less equally in the benefits brought by city life and thereby to develop a 
sense of belonging and of mutual trust.  
  
Policy Implications of the Study  
Given the patient fact that migrants, and especially those falling within the population’s unskilled and 
impoverished sub-groups, are used as a scapegoat so as to divert the public’s attention from the State’s 
failure to manage rapid urbanization and its corollary, social phenomena, the State is likely well aware 
that a mere reinforcement of residence-based policies, via more stringent measures such as the Capital 
Law of 2013, is not a fundamental or long-term solution to the problem.  For it is clear that tightening 
regulations to discourage urbanward in-migration has proved to be largely ineffective in keeping Hanoi’s 
swelling population under control; enhanced regulations have made migrants’ lives in the city more 
difficult, but they have not held migrants back from seeking opportunities by moving out of rural areas.   
 The most basic and yet also far-reaching questions that must be asked at this juncture are these 
two: Will tomorrow’s Vietnam still be a place where urban-dwellers have hugely differential access to  
economic, social, and cultural resources?  What would be a critical starting-point for dismantling 
discriminatory social institutions so as to build a more inclusive and cohesive society, one in which groups 
of urban residents with different sets of resources and needs can nurture mutually accepting and 
supportive relationships?   
 I believe the logical first step is to enhance policy coherence,87 so that all issues pertaining to 
migration become integral aspects of the State’s policies designed to spur economic growth and lift 
people’s standard of living.  It is high time that the government moved beyond its currently piecemeal, ad 
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hoc approach to migration; that mindset could be changed if the government officials could be brought to 
see how a greater degree of integration of the migrant population in the destination areas could, if all the 
potential benefits of migration were facilitated via multi-sectoral policy coordination, lead to poverty 
alleviation and sustainable growth over the long term.  Such a shift of policy direction would have to occur 
on two levels, via (i) a restructuring of institutional mechanisms and tools to enable policy coherence and 
thereby address all issues relating to migration; and (ii) a working with all relevant parties to alter the 
currently negative prevailing perception of migrants and to foster a sense of solidarity among all of the 
residents of all of Vietnam’s major cities.  
 Thus, policymakers must be encouraged to achieve the fullest possible inter-ministerial policy 
coordination, with the newfound consistency between migration policies and other public policies helping 
to uphold the rights of the migrant population.  A top priority should be to erase the current discrepancies 
between the legal prescriptions pertaining to migration and its associated arenas (e.g., education, health, 
housing, labor and employment) and the actual practices that are not in conformity with them and thereby 
place constraints on migrants’ access to resources.  Scarcely less important would be the integration of 
the administrative management of migration, both spontaneous and organized, and the mounting of a 
coordinated effort to create a more cohesive approach to the interventions targeted at migrants in the 
place of destination and at candidate migrants in the place of origin.  Some concrete measures that could 
be put in place include but are not limited to: “decoupling the registration status of citizens from their 
access to services” (UN Viet Nam, 2010a, p. 47); abolishing the de facto practice of excluding non-
permanent residents from communal activities; opening to all residents, both migrant and non-migrant, 
eligibility for government programs targeting the urban poor; reforming the budgeting and planning 
processes at the district, provincial, and national levels so as to ensure that sufficient funds are allocated 
to all residents regardless of their registration status (UN Viet Nam, 2010a); setting up information kiosks 
at both departure and destination points so as to provide migrants, and especially those with limited 
contacts at the place of destination, with information that will help them to orient themselves in the city 
(e.g., finding suitable accommodation and employment opportunities, familiarizing themselves with their 
rights associated with labor and access to social services, gaining the vocational training that is offered to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




unskilled and low-skilled migrants, coping with the financial and other difficulties that migrants often face 
upon their arrival) (Save the Children, U.K., 2006; UN Viet Nam, 2010a); introducing measures designed 
to minimize the impedance of low-income migrant children’s access to formal education by the growing 
informal economy in the education sector (e.g., extra study, monetary gifts, imposition of arbitrary non-
tuition fees and thereby “provid[ing] pathways for [children who were once placed in alternative education] 
to reintegrate into mainstream education” (UNICEF & MOLISA, 2009, p. 57); and capacity development of 
the relevant government agencies and local authorities to put these new measures and initiatives into 
practice.   
It must be stressed, however, that such policy coordination, plus substantive governmental 
interventions, will fail to open up opportunities for migrant residents to become integrated into their urban 
communities unless they are implemented in tandem with awareness-raising campaigns designed to 
show that both migrants and non-migrants are integral to the state’s growth and development.  In other 
words, fostering social cohesion in relation to migration ought to “go beyond anti-discrimination measures” 
(OECD, 2011, p. 24).  And that means, in my view, replacing the current regime’s vision of a cohesive 
society with one that takes into account the citizens’ divergent needs and priorities and their highly 
variable amounts of economic and social capital.  I can only interpret the regime’s reluctance to dismantle 
its residence-based policies centered upon the ho khau system, despite Vietnam’s ever-widening social 
segregation, as revealing the CPV’s determination to build an ideologically coherent, modernized society 
that inevitably favors the insiders (in the context of this study, permanent city residents), while further 
marginalizing and suppressing the resentful voices of those (e.g., migrant residents) whose diverse, non-
homogeneous makeup is in fact, when viewed rightly, precisely what Vietnam needs more of, if it is to 
remain both economically and socially vibrant.  In other words, policymakers seeking to build a cohesive 
society should begin by heeding the perceptions of all relevant parties (OECD, 2011), regardless of their 
differences in terms of residential and economic status, place of origin, ethnicity, affiliation with the 
government or lack thereof, and so forth.  Only thus will they create that a climate conductive to bonding, 
one that fosters a sense of trust and thereby reduces the social exclusion of particular groups.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           




One way to work toward such enhanced social cohesion might be to consider the applicability to 
urban communities of the formation of tinh cam or social sentiment.  As we have seen, tinh cam has long 
served as the mortar, so to speak, binding together the social relationships in Vietnam’s tight-knit village 
communities (Mcelwee, 2007).  Along with the prevailing practice of endogamy and the pervasiveness of 
communal institutions in northern and central Vietnam, as the two other notable sources of strong village 
collectivity (Luong, 2010), the maintenance of congenial relationships with one’s fellow villagers, the vital 
process of nurturing social bonds, trust, and tinh cam, has been found to be an equally vital component in 
both southern and northern Vietnam.  Hickey (1964), in his study of Mekong Delta villages in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, where close neighbors often are treated as kin, pointed up the importance of 
such proximity of residence when it comes to forming social bonds.  Similarly Mcelwee (2007), in her 
study of five different villages in Ha Tinh province, showed how keeping up good relations and feelings of 
tinh cam with their neighbors has served these villagers as an organizing principle, even though their 
village societies are quite socially differentiated; at one point she refers to “a common saying that one 
ought to ‘sell distant kin, and buy close neighbors’” (p. 71).  Thus I would argue that precisely because 
Vietnam is blessed to have a solid historic tradition of fostering cohesive social relations, there is no 
reason why that tradition cannot be invoked at the present time to help heal the wound created by 
modern Vietnam’s vastly, and inequitably, differentiated urban communities.   
If one postulates that children are the building-blocks of a country’s future, school education 
should be expected to play a crucial role in building a more inclusive and cohesive society.  And yet the 
school experiences of some of this study’s migrant children have made it all too clear that the differential 
treatment of migrant students, in both regulatory and monetary terms, has brought them low self-esteem 
and a sense of embarrassment and has thereby adversely affected their interactions with their non-
migrant peers.  Conversely, schools could be turned into life-venues fostering inclusiveness and 
compassion for others of different socioeconomic backgrounds if steps were taken to enable more 
equitable participation of children from marginalized groups in both classroom and extracurricular 
activities and if a learning environment was constructed that helped students to mutually develop “positive 




 Given the massive influence of public discourse in shaping people’s interactions with others as 
well as in stigmatizing certain groups, a combination of elimination of the institutional obstacles presently 
impeding the migrants’ social integration and renovation of the discourse so as to lead the Vietnamese to 
see urbanward migration as a prompter of the state’s growth and integration instead of a detractor from it,  
might help to counteract the social exclusion of underprivileged migrants and allow urban residents to 
incrementally develop more trust of “the other,” regardless of the latter’s place of origin, migratory status, 
or socioeconomic condition. 
 Certainly there is no guarantee that a restructuring of the institutional mechanisms and tools that 
affect migration, even to the extent of demolishing the existing residence-based policies that bind one’s 
residential status and right to access service-delivery, or the ho khau system itself, will in and of itself 
dramatically alter discriminatory perceptions of migrants or boost their upward mobility.  As noted earlier, 
policymaking is not a neutral or one-way process; rather, it is often ideologically nuanced (Shore & Wright, 
1997) and is subject to appropriation, interpretation, and re-interpretation in the process of policy 
formulation and implementation by all of the stakeholders.  This fact reminds us that the future of those 
social relations that affect the dynamics of the wider society is still unknown.  Smith (1998) held that 
“individual perceptions of one another and of social relations continuously develop and change” (p. 53) 
and that “beliefs and ideas about the world, society, individuals and interests” (p. 53) are susceptible to 
testing, adjustments, affirmation, or modification through social interactions.  I for one find highly 
compelling that vision of the interactive and fluctuating nature of culture and society, and I believe we are 
entitled to deduce from it that new policies and a new discourse could jointly work to elicit people’s 
interest in, and renew their perceptions of, how they relate to one another.  Those stimulated interests 
and refreshed perceptions could ultimately create, or at least help to usher in, a society whose members 
are so intent on sharing a sense of belonging both to each other and to their nation that differences with 
respect to migratory status, place of origin, and socioeconomic condition would pale into insignificance.    
 
 
Limitations of the Study 
There are some limitations to this study.  Before elaborating upon those limitations, however, I first will 




 One of the major methodological shortcomings of this study is its focus on just a limited segment 
of the migrant population in Hanoi and thus its small sample size and selection.  As described in Chapter 
II, not only was the number of migrant research participants fairly small at 33; the lack of consistency in 
interviewing both the children and the parents/guardians in a household, as well as the overlap of 
households to which the migrant participants belonged, also resulted in a reduction in the number of 
participating migrant families to 21, in relation to the total number of migrant participants living with their 
families (33).   While the migrant participants who were selected all met the study’s criteria by being 
socioeconomically disadvantaged migrant families with school-age children, they all were working in the 
informal sector, predominantly in small trading.  Thus although the study reflects the overall reality of the 
situation, wherein few opportunities are accessible by unskilled and impoverished migrants, it has failed to 
systematically assess and compare with the different occupations of migrants working in the city.  These 
include domestic helper, bootblack, scavenger, factory worker, and industrial/construction worker.  As 
Dang et al. (2003) rightly pointed out, the components of Vietnam’s migrant population are highly diverse 
and have very different needs and priorities.  Thus the findings of the study will be best understood when 
viewed in the context of how disadvantaged migrant families cope with their day-to-day and educational 
challenges, and how Vietnam’s residence-based policies adversely affect their attempts at resource 
mobilization.  They cannot be well applied to the circumstances of other segments of the migrant 
population.   
Yet another of the study’s failings is that while it did highlight the tendency of longtime migrant 
families to draw apart from their home villages, it never made a concerted effort to assess the degree and 
nature of migrants’ ties with their home villages.  As examples of weakening village ties the study cited 
the infrequency of remittances sent from migrant families to their relatives still living in the villages, their 
few homecoming visits, some families’ losses of land and/or ho khau status in their villages, and their 
preference to get their own rental place in the city in contrast to seasonal migrants who usually migrate 
without their immediate families and typically stay in nha tro with other fellow villagers.  My argument 
would have been strengthened if I had been able to offer a better clarification of, and a more sufficient 
amount of data on, the matter of how the extent of one’s bond with one’s home village can be determined 




homecoming visits per year, proximity of fellow villagers in the city, frequency of their meetings with fellow 
villagers in the city, possession of land properties in the village) but also in descriptive terms (e.g., 
recourse to financial, material, and/or moral support from their relatives and other fellow villagers, prior to 
and after migration to the city; types of responsibilities involved, and sense of obligation to repay a person 
who did one a favor).      
 The third of the study’s weaknesses that must be pointed to pertains to its assertion that migrants 
need to be construed as playing an important part in the development of the city and the country, as 
opposed to coolly dismissed as “the disorderly poor” (Hayton, 2010, p. 48) or “social burdens.”  That 
argument would have been more convincing had it been backed up by quantitative data corroborating 
migrants’ contribution to the state’s economic growth.  
 In addition to methodological weaknesses, the study has a topical limitation.  I refer to its 
inadequate explication of the increasingly diversified concept of “village” and, more broadly, the social 
changes occurring in northern Vietnam.  As a way of underscoring the characteristically strong collectivity 
and profound sense of trust that pervade the village-based networks of migrants hailing originally from the 
northern provinces, the study pointed to the historical pattern there of structuring social relations in 
relation to communal approaches to land and village rituals and to the lingering but real influence of 
endogamy and tinh cam or social sentiment.  There is an emerging awareness among some scholars, 
however, that Vietnam’s rural villages have shifted away from being socially autonomous administrative 
units, imbued with a sense of moral and spiritual communality, as traditionally they have been 
conceptualized by those specializing in village studies, to being mere territorial congregations of people 
(Nguyen, personal communication, September 23, 2013).  In other words, this new perception of rural 
villages raises questions about the validity of the village as a unit of analysis.  Moreover, just as more and 
more economic, social, and cultural changes are taking place in the city via the marketization process, so 
too villages are undergoing transformations.  Shibuya (2000) suggested that the increasingly important 
role of the family as a basic social unit, as indicated by its rising economic responsibilities, has, ever since 
the doi moi reforms were launched, been correlated with a weakening of the nation’s socialist-oriented 
social foundations.  The glimpse I gained through my interviews with some of the migrant participants of 




endogamy continues in many northern villages, those who have migrated most frequently, for an 
extensive period of time and from a young age, are more likely to meet someone outside of her/his village 
and to marry her/him.  Some migrants also attested verbally to a declining value placed on endogamy 
among the members of the younger generations in their villages.  For instance, the 32-year-old mother of 
two sons from Hung Yen said, “As I grew up, my parents would often tell me and my siblings that we 
should marry someone from the same village.  All four of us got married to people from the same village 
eventually, but I would say that our generation doesn’t care as much about that as our parents’ 
generation did.  It’s very much up to our children to decide.”  Another 25-year-old new mother of a baby 
boy, also from Hung Yen, got married to a man from Bac Giang province after she was introduced to him 
by her brother-in-law, a coworker of his.  After engaging in a series of short-term seasonal migrations as a 
street-seller during her primary school years, she migrated to Hanoi semi-permanently.  She told me that 
marrying someone outside of her village and province has been like exposing herself to a foreign culture.  
“One of the things I love about my husband’s village is that people are open and accommodating.  They 
frequently invite their neighbors to share meals or drinks.  In my village, we don’t get that a lot.  It doesn’t 
mean that my village people are mean or anything, but it’s a bit more closed and people gossip about 
each other all the time.”  She added that not only was the level of education attained by her husband’s 
fellow villagers higher, but there also was more wage labor to be found, outside of farming, than there 
was in her native village.  There only a handful of people went to upper secondary school, whereas in her 
husband’s village more than 80 percent of lower secondary students move up to upper secondary school.  
Then, too, because of the relatively high industrial level of the village and its vicinity, members of the 
younger generation—those born after the late 1980s—as well as some of the oldsters are inclined to stay 
in the village instead of migrating to Hanoi.  In the case of her husband’s immediate family, his father and 
younger brother are working for the local television network and his older brother as an engineer, while 
his mother is a retired accountant.  Her remarks suggested that there are varying degrees of both 
industrialization and openness among the northern villages.  To sum up the third of this study’s failings: A  
more extensive examination of the social changes taking place in some of Vietnam’s northern villages, in 




ongoing societal transformation and the extent of solidarity among the village-based networks of migrants 
in the city.  
                   
 
Areas for Future Research 
There are several areas pertinent to this study that would benefit from further research in the future.  First, 
a systematic comparison of parents who migrated accompanied by their children and those who chose to 
leave their children behind in the countryside would do much to help us understand the particular 
socioeconomic and cultural conditions that prompted the two different choices, as well as the needs and 
priorities that these two different groups of migrant parents share and do not share.  As briefly noted 
earlier, children who did not follow their parents to the city normally are under the tutelage of their 
grandparents on their father’s side during their parents’ absence.  An oft-made assumption is that migrant 
parents who bring their children along are from a more underprivileged group in the home village.  As for 
actual reasons given by the migrant parent participants in this study who moved to Hanoi together with 
their children, they included a lack of guardians who could take care of their children due to weakened 
physical condition, an estranged relationship with their parents as a result of elopement or common-law 
marriage, and non-possession or loss of land in the native village.  In some cases children are considered 
to be part of the family workforce and work on the street with or without the supervision of their parents.  
By contrast some migrants, though very limited in number in this study, those who moved to the city 
without their children, emphasize that leaving their children behind in the countryside helps them to stay in 
school and thus to have a better future; others said they would have loved to bring their children to the 
city to live with them, but their income was not sufficient to cover all the school fees incurred by attending 
mainstream schools there.88  Little is known to date, however, as to how children who migrated with their 
parents, and those who were left behind, fare with their school educations and with their long-term 
outcomes.  Further investigation of such questions might tell us much about how family migration affects 
children’s educational futures, and thereby help us to fashion policies and interventions better tailored to 
each migrant group’s needs and priorities.   
                                                          
88 According to the 2004 VMS (as cited in UN Viet Nam, 2010a), approximately one in five migrants responded that 




Second, it would be invaluable to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of inequality seen 
across a wider historical context, and their implications for migrants’ attempts to cope with inequitable 
resource allocations in the post-doi moi period.  In his careful study of the challenges confronting the 
Vietnamese state in this era of yawning inequalities, Taylor (2004) contended that the hierarchical modes 
of authority favored by the CPV have been profoundly affected by the structural inequalities imposed via 
France’s (indirect) colonial rule.  Just as the colonial government reigned over its colonial population by 
way of local institutions premised on social hierarchies (e.g., the royalty, the mandarinate, the council of 
elders at the village level), so too the post-colonial socialist state exerts its sway over Vietnam’s citizens 
by promoting a paternalistic structure of political authority.  Taylor reasoned that such an ironic colonial 
legacy, a virtual reprise of the earlier governing mechanism, must stem from the fact that many of the 
revolutionaries and leaders of the anti-colonial movement who laid the foundations of the current CPV-led 
State (among them being Ho Chi Minh) “came from collaborating mandarin families or had trained in 
schools set up for colonial era civil servants” (Taylor, 2004, p. 21).  Thus, enhancing our historical 
understanding of previous times spanning from the pre-colonial to the pre-doi moi periods could help us to 
build on Taylor’s work by tracing some specific impacts on differential resource distribution back to the 
lingering colonial social influence, with all of it deepening our knowledge of the structural dynamics of the 
various inequalities, especially those related to people’s access to school education prior to marketization.   
Third and last, obtaining a wider view of how various different NGOs with varying missions, 
objectives, programs, and activities are helping to ameliorate the living conditions of socioeconomically 
challenged migrant families is essential, given their growing presence as social-service providers, 
especially to those migrants lacking access to formal sources of help.  While my field observations 
identified several NGOs operating in the Thanh Ninh area, and while some of the migrant participants 
were receiving assistance from more than one NGO, my interviews with both NGO workers and migrant 
recipients of their support confirmed my impression that these NGOs fail to work together even when 
some of their activities happen to overlap.  Thus a more rigorous investigation of how NGOs having very 
varied organizational and project goals, project spans, targeted populations, and budgets are providing 




migrant recipients, might help officials to coordinate their efforts and thereby upgrade migrants’ standards 
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Appendix A: Research Methodology 
 
This appendix delineates the process whereby the research was designed and implemented, and points 
up the methodological limitations of the study.   
 
Identifying Research Participants 
Research Sample 
The research sample of this study is comprised of the following: migrant children and their parents and 
guardians; their non-migrant neighbors; and individuals who have had direct interactions with the migrant 
families via governmental and/or non-governmental interventions.  The last group included 
schoolteachers, aid workers, and local and government personnel working in the areas of migration, child 
education, and urban poverty.  As spoken about in greater detail in Chapter III, the definition of 
“migrants,” found in Vietnam’s censuses, limits itself to those who moved from one district to another in 
the five years before the survey was conducted.  That definition therefore leaves out both long-term 
migrants who migrated more than five years prior to the survey and seasonal migrants who come and go 
within a short timeframe, and above all those who reside in the city without obtaining temporary permits 
(i.e., unregistered migrants), regardless of duration of stay.  In this study, however, migrants are defined 
as those who reside in their current place of residence without gaining permanent-resident registration, 
regardless of their possession of temporary permits or length of stay.  
The study’s participants consisted of 16 children (3 boys and 13 girls) aged between 8 and 18 
years old,89 and 18 parents and guardians (4 men and 14 women) aged between 32 and 66 years old.  
Thirteen out of 16 child participants were recruited in the charity class.  Two girls out of the 16 children 
were not receiving formal or non-formal education class at the time of the interview.  Prior to their 
migration to Hanoi, both of these girls had attended school in the provinces where they were born; after 
their migration, they were working full-time as street-sellers.  One girl was attending a state primary 
school, but not the charity class.  All of the migrant participants belong to the Kinh ethnic group, with the 
exception of one female student who is Tay.  All of the migrant participants originated from provinces in 
northern Vietnam, among them being Bac Giang, Hai Duong, Hung Yen, Lang Son, Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, 
Thai Binh, and Thanh Hoa, except one participant who was born in Hanoi but later lost her permanent-




non-seasonal migrants (i.e., those intending to stay in the city for an indefinite period) residing in the city 
with their families, except for one seasonal female migrant who comes to work in the city without her 
family only for short periods of time (two weeks to a month) during the slack seasons on the farm.90  All of 
the migrant participants were residing in the Thanh Ninh area at the time of the interviews.  Except for the 
seasonal migrant who was renting a room in a nha tro along with three other women from the same 
village, all the other migrant participants were living in self-contained housing units with their families.  
Eight migrant families out of the 21 whose members I interviewed were living in their own property: 6 
families in the brown village and 2 families in other parts of the Thanh Ninh area.  Thirteen migrant 
families were residing in a rental property.     
In addition, 6 non-migrant neighbors, all of them women and all holders of permanent residency 
in their current place of residence, were interviewed; within this group were the manager of a neighboring 
wholesale market, a resident landlord of nha tro, the owner of a small grocery shop, a woman working for 
the People’s Committee in one of the wards of the Thanh Ninh area, a college student, and a woman who 
recently obtained permanent residency in the Thanh Ninh area after her husband purchased a piece of 
land and built a new house on it.  All of the non-migrant neighbors interviewed were living in their own 
property.  
Aside from the abovementioned participants, 24 individuals (13 women and 11 men) who 
previously had been or currently are working within the education or social-service sectors were 
interviewed.  Among these were school personnel and NGO staff members involved in the charity class, 
local social workers working with the poor, staff members working at international NGOs sponsoring 
programs designed to improve education and sustain the livelihood of underprivileged children in Vietnam, 
and government personnel at the provincial and ministerial levels who are concerned with education and 
labor issues pertaining to migrants and disadvantaged children.  Three of the aid workers were foreign 
nationals (two American and one British) while the rest of the individuals were Vietnamese. While all 21 of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
89 In this study, when referring to a person’s age I will follow the Vietnamese tradition of counting age from the first 
day of the year in which the person was born, with that year being numbered one.  Thus a child with the age of eight 
in Western terms will be identified as a nine-year-old child.   
 
90 While the target group of the study was migrant families intending to stay in Hanoi over the longer term, this one 




the Vietnamese interviewees had permanent residency in Hanoi, none of them was a resident of the 
Thanh Ninh area and thus I have not counted them as neighbors of the migrant participants.  
 
Sampling Strategy  
The study employed as its main sampling strategy a combination of purposive sampling and convenience 
sampling.  I began by locating socioeconomically disadvantaged and migrant residents of the Thanh Ninh 
area,91 considered one of the most heavily migrant-concentrated areas within the central part of Hanoi.  In 
order to better understand how migrants’ lives have changed since their relocation to Hanoi from their 
places of origin, I selected families who had chosen to migrate for a longer period—that is, semi-
permanently or permanently, as opposed to just seasonally.  While several “repeaters” among the 
participants previously had migrated to Hanoi with or without children, all the participating migrant families 
had left their places of origin intending to settle in Hanoi for an indefinite period of time.  
It also must be noted that research participants occasionally were recruited on the spot in the 
Thanh Ninh area, after I had learned from informal conversations that they were rural migrants who had 
come to work in Hanoi with their families.  All these individuals who agreed to participate were either 
migrant adults living with their school-age children or migrant children residing with their parents and/or 
guardians in the Thanh Ninh area.    
In addition to the purposive and convenience sampling, snowball sampling was used in order to 
identify people engaged in the education and social-service sectors.  Particular emphasis was placed on 
finding and interviewing those people who have had direct interactions with migrant children and families 




The primary research methods employed in this project were participant observation and non-structured 
and semi-structured interviews, but these methods were combined, in a complementary manner, with 
such methods as informal conversation, life history interview, and documentary research.   
 
Participant Observation  
Participant observation was conducted throughout the field research process in a variety of settings: 




homes and to the streets where some participants work; and activities organized by the NGO for the 
charity-class students and their teachers.  The aim of participant observation was to observe and 
experience social encounters and activities within natural settings so that I, as the researcher, could 
better understand the norms and values embedded within everyday interactions and activities. 
During my visits to the charity class I would observe and often participate in the activities that the 
students were engaged in.  Since the time I spent in the class was restricted to recess, I would sometimes 
join them in playing games.  In so doing I would pay close attention to who participated in which kind of 
activity, and to the manner of interaction among the students themselves and between the students and 
the teacher.  During the first month of my visits to the class I focused on becoming a familiar face to the 
students and having informal conversations with them.  Gradually, however, as we were playing games, 
children began to ask me questions about my family, what had brought me to Vietnam, why I was 
studying in the United States, how to write their names in Japanese, and so on.   
 Visiting participants’ homes also formed an important part of my fieldwork.  Initially, Huyen and I 
started to visit a handful of migrant families residing in the Thanh Ninh area.  In search of potential 
research participants, we gladly chatted with the migrant street workers who approached us as we 
roamed around the Hang Dau lake area.  My preliminary research indicated that many of the street-
sellers working there resided in the Thanh Ninh area, which is about two kilometers from the city center 
where the lake is located.  Thus soon we found ourselves spending even more time in the Hang Dau area, 
getting to know them better and learning about their daily lives as street-sellers.  As we would spend more 
time with them they would invite us to come to their homes, so that we could see firsthand how they were 
living.   
Later on, we had a great number of opportunities to visit the households of families living in the 
Thanh Ninh area, especially those of the charity-class students.  On our visits to participants’ homes I 
would pay close attention not only to their living conditions but also to the family dynamic within each 
household.  While chatting with and interviewing parents/guardians I would observe the ways in which the 
children behaved around their parents/guardians and other household members, who sometimes were 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




present, such as their siblings, grandparents, uncles, and aunts.  In addition I would look, as closely as 
politeness allowed, at how personal and social spaces were organized within a home.   
While most of my fieldwork revolved around my meetings with the charity-class children during 
the class breaks92 and my after-class visits to their homes to meet their parents and/or guardians, Huyen 
and I also were invited to participate in various activities organized by the NGO for the students.  These 
included health checkups and gift-giving at the end of the school year and the graduation ceremony.  We 
also had the opportunity to join an evaluation exercise held at the end of the school year, in which the 
class teachers and the NGO staff members discussed ongoing and emerging issues related to their class 
activities and to the students’ learning situations. 
In addition to the observations in school and home settings, Huyen and I also, as noted in 
passing a moment ago, spent a fair amount of time on the streets where some of the participants were 
working.  (When the participants said that they were “working on the street” that generally meant street-
selling, but in some cases it entailed begging.)  This observational exercise helped me to see if the 
participants’ patterns of behavior varied across different situational contexts and various social attributes 
such as gender, age, kinship, and socioeconomic status.  Spending time with working children outside of 
their homes as well as in the classroom also allowed me to observe and compare their modes of 
communication and their mannerisms when they were with their families, their peer groups, and 
surrounding adults in their workspaces.  
In summary, observations of the multiple places where the participants engaged in their daily 
activities, aside from classroom settings, gave me some idea of how the children behaved in various 
social settings and also depending upon whom they were with—be it their classmates, other working 
children, siblings, parents, guardians, relatives, or neighbors.  It is worth noting in this connection that our 
inability to spend almost any time observing actual classes turned out to be a blessing in disguise, for our 
exclusion from that one space granted us admittance to that wider social context in which the participants 
lead their daily lives and build their relationships with others.   
 
                                                          
92 One of the conditions of my being granted access to the charity class was that my observations be limited to the 




Interviews with Research Participants 
Upon the conclusion of this study’s initial phase of field immersion and observation, I developed an 
interview guide containing a set of questions, some structured and others more open-ended, for use 
during my interviews with children and their parents or guardians.93  The structured questions were 
intended to draw out children’s and their family’s demographic and other information which would identify 
who they were (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, place of origin, years of schooling/non-schooling, familial 
background in light of their socioeconomic status, familial composition, occupational structure of the 
family).  Open-ended questions, on the other hand, were set out in order to discover the following: 
children’s educational circumstances; children’s and parents’/guardians’ attitudes toward the education 
the children have access to, and what it might mean for the children’s future; their immediate concerns, 
interests, and needs; the children’s, and their family’s, daily routines, and the children’s activities and 
responsibilities inside and outside of the house; benefits and challenges the children and 
parents/guardians see in juggling their activities and responsibilities inside and outside of the house; 
support system in time of need (financial or otherwise); access to public and private social-service 
providers; groups of people they associate themselves with in their daily lives, and their ways of 
interaction.   
In addition migrant participants were asked about: their migration history; their reasons for 
migration and their household status; any changes they have experienced in their daily lives and their 
relationships with their families, kin, peer groups, and neighbors, and the visions of the future they have 
had since migrating to Hanoi.  Whenever possible, both children and their respective parents/guardians 
were interviewed.  This interview strategy helped me to see if their (children’s and parents’/guardians’) 
answers to the same questions overlapped or differed, and to seek further for causes of the discrepancies, 
if there were any.  As my understanding of the situations of the participants and their families grew, some 
questions were revised to draw out the solicited information more effectively, while new and 
supplementary questions were added to aid further investigation of the issue concerned.   
                                                          
93 The interview guide is Appendix B of this dissertation.  It was used in a reasonably consistent manner at all of the 
semi-structured interviews with the migrant research participants.  I say “reasonably consistent” for at times, in 
keeping with the flow of the interview, the sequencing of the topics and their associated questions were flexibly 




In my interviews with aid workers, government officials, and schoolteachers who have had 
interactions with migrant children, including those individuals involved in the charity class, emphasis was 
placed on gathering information about existing services and interventions targeted to migrant children and 
their families and about their experiences in, and perspectives on, such service provisions and 
interventions.  The collected data then were compared and analyzed to see how those individuals’ views 
and attitudes toward the lives of migrant children and families overlapped and/or differed.  In addition, the 
solicited information was used to identify any factors tending to hamper their efforts to upgrade the 
livelihoods of migrant children and families.  
The interviews took place at various locations, depending on the convenience of the participants: 
at the participant’s home, on the street, in a classroom or an office.  In the case of aid workers and 
government officials, the interviews typically took place in their offices.  Interviews with the charity-class 
teachers and NGO staff members working with the charity class were held in the classroom or at a nearby 
café.  I usually set up an appointment with the aid workers and government officials in advance.  I also 
offered, verbally or in writing at some point prior to our meeting, a brief self-introduction, description of my 
research, and statement of the purpose of the forthcoming interview.   
 Interviews with students attending the charity class were conducted in the classroom, on the 
street, or in their house.  Due to the brief amount of time typically available to us (on average, 15-20 
minutes per visit), we often would conduct an interview across several separate sessions.  At times 
interviewing students during the class break was not easy, given that some students would be running 
around  playing games while others were falling asleep.  In order to mitigate the disadvantage of 
interviewing during the recess, we asked some students who were willing to participate in the study if we 
could interview them when the class was over.  When they were not available immediately after the class 
but agreed to meet us elsewhere, we would make an arrangement to meet them at a particular time and 
place which usually was within walking distance of where they lived or worked.  Moreover, in order to 
make our child participants feel more at ease, my interpreter and I strove to create a less intimidating and 
more inviting environment for them.  We did this by, wherever possible and appropriate: sharing drinks or 
meals with them; doing a bit of chatting before moving on to the interview; interviewing several children at 




In the course of identifying and recruiting children who were willing to participate in the study, I 
would explain upfront to them—and also to their parents and guardians, if they were present at the time 
we were visiting their homes or working alongside their children—what issues were being explored and 
how the study was to be done.  I also would assure the children and their parents/guardians, prior to 
obtaining their informed consent, that they had the right to say “no.”  Throughout the research process I 
would stress that I wanted to learn from them, and that there was no right or wrong answer to any 
question I would ask. 
Most of the parents and guardians we interviewed for the study were introduced to us by their 
children whom we had met in the charity class or on the street.  During our class visits Huyen and I would 
ask various students if we could come by their house to meet their parents and guardians to learn about 
their families’ lives.  Some students were willing to take us to their home with them when the class was 
over.  Although normally we would visit the parents and other family members without having made any 
appointment, they would kindly invite us in and agree to participate in the study.  In the case of the 
parents and guardians who work on the street, typically we would have informal conversations with them 
first, then ask about their willingness to participate in the study and their availability for an interview on the 
spot; occasionally, I scheduled an appointment for a different date and time, agreed upon by them.   
When we tried to interview people without personal referrals, as through introductions from 
children, NGO workers, or schoolteachers, we first would approach them by making small talk and asking 
noncommittal questions so that we would not scare them away.  For instance, if they were street-vendors 
we would ask what they were selling and how their business was going these days.  Only after having 
such interactions did we explain what we were doing and ask if they could share with us their views and 
experiences.  Catching the attention of some people, especially those working on the street, was not easy.  
Even when we were in the middle of our conversation or interview they would, understandably, seize any 
presented opportunity to sell their things to passersby.  If they caught a glimpse of the police they would 
run away at once, so that they would not get their products taken away and be charged high penalties for 
street-vending. 
A flexible approach was taken to recording the interviews with participants.  In the case of aid 




up-front for their permission to audio-record the interview.  I would add that if audio-taping caused her/him 
discomfort at any time during the interview, recording would immediately be stopped and the interview 
would be discontinued altogether.  I also would tell them that any portion of the audio-taping could be 
deleted at her/his request at any time.  Occasionally participants looked a bit nervous at the outset of the 
interview, speaking in a low tone and carefully choosing their words; as the interview went on they would 
speak more spontaneously and volubly, and most of them told me that they had even forgotten about the 
recording by the time we finished the interview.  None of the participants whose interviews were tape-
recorded asked to discontinue recording at any point.  My interviews with the migrant participants, on the 
other hand, were not tape-recorded, in order to minimize the risk of arousing their wariness or inviting 
unnecessary attention from onlookers on the street.   
With respect to the semi-structured interviews, several interviewing methods were used in a 
supplementary manner so as to gain a better understanding of the situation of migrant children and their 
families.  These methods included life-history interviewing and “daily routine” questioning, whereby the 
interviewer asks respondents to describe a typical day (Spradley, 1979).  
After each interview, Huyen and I reviewed it and discussed all issues and questions that had 
emerged from it.  Based on my notes and Huyen’s translations of the interview, I would ask her about 
participants’ remarks that I did not quite understand or that had prompted my interest.  She would then fill 
in the gaps in my understanding.  These post-interview meetings helped me tremendously, not only to 
heighten the clarity of the data collected from each interview but also to better achieve a more nuanced, 
contextualized view of the participants’ attitudes as those emerged from their remarks and behaviors.   
Furthermore, our meetings were used to exchange our views on how each interview had gone 
and to identify areas that needed to be worked on or followed up on in the forthcoming interviews.  The 
information collected from the interviews with the migrant participants was triangulated with the data 
drawn from the interviews with aid workers, schoolteachers, and local authorities, and vice versa, as well 
as with existing research studies, reports, and news articles on such issues as urban poverty, migration, 
family, and education in Vietnam.  In some cases the children were secretive about their backgrounds in 
the beginning, and would make things up to disguise their age or familial background.  While Huyen and I 




truthful whenever they asked what we were doing and what we would like to learn from them.  As they 
saw us keep coming back to where they were working, studying, playing or just hanging out, those 
children who initially were closed gradually opened up, becoming more willing to talk to us.  Moreover, the 
efforts we made to come and see the participants on a regular basis paid off, for the visits not only helped 
us to build rapport with them by having follow-up meetings, conversations, and interviews, but also made 
me more conscious of any misunderstandings that might have occurred in the course of sharing each 
other’s intentions and ideas; that consciousness might, or might not, have surfaced in our initial 
encounters and/or interviews with them.  In short, the ongoing process of checking and comparing 
different sources of data helped me to see where the commonalities and discrepancies were, and to 
decide whether those served to corroborate or disprove my interpretations and findings.  
Throughout the study, pseudonyms are used for my research site, the names of the participants 
and the individuals with whom they are associated, their affiliated organizations and/or schools, and any 
and all other identifying characters.  Because of the personal nature of the information obtained about 
and from participants, it was imperative to disguise their identities and respect their confidentiality. 
 
Documentary Research 
Documentary information was collected from a broad range of sources: government and NGO 
publications and reports; census data; conference proceedings and academic publications pertaining to 
migration, child and urban poverty, and education issues in Vietnam; NGO project documents on the 
charity class; newspaper and magazine articles; video clips; and email correspondence with contact 
persons involved in the sectors relevant to the study.  The documentary research served two primary 
purposes: to outline the current state of, and changing circumstances surrounding, the livelihood and 
educational environment of impoverished migrants living in Hanoi; and to examine how the urban poor 
and migrants are portrayed in various media. 
 
Analyzing, Interpreting, and Synthesizing the Collected Data  
Analysis, interpretation, and synthesis of the collected data occurred in three steps. The first step was to 
draw out, from my ethnographies, observational and descriptive notes encapsulating the many 
impressions that had struck me during my fieldwork (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008).  After the notes had 




tentative categories; these included social segregation and distrust among migrant and non-migrant 
residents; social collectivity among migrants of the same place of origin; coping mechanisms and 
strategies employed by the migrant families, and discrepancies between policy and practice in the 
spheres of migration and schooling.  Second, the dataset of each category was reclassified according to 
the three types of resources, economic, social, and cultural, that appear to operate as a mutually 
interactive organizing principle, structuring the everyday lives of migrant families.  Using a conceptual 
framework predicated on the premise that patterns of resource access and mobilization shape the 
processes of social change, an analysis was made of how each type of resource has been accessed and 
used by migrant families and what opportunities and obstacles they have encountered in the context of 
post-doi moi Vietnamese society.  Third, the findings on each resource were synthesized so as to 
illuminate the continuities and changes that cut across the patterns of migrants’ resource mobilization and 
to reveal how such patterns have been impacted by larger institutional and cultural dynamics.   
 
Methodological Limitations 
Three major methodological limitations that are specific to this study need to be addressed in closing: its 
small sample size, its sample selection, and its unequal gender ratio of participants.   
First and foremost, the sample size of the study was fairly small: 64 participants in total, of 
whom 33 were the main target population of the study: non-seasonal migrant children of school age and 
their parents/guardians residing in the Thanh Ninh area with their families.  The challenge of gaining 
access to educational institutions, combined with the general cautiousness vis-à-vis “outsiders” that one 
tends to encounter in northern Vietnam, was overcome via the participants’ willingness to cooperate with 
us on the research project, as well as by the researcher’s, and the research assistant’s, efforts to get 
close to the target group/institution and build rapport with them.  Still, a larger number of participants 
drawn from the target group could have afforded the reader more insights into the social worlds of the 
population concerned.   
Secondly, and related to the first limitation, there is the sample selection.  As noted earlier, most 
off the child participants, 13 out of the 16 children, were recruited in the charity class.  While the 
association I had with the charity class facilitated my access to the families whose children were attending 




charity class.  These individuals would have included families and their children who did not attend the 
charity class but instead received some other types of informal or formal schooling, as well as children 
who did not attend any type of school.  Such a selection of participants might have enabled me, for 
instance, to investigate any differences that might have been discovered between the children attending 
the charity class and those not attending in terms of their educational challenges, familial backgrounds, 
and relationships with families, peers, teachers, and neighbors.   
Another limitation in relation to the sample selection has to do with the level of consistency in 
interviewing migrant participants who share the same family household.  Given the nature of this study it 
was necessary to gain the broadest possible view of the livelihoods of migrant families, and thus both 
migrant children and their parents/guardians were interviewed to solicit their perspectives.  And yet the 
lack of consistency in sometimes, and sometimes not, interviewing both children and parents/guardians 
from the same family household, as well as the overlap of the households to which various migrant 
participants belonged, resulted in the reduction to 21 of the number of migrant families, when the total 
number of migrant participants living with their families was 33.  The ultimate objective of qualitative 
research is not to generalize about the social phenomenon in question, backed up by a representative 
sample; rather, it is to facilitate the transfer of useful, in-depth, context-specific research to other social 
settings (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008).  Thus both a larger and more selective sample of migrant children 
and families, beyond the bounds of the charity class, as well as a higher level of consistency in 
interviewing the family households, could have more compellingly underscored the usefulness of the 
research findings and their possible applicability to the contexts of other migrant-concentrated, low-
income areas in the cities of transitional societies. 
The third methodological limitation of this study lies in the gender imbalance of its participants. 
Among the 64 participants, 43 were women (67 percent) and 21 were men (33 percent).  This imbalanced 
gender composition was most pronounced for non-migrant neighbors, because all 6 of the people 
interviewed were women, followed by migrant participants, of whom 24 were female (71 percent) and only 
10 were male (29 percent).  With respect to parents and guardians, it often was the case that mothers 
and female guardians were more available at feasible interview times.  The interviews often took place at 




late at night.  Moreover, there was a high ratio of female-headed households.94  Among the 21 family 
households that the participating parents and guardians represented, 8 women (38 percent) responded 
that they were the heads of their households.  These individuals included 5 widows (two of whom were 
grandmothers living with their grandchildren as guardians), 2 divorcees, and 1 woman whose husband 
has been reported missing.  This high proportion of woman-headed households may indicate that woman-
headed households are more susceptible to poverty.  Nevertheless, a more conscious recruitment and 
representation of male participants, in particular boys and male parents/guardians, would have helped us 
to understand the role played by gender in forming the dynamics of social relationships and support 





                                                          
94 In this study, household heads are defined as individuals who house their children and/or grandchildren and who 
are in charge of feeding and rearing them in their current place of residence (i.e., in Hanoi).  Among the eight female-
headed households seven were single-parent/grandparent households, while one female household head was 
residing there with her male partner, who was the father of one of her children, along with her two other children from 




Appendix B: Interview Guide for Migrant Children, Parents, and Guardians 
 
 
Basic Questions for Children, Parents, and Guardians 
・ Age: (Year, Date)    
・ Places of origin: Where were you born? Where did you grow up?  
・ Household registration (ho khau) status: Where is your ho khau registered? What is your residential 
status in Hanoi (e.g., temporary resident, unregistered)? 
・ Living arrangement: Where in Hanoi do you live at the moment? If you have lived in different places in 
Hanoi, where did you live previously? 
・ Household structure: Whom do you live with? Who is the head of the household? What does the 
head of the household do? 
・ Family structure: Tell us about your family structure: parents, grandparents, siblings (who attend 
which school), their ages and places of residence. 
・ Occupation of parents/guardians: What do your parents/guardians do? (Multiple answers possible; If 
parents/guardians are present at time of interview, ask them directly.) 
・ Level of schooling attained by parents/guardians: What is the highest level of schooling your 
parents/guardians have attained? (If parents/guardians are present at time of interview, ask them 
directly.)  
 
In-Depth Questions for Children  
Education 
・ Are you currently receiving any form of education?  
・ If no, have you dropped out of school, or have you never received any form of education?  
 
If yes: 
・ What type of school are you attending (e.g., state school, charity class, evening class)?  
・ Who pays your school/education-related fees?  
・ Who in your household makes the decision as to whether you should go to school/which school you 
should go to?  
・ What do your parents/guardians say about school? 
・ What do you like about school? What do you not like about school?  
・ How do you think the knowledge you have gained at school/charity classes helps your current life? 
・ How do you think schooling could help your future life?   
 
If no and dropped-out: 
・ Where did you study previously (e.g., state school, charity class, evening class)?    
・ Who paid your school/education-related fees?  
・ Who in your household made the decision as to whether you should go to school/which school you 
should go to?  
・ When did you stop going to school? What grade were you in when you last attended school? 
・ Why did you leave school? 
・ Do you wish to return to school? Why?    
・ What do your parents/guardians say about school? 
・ What did you like about school? What did you not like about school?  
・ What did your parents say about school?  
・ How do you think the knowledge you gained at school helps your current life?  
・ How do you think schooling could help your future life?  
・ Considering your experience, what do you think can or needs to be done, to help children like you 
stay in school?  
 
Peers  




migrant children, friends from school)?  
・ What do you play?  
・ What kinds of issues/problems do you talk about with your friends? 
・ What kinds of issues/problems do you talk about with your parents/guardians?   
 
Work and Household Chores  
・ What kind of work do you do outside of the house? (Multiple answers possible)  
・ Where do you work outside of the house?  
・ How much do you make per day?  
・ What do you do with the money you earn? 
・ For how long have you been working outside of the house?  
・ Why do you work outside of the house?  
・ How did you choose the work you do outside of the house?  
・ What kind of work do you do at home? (Multiple answers possible)  
・ What do you like and dislike about your work outside of the house and at home?  
・ Have you experienced any difficulty balancing your work and your schooling? If yes, what kinds of 
difficulty have you encountered?  
 
Leisure 
・ What do you do during your leisure time? 
・ Where do you hang out?   
 
Typical Day  
・ Can you describe your typical day? Any difference between weekdays and weekend?  
 
Life of Migration / Life-Changes  
・ Migration history: When did you first emigrate from your place of origin? If you have migrated to more 
than one place, where did you live before coming to Hanoi?    
・ Migration pattern: daily, circular, seasonal, or year-round migration?  
・ Status of household registration: ho khau? (If the child does not know, ask her/his parents or 
guardian.) 
・ How often do you go back to your place of origin? 
・ How has your life changed since you migrated to Hanoi?  
・ Would you like to continue to live in Hanoi, return to your place of origin, or move to other places? 
Why?  
・ How do you identify yourself (người ở đâu)? 
 
Social Network and Support System: Availability and Accessibility  
・ What are your immediate concerns and/or needs?  
・ What kinds of problems/issues do you have?  
・ If you have problems or need help, who do you talk to: friends, family members, relatives, neighbors, 
NGO officials, and other children’s welfare/service-providers, local authorities? (Multiple answers 
possible.)  
・ When in trouble, how do you help each other?  
・ Have you ever been caught by the police? If yes, what happened exactly?  
・ Have you experienced being discriminated against or felt discrimination coming at you from 
community members, neighbors, schoolteachers, friends, classmates, etc.? If yes, can you tell us 
about your experience or your feeling?  
・ Have you ever accessed any social services and activities offered by local authorities and mass 
organizations? If yes, can you tell us about your experience? If no, why?  
 
Support from Children’s Welfare and Other Service-Providers 
・ Do you know of any children’s welfare or other service-providers?  




・ How did you find out about their services?  
・ What type of support (e.g., educational, health, nutritional, vocational) do you seek?  
・ On what occasions, and how frequently, do you seek support from the children’s welfare and other 
service-providers?  
・ How well are you satisfied with their support? Why?  
 
Future Aspirations and Long-Term Goals 
・ What are your long-term educational and career goals? (For younger-aged children: What do you 
want to be in the future?) Why?  
 
 
In-Depth Questions for Parents and Guardians 
Life of Migration / Life-Changes  
・ Migration history: When did you first emigrate from your place of origin? If you have migrated to more 
than one place, where did you live before coming to Hanoi?    
・ Migration pattern: daily, circular, seasonal, or year-round migration?  
・ Status of household registration: ho khau? 
・ Why did you decide to migrate to Hanoi? 
・ Who made the decision to migrate to Hanoi?  
・ When did you first migrate to Hanoi with your child(ren)? Why? 
・ How often do you go back to your place of origin? 
・ How has your and your family’s life changed since you migrated to Hanoi? 
・ Would you like to continue to live in Hanoi, return to your place of origin, or move to other places? 
Why?  
・ How do you identify yourself (người ở đâu)? 
・ What have you done with your land/house in the countryside (e.g., sold it, kept as it is, left it to be 




・ Is your child currently receiving any form of education (e.g., state school, charity class)? If you have 
more than one child and not all of them are attending school, which children of yours are attending 
school? Why? What type of school are they attending? (e.g., state school, charity class, evening 
class)? Why?  
・ Did your child receive any form of education (e.g., state school, charity class) in the past? If you have 
more than one child and not all of them were attending school, which children of yours were attending 
school? Why? What type of school were they attending (e.g., state school, charity class, evening 
class)?  
・ If your child(ren) attended more than one school, what was the reason for transferring schools? Have 
you experienced any problem with your child’s school transfer? Can you tell us about your 
experience?  
・ How much per month do you pay for your children’s school/education-related fees?  
・ What do such school/education-related fees include (e.g., tuition fees, exam fees, extra classes, PTA 
fees, lunch fees, contributions to school restorations, textbooks, notebooks and other learning 
materials, school uniforms)? 
・ Who pays for school/education-related fees? Do you receive any financial support (e.g., government 
subsidies, NGOs, relatives, etc.)?  
・ Who in your household makes the decision as to whether and which of your children should go to 
school, and which school they should attend?  
・ What benefits and costs do you see in sending your children to school? Any difference by gender?  
・ How are you involved in your children’s schooling (e.g., helping them with their homework, attending 
PTA meetings)?  
・ How satisfied are you with the school and other forms of education your children are receiving? Why? 




・ How do you think that school education will benefit your children? 
・ What do you expect or wish your children to become in the future?  
 
Children’s Work and Household Chores 
・ What is the amount of your average family expenditure per month?  
・ What is the amount of your average family income per month?  
・ What do you spend the money on?  
・ Who manages the finances in your household?  
・ How and to what extent do your children contribute to the family income?  
・ How and to what extent do you rely on your children for domestic duties and activities? 
 
Social Network and Support System: Availability and Accessibility 
・ What are your immediate concerns or needs in relation to your children?  
・ What kind of problems/issues do you have?  
・ If you have problems or need help in relation to your children, who do you talk to (e.g., friends, family, 
relatives, neighbors, NGOs and other children’s welfare/service-providers, local authorities)? (Multiple 
answers possible.)  
・ When in trouble, how do you help each other?  
・ Have you felt or experienced being discriminated against by community members, neighbors, 
schoolteachers, friends, etc.? If yes, can you tell us about your experience or your feeling?  
・ Have you and your children ever accessed any social services or activities offered by local authorities 
and mass organizations? If yes, can you tell us about your experience? If no, why?  
 
Support from Children’s Welfare and Other Service-Providers 
・ Do you know of any children’s welfare or other service-providers?  
・ If yes, what type of support (e.g., educational, health, nutritional, vocational) do they provide? 
・ How did you find out about their services?  
・ What type of support (e.g., educational, health, nutritional, vocational) do you seek?  
・ On what occasions, and how frequently, do you seek support from the children’s welfare and other 
service-providers?  
・ How well are you satisfied with their support? Why? 
 
Remittances 
・ To whom do you send the money (e.g., immediate family members, relatives or others in the 
countryside)? 
・ How often do you send remittances? 
・ For what purpose(s) do you remit the money?   
・ How do you remit the money (e.g., hand-deliver on your own, ask someone else to hand-deliver, 
send by mail)? 
・ How much on average do you remit per month?  
・ How much on average do you make per month? 
 
Loan Sharks  
・ What is the common term used for loan sharks?  
・ How long is the loan period?  
・ What are their average interest rates? 
・ When was the first time you borrowed money from loan sharks? 
・ Before you started to borrow money from loan sharks, to whom did you turn when you needed some 
extra cash?   
・ If you have borrowed money from loan sharks, how much did you borrow? How did you repay the 
money? What happened if you failed to repay?  
・ Who are the loan sharks, exactly? Are they migrants, too? What are your connections with them? 
(They often are referred to as ban or “friend,” but what is the true nature of the relationship between 




・ If the lender is a ban who is engaged in the same or a similar job in the informal sector as you, the 
migrant borrower, how does s/he manage to lend such an amount of money? 
・ Have you ever lent money to your friends with high interest rates?     
・ How do you define “friends” and “loan sharks,” respectively? For instance how are regular “friends,” 
without any money being involved, and those who lend money at high interest rates different? 
 
Social Relations in Hanoi 
・ Who do you interact with most frequently outside of your immediate family while in Hanoi (e.g., 
neighbors, fellow workers, relatives, people from the same village), and why? 
・ Who do you feel is most trustworthy outside of your immediate family while in Hanoi (e.g., neighbors, 
fellow workers, relatives, people from the same village), and why? 
・ What is the nature of your interactions with different groups of people (e.g., neighbors, fellow workers, 
relatives, people from the same village), and how are the interactions different?  
・ Where are your neighbors and fellow workers originally from? What is their ho khau status (e.g., 
permanent residents, migrants with permanent-residency permits, unregistered migrants)?  
・ Do you have emotional ties to where you now live, and why? 
 
Tinh Cam (“Social Sentiment”) in Urban vs. Rural Settings 
・ On what kinds of occasions do you show and/or feel tinh cam? 
・ How are the manners of expression of tinh cam similar or different in Hanoi and in your home village?  
 
General Perception of Hanoi Life 
・ What is your general perception of living in Hanoi in comparison with your home village? 
・ What is your take on the saying “Giàu nhà quê không bằng ngồi lê thành phố” (“It is better to be poor 
in the city than rich in the village/countryside”)?  
 
  
 
 
 
